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A B S T R A C T
The processing of personal information is omnipresent in our data-
driven society enabling personalized services, which are regulated by
privacy policies. Although privacy policies are strictly defined by the
General Data Protection Regulation (GDPR), no systematic mechanism
is in place to enforce them. Especially if data is merged from several
sources into a data-set with different privacy policies associated, the
management and compliance to all privacy requirements is challeng-
ing during the processing of the data-set. Privacy policies can vary
hereby due to different policies for each source or personalization
of privacy policies by individual users. Thus, the risk for negligent
or malicious processing of personal data due to defiance of privacy
policies exists.
To tackle this challenge, a privacy-preserving framework is pro-
posed. Within this framework privacy policies are expressed in the
proposed Layered Privacy Language (LPL) which allows to specify le-
gal privacy policies and privacy-preserving de-identification methods.
The policies are enforced by a Policy-based De-identification (PD) pro-
cess. The PD process enables efficient compliance to various privacy
policies simultaneously while applying pseudonymization, personal
privacy anonymization and privacy models for de-identification of the
data-set. Thus, the privacy requirements of each individual privacy
policy are enforced filling the gap between legal privacy policies and
their technical enforcement.
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I N T R O D U C T I O N
In day to day life, personal data is collected and processed continu-
ously to provide personalized services easing one’s daily tasks. How-
ever, privacy protection of personal data is a fundamental right re-
quiring that personal data can only be processed for defined purposes
with the consent of the user or on legitimate interest based on a law
[98, Art. 8]. Thus, enforcing personal data protection is essential.
In the context of the processing of personal data by companies, the
privacy policy is the core for expressing and regulating the usage of
one’s data. Assuming that a user registers for a service offered by
a company, a privacy policy about his data has to be agreed upon.
This agreement can hereby include the consent to individual pur-
poses. Only after the agreement of the user, his personal data may be
processed by the company.
Furthermore, data can be transferred from the company to a third
party, e.g., for outsourcing processes or data trading as part of the
business model of the company (see Figure 1.1).
Figure 1.1: Privacy policy scenario for the processing and transfer of personal
data.
The key actors within this privacy policy scenario are the user
agreeing on the privacy policy and the company providing the privacy
policy and processing the personal data. Transfer to a third party,
e.g., another company for B2B business, is optional and lies in the
responsibility of the company and must be agreed upon by the user
through the privacy policy. This simple scenario is applicable for most
situations of life in which personal data is processed, for example daily
activities like shopping, transportation, socializing and connecting
with others, health care, home automation and many more.
1
2 introduction
Both users and companies have their own concerns regarding the
protection of privacy in the context of the processing of personal data.
In the following, those concerns are highlighted and several key issues
are derived which are correlated to privacy policies for both companies
and users. Detailed description of the tackled research questions and
used methodology follow.
1.1 user concerns
From the user’s point of view, privacy should be provided at any
time minimizing the personal data exposure, while the quality and
performance of the service is maintained. In contrast, processing
personal data is common and necessary during various aspects of
daily life, e.g., online shopping, to provide user-centric services. These
contradicting objectives require the regulation via privacy policies,
allowing the user to be informed about the processing of his personal
data while having control over the processing of his personal data.
Thus, the main concerns for the user are the transparency and control
of personal data use while the quality and performance of the service
is maintained, which are illustrated respectively by Scenarios 1, 2 and
3.
Scenario 1: Online shops use their customers’ (users’) personal in-
formation to provide personalized offers and specifically market new
products to target audiences. Furthermore, customers behaviour and
interests are tracked to recommend products they might be interested
in. These services are highly connected, such that the usage of a search
engine looking for a TV series, e.g., ′Game of Thrones ′, is tracked
and shared with other services. This information about the interests of
the user leads to product recommendations for merchandise while us-
ing online shops. The relation of the usage of the search engine of one
company, which derives the users interest, and the recommendation of
merchandise by another company, utilizing the information about the
users’ interest, may not be clear from the point of view of the user. It is
not transparent for the user how the online shop received his personal
data, i.e. interest in ′Game of Thrones ′ for the recommendation of
products.
Such services allow online shops to gain added value through a
potentially increase in their revenue. For users, these services may be
positively or negatively perceived, depending on their personal atti-
tude. This can be perceived positively, adding value to the shopping
experience of the customer because recommended products match
exactly what the user is interested in. Inversely, this may be perceived
as a violation of privacy, because personal information, i.e. interest
in ′Game of Thrones ′ is shared without the known agreement of
the user. This perception may be based on a non-transparent agree-
ment stating the sharing of personal data from the search engine, or
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the online shop not informing the user about reasoning behind the
personalized recommendations. In both cases the user is unable to
reconstruct the agreement sharing this personal data for either the
online shop or the search engine.
Therefore, transparent presentation of privacy policies is a key issue
[110, Art. 13 - 14]. In the above use case the search engine could
express in a clear and concise way that the submitted search terms are
tracked and can be used by third parties for personalized offers. The
online shop could furthermore specify that the user is recommended
specific products based on tracked search terms of the search engine.
Therefore, the flow of personal data as well as its usage would be
more understandable for the user.
Scenario 2: In social networks, privacy issues can be perceived in
a similar way. Users stay in contact with dear friends and family,
get in touch with new individuals or groups, or forge new business
relationships. To enable the full potential of such networks, the user
is encouraged to create a personal profile, including various personal
information on age, gender, education, interests, and profile picture.
Messages, pictures and videos are exchanged to share one’s thoughts
and experiences with others. This sharing of information is the crux
of the matter for users, due to the non-transparent rules and settings
of the social network provider. One cannot be sure that personal
information is only shared with his intended audience nor is aware of
how to change his personal settings. Furthermore, if the information
is shared with third parties, the user has no more control over future
processing of his personal data.
Thus, the user needs a transparent and fine-grained control over his
personal data, such that only specific user groups, e.g., trusted family
and friends, can have access to a specified part of his information. This
includes situations in which personal data is shared to third parties.
Hereby, the user shall have the ability to specify the way how his
personal data is handled. Furthermore, it should be considered that
the default settings for the privacy control protect the user [110, Art.
25], so that only through explicit interaction personal data is shared to
a greater extent [110, Art. 7].
Scenario 3: This concern is even more present when sensitive infor-
mation of users is processed, e.g., personal data on health, religion or
sex. The access to such data should be limited by the usage or purpose.
According to the GDPR, such data has to be treated with special
care [110, Art. 9] Assuming the user had a severe car accident and
is treated by the first responders, the emergency physicians require
information for fast and effective treatment of the user to save his life.
For example, the blood type for transfusions or possible information
about allergies or incompatible medication. Such information should
only be accessible to the emergency physician in case of such an
accident scenario, otherwise a treating physician, or anybody else, has
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no reason to access the personal information.
Those concerns are publicly known, discussed and can be mitigated
by the user with additional effort. Users can directly influence the pri-
vacy of their personal data by the choice of alternative privacy-friendly
services, e.g., search engines, private modes in web-browsers prevent-
ing tracking [209] [210], or due to detailed engagement with privacy
settings of a service. But, this requires users to actively decide and
search for privacy-friendly alternatives and settings, thus requiring
additional effort. Despite privacy being a concern for many people,
only few actually act to preserve their privacy [256]. This phenomenon,
in which users express privacy concerns but do not act accordingly,
is denoted as Privacy Paradox [246] [26] [143] [24]. For example, it has
been shown that users, despite being sufficiently familiar with tech-
nology, claim to be concerned about privacy are not willing to invest
time, effort or money to protect their privacy [25]. This unwillingness
of the users has to be considered for the design of privacy solutions,
which should be easy to use.
Thus, the user has several concerns. First, the user has to be in-
formed about the processing of his personal data in a transparent
way. Second, the user has to have control over the processing of his
personal data for different purposes even when data is transferred or
traded to third parties. Third, the control over the processing of his
personal data has to be designed in an easy and accessible way. The
user should be able to personally decide on a trade-off between his
privacy and the functionality of the service.
1.2 company concerns
From a company point of view, the personal data of their users is a
valuable asset, which is essential for many business models. However,
if a privacy incident, i.e. data breach, happens then the reputation
of the company can be affected. A survey showed that before a data
breach happens users typically only discuss the perceived quality of
the product or service. But after a data breach occurred also other
aspects of the companies reputation are payed attention to, i.e. the
customer orientation or performance of the corporate [70]. Thus, the
companies reputation can be affected by privacy incidents, which
changes the users’ perception of the company.
Besides, companies are also enforced by law to protect users’ privacy.
In fact, within the European Union (EU), the General Data Protection
Regulation 2016/679 (GDPR) entered into force on 25th May 2018 [110,
Art. 99 (2)]. This legal framework is designed to standardise privacy
laws for all member states of the EU, to protect and empower citizens’
privacy, and to revise how companies approach data privacy. The
principles Privacy by Design and Privacy by Default, as well as the
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introduction and strengthening of Data Subject Rights, the rights a user
has, are hereby most noticeable.
Privacy by Design, an already existing concept adopted by the GDPR,
denotes that all technical systems have to include at design time
appropriate technical and organisational measures to preserve privacy
[110, Art. 25 (1)].
Furthermore, Privacy by Default denotes that technical systems have
to provide the users with privacy-friendly settings. Therefore, by
default only necessary personal data shall be processed for a purpose.
This includes that no pre-emptive data collection for future processing
shall be conducted, that personal data processing is limited to the
scope of the intended purpose, and the transfer of data is limited by
default and can only be extended with prior intervention of the user
[110, Art. 25 (2)]. Thus, the users’ privacy is protected by default in
the best way possible and requires no further interaction or effort by
the user.
Both Privacy by Design and Privacy by Default motivate strict regula-
tions and restrictions on companies processing personal data. Before
personal data can be processed, the company has to present the pri-
vacy policy to the user, expressing which personal data is processed
for which purpose, and the user has to agree to it. Hereby, purposes
must have a legal basis or have to be explicitly consented to by the
user. Consent has to be given freely and informed to be valid [110,
Art. 7]. Examples for invalid consent violating the freely condition
would be pre-ticked boxes or assumed consent due to inactivity of
the user [110, Recital 32]. The term informed indicates that the user
should know about the contents of the privacy policy to a certain
degree, but no further details are given for this legal requirement in
the GDPR. In practice, consent is usually given by ticking a check-box.
This individual choice of users has to be taken into account for the
processing of personal data, while the user shall remain in control
over the processing of his personal data such that his decision can be
altered at any time, e.g., revocation of consent for a specific purpose.
Thus for each user, individual consent decisions have to be managed
and differentiated during processing in an efficient way.
If a privacy policy is agreed upon, the users’ rights are strengthened
by the GDPR. These rights grant the user the power to request detailed
information from the company about the processing of their personal
data [110, Art. 15]. Other rights enable the user to control or restrict the
processing of his personal data. This includes the Right to be Forgotten
(or Right to Erasure) [110, Art. 17], and the Right to Object the processing
of personal data at any time [110, Art. 21]. Furthermore, the Right to
Data Portability, introduced as a novelty, allows the user under specific
prerequisites to receive a copy of all his personal data or let the data
be transferred from one company to another. The latter is neither
restricted to specific domains nor limited to companies of a specific
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size. The strengthening of user rights puts companies in a strong
responsibility processing personal data under the legal framework
of the GDPR. Fines for the violation of the GDPR can be set up to
20.000.000 EUR or up to 4% of the total worldwide annual turnover of
the preceding financial year, whichever is higher [110, Art. 83].
This poses the obligation to answer Data Subject Right requests. This
can be quite challenging, e.g., considering a user who requests all
his personal data that is processed within a company including their
corresponding purposes, or a user who requests the deletion of his
personal data. This requires the identification of the individual and the
association of his personal data within the company, which becomes
more complex with heterogeneous services and increasing size of the
company due to diverse allocation of personal data.
Thus, efficient fine-grained control over the enforcement of the
policy has to be considered throughout business processes to preserve
privacy and minimize the required overhead. This affects not only
global companies but each legal entity processing personal data, e.g.,
(voluntary) clubs, public services, self-employers, start-up companies,
putting additional stress on them.
Lastly, when a company intends to process vast amounts of personal
data for a specific purpose, it has to consider the privacy policies
of each individual. Due to data collection from different sources,
e.g., web-services, with varying privacy policies, a differentiation
between policies has to be made during the processing of personal
data. This issue increases in complexity even further, if previously
introduced personalized privacy policies are assumed, such that even
for the same service various policies exist. A manual differentiation
and determination of a unified privacy level for a specific processing
purpose is hereby not feasible if a high volume of personal data with
corresponding policies has to be processed. Therefore, scalable and
efficient determination of a unified privacy level based upon various
privacy policies is desirable.
Once a policy has been determined, the processing of personal
data should be conducted in a privacy-preserving way, such such
that individuals’ privacy requirements are satisfied. To enable privacy-
preserving processing, various de-identification methods have been
proposed including the application of pseudonymization methods,
anonymization methods and privacy models. A privacy model hereby
defines properties of a data-set to prevent re-identification of an indi-
vidual. But various privacy models exist with different properties for
different use cases, such that the selection of the appropriate method
requires extensive expert knowledge and time-consuming manual
interaction. Therefore, an efficient process considering privacy policies
on-the-fly during the processing of high volume of personal data is a
challenge for a company.
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The application of de-identification methods on a data-set alters
it and usually reduces the overall quality of the resulting data-set.
To allow the company to reliably process personal data to derive
meaningful results, the quality reduction must be limited in a way that
it remains usable for the intended purpose, e.g., billing. Otherwise, to
introduce an example ad absurdum, a user could define that his bank
account must not be processed by an online shop after he received the
order preventing the payment deduction from his account. Therefore, a
dialectic approach has to be implemented to define a balance between
the privacy requirements of the user and the processing requirements
of the company.
Privacy should not hinder business processes but be integrated to
protect individuals while their personal data is processed in a trusted
way.
1.3 key issues
Privacy has many facets which have to be considered for supporting
a holistic management approach. The user, as the source of personal
data, expresses his concerns about his personal data processing. But
as detailed by the Privacy Paradox, users are, generally speaking, not
willing to put additional effort into the protection of their privacy.
Thus, they have to be protected by default which is realized in the EU
by the legal framework GDPR.
This protection comprises transparent information on the processing
of the personal data and control due to strengthened rights, which
are expressed and regulated within the privacy policy. Both trans-
parency and control over the processing of personal data are the main
challenges. Transparency is a challenging task as privacy policies are
commonly presented as legal text which makes them hard to compre-
hend and hard to be consulted by the user. To enable transparency,
privacy languages have not only to be machine-readable but also
human-readable. The second issue is how to efficiently enforce the
users’ control over personal data. Besides legal policies express the
handling of personal data, no technical measures for preserving pri-
vacy are directly bound to such policies. Therefore, the user can only
trust the company to process the personal data only for the defined
purposes. But this is also an issue for companies, which intend to
comply with the legal framework for which they are responsible. The
processing of personal data according to the privacy policy is hereby
a core challenge which has further aspects to be considered. Efficient
processing of personal data is essential for companies. On the one
hand, this requires the preservation of privacy according to the agreed
on privacy policies of individuals. On the other hand, the utility of the
data-set has to be preserved such that the data is still useful for the
intended purpose. Thus, a trade-off between privacy and utility has
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to be considered. Moreover, user requests regarding their Data Subject
Rights have to be supported by technical means to support the data
protection officer in his task.
The gap between legal requirements and their technical realization
using privacy-preserving technologies is due to the lack of a machine-
readable representation of privacy policies. The goal of this thesis is to
formalize privacy policies in machine-readable format integrating legal
requirements of the GDPR and privacy-preserving technologies and
to enable the enforcement of efficient policy-based and user-guided
processing of personal data.
1.4 research questions
To reach the goal of this thesis, the research questions (RQ) are stated
in the following. Furthermore, the respective research approaches are
detailed in the following.
RQ1 How to represent legal privacy policies in a machine-readable
format which complies to the legal requirements of the General
Data Protection Regulation in the EU while privacy guarantees
are defined?
The first research questions RQ1 requires a holistic understanding
of privacy in the context of the legal framework of the GDPR as well as
de-identification methods, used to preserve privacy, from the computer
science domain. Therefore, a set of requirements is derived from both
domains with the goal to express machine-readable privacy policies
taking into account the concerns of users as well as the personal data
processing companies.
From a legal point of view, the required contents and representa-
tion as well as the overall structural composition of a privacy policy
are considered. But also privacy policy related concepts have to be
considered, e.g., Privacy by Design, Data Subject Rights, and Consent.
For example the differentiation between purposes based on consent or
legitimate interest has to be considered within the privacy language to
enable appropriate consent management. But also the transparent and
human-readable presentation of the privacy policy has to be supported
while consent negotiation is enabled.
From a privacy-preserving point of view, appropriate methods have
to be identified that enable the preservation of privacy and can be
used to define privacy guarantees in the context of a privacy policy.
The appropriate privacy-preserving methods shall hereby provide the
user with a fine-grained control over the access as well as the privacy
of his personal data through the personalization of the privacy policy.
Furthermore, this shall enable companies processing the personal data
of several users to efficiently determine and apply the required privacy-
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preserving methods while their own requirements for processing
personal data are met.
To answer RQ1, a set of requirements for a privacy language rep-
resenting privacy policies is derived. Related privacy languages are
evaluated against those requirements to identify a research gap in the
expression of privacy guarantees with de-identification methods in
privacy languages. Based on the derived requirements, the reasoning
for the Layered Privacy Language (LPL) and its formalization is detailed
. Furthermore, LPL is qualitatively evaluated according to the given
requirements including the discussion of prototype implementations.
With the definition of a privacy language that fulfils the require-
ments of RQ1, a personal privacy policy can be assumed for each
user that details the individuals’ privacy requirements. Therefore, the
conditions under which personal data can be processed can vary for
each user. Considering a data-warehouse that sources its data from
various sources, the policies for processing the data can also vary. This
has to be taken into account before processing a data-set, such that the
individuals’ privacy is preserved while the data can be processed in a
meaningful way by the company. Thus, the second research requestion
is:
RQ2 How can machine-readable privacy policies, expressing privacy-
preserving methods, be utilized to efficiently preserve the pri-
vacy of individuals when a set of users’ personal data is re-
quested for processing?
Enabling privacy of individual users while their personal data is
processed by companies is the core of the second research question
RQ2. Assuming a data-warehouse scenario in which personalized pri-
vacy policies are stored for individual users alongside their personal
data, the de-identification of the requested data has to be conducted
for each request due to varying combinations of data records with
their corresponding privacy policies. The personal privacy policies
may vary hereby regarding the consented purposes or defined de-
identification methods, which may be introduced by the individuals’
privacy requirements. These individual privacy requirements can be
altered at any time due to the control of the user which results in dy-
namic privacy requirements over time which have to be reconsidered
for each processing of personal data.
Furthermore, the interplay of the de-identification methods has to
be considered, because they alter the original values and therefore
affect the quality of the requested data-set. Thus, the de-identification
process chain has to be carefully crafted considering the properties
of the de-identification methods. The automatic determination of
appropriate de-identification methods from various privacy policies,
iff different methods are defined, is additionally subject to research
and has to be integrated within the process chain.
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The processing of possibly millions or billions of privacy policies
introduces additional overhead compared to the sole application of
de-identification methods, because privacy requirements have to be
derived from the set of personalized privacy policies. The efficiency
of this de-identification process chain is quantitatively evaluated. The
evaluation includes a detailed run-time performance analysis and
how the data-set as well as the privacy policies affect the run-time.
Moreover, the impact of personalization of policies by users on the
de-identification process is quantified.
To answer RQ2, the Policy-based De-identification (PD) process is in-
troduced, which combines and integrates pseudonymization, personal
privacy anonymization, and privacy models, using LPL as a basis. Fur-
thermore, the process is evaluated in detail with a focus on efficiency
both with and without the introduction of personal privacy policies.
1.5 key contributions
The key contributions of this thesis include the proposal of the Lay-
ered Privacy Language (LPL) (see Chapter 5) and the Policy-based De-
identification (PD) process (see Chapter 6).
LPL models privacy policies while it incorporates various require-
ments detailed in Chapter 2 – R1 Privacy Policy Structure, R2 Legal
Compliance, R3 Human-readability, R4 Access Control, R5 De-identification
Capabilities, and R6 Provenance. Although some of these requirements
have been addressed by related works (see Chapter 4), they have not
been brought together in one privacy language. Especially, the fulfil-
ment of the requirement R5 De-identification Capabilities is emphasized
in LPL, allowing the definition of anonymization and pseudonymiza-
tion methods as well as privacy models. The inclusion of such methods
within privacy languages has been understudied in related works, al-
though they are a valuable asset in the definition of privacy that
extends classical approaches for privacy languages based on access
control. In addition, a personalized LPL instance is intended for each
user, which allows the distinction of personalized privacy settings,
i.e. each user can decide for which purpose what data is processed
by whom with which de-identification settings. Combined with the
fulfilment of the remaining requirements, LPL is able to represent pri-
vacy policies compliant to the GDPR that are intended to be presented
to the user, enable provenance, and facilitate the privacy-preserving
processing of personal data due to access control and de-identification.
Thus, LPL is intended as a holistic approach to model, present and
process privacy policies.
The second main contribution – the PD process – demonstrates how
various distinct (personalized) LPL privacy policies can be used to effi-
ciently determine and apply the de-identification methods applied on
the data-set while the individuals’ privacy settings are guaranteed (see
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Chapter 6). This challenge is detailed according to a data-warehouse
scenario in which personal data from various sources, i.e. with various
LPL privacy policy settings, are combined and requested for being pro-
cessed for a specific purpose. Therefore, two main challenges had to
be overcome: First, the sequence of methods applied for pseudonymi-
zation, personal privacy anonymization, and privacy models has to be
set to guarantee privacy while the data quality is preserved as best as
possible. Second, various different LPL privacy policies have to be ac-
counted to during the PD process, thus for each of the de-identification
methods – pseudonymization, personal privacy anonymization, and
privacy models – algorithms are proposed to identify and apply the
respective de-identification methods while the requirements of all LPL
policies are fulfilled. In addition, two distinct algorithms – Minimum
Anonymization (MA) and Global Minimum Anonymization (GMA) – are
proposed to realize personal privacy anonymization. Compared to the
isolated usage of de-identification methods for specific use cases in the
literature, the PD process highlights how de-identification methods
can be combined in an approach to fulfil personal privacy require-
ments as well as preserve the privacy of a whole data-set based on
personalized LPL privacy policies. Furthermore, it is shown that the
core-algorithms of the PD process add a relative minor run-time over-
head compared to the usage of privacy models, thus are efficient. In
addition, the usage of the GMA algorithm in combination with privacy
models demonstrates that the baseline run-time of privacy models can
be significantly undercut in a scenario using personal privacy settings
(see Chapter 7).
1.6 organization of the thesis
The remaining of the thesis is structured as follows: In the following
Chapter 2, requirements for a privacy language that expresses privacy
policies are derived. Chapter 3 details background information on
the de-identification methodology that is considered throughout the
thesis. Related work is detailed in Chapter 4 classifying related privacy
languages according to the requirements for a privacy language in
Chapter 2 showing a research gap. Furthermore, the approach of this
thesis is positioned according to related works. Chapter 5 details the
reasoning of the Layered Privacy Language and formalizes the proposed
privacy language. Additionally, the fulfilment of the requirements
for a privacy language by LPL is detailed and discussed. The Policy-
based De-identification (PD) process is detailed in Chapter 6 based on
a data-warehouse scenario. The evaluation of the run-time efficiency
of the PD process and the impact of personal privacy settings on the
run-time of the PD process are detailed and discussed in Chapter 7
for which a suitable test framework is introduced. Lastly, the work is
concluded and an outlook for future work is given in Chapter 8.

2
P R I VA C Y L A N G UA G E R E Q U I R E M E N T S
This chapter details the requirements for a privacy language that
expresses privacy policies. In the following, a set of requirements
for a GDPR-compliant privacy language is derived, which enables
privacy-preserving processing of personal data based Gerl et al. [121].
A privacy language can be denoted as a specialization of a domain
specific language (DSL) in the context of privacy. Privacy itself is a
complex and vast field, which is not only tackled in computer sci-
ence but also in social and legal sciences. Several aspects have to be
considered for a privacy language that represents and enforces legal
privacy policies. On the one hand, the legal view on privacy, i.e. the
GDPR [110], has to be considered to comply with the current legal
privacy framework in Europe. On the other hand, available technolo-
gies and methods to realize privacy, i.e. give privacy guarantees, have
to be considered. Therefore, a set of requirements – R1 Privacy Policy
Structure, R2 Legal Compliance, R3 Human-readability, R4 Access Control,
R5 De-identification Capabilities, and R6 Provenance – is defined and
detailed in the following.
2.1 privacy policy structure
The first requirement for a privacy language that represents privacy
policies is denoted as:
R1 The base structure of a policy language has to
match the structure of legal privacy policies.
Hereby, a legal privacy policy defines, at its core, purposes for which
personal data is processed. Furthermore, it is specified from which
entity the personal data originates and by which entity the personal
data is processed. It has to be noted that, legally, privacy policies are
voluntary regulations that a company follows, while a privacy notice,
i.e., Art. 12 - 14 [110], is required by all companies processing personal
data and can be embedded in privacy policy. For simplicity the terms
’privacy policy’ and ’privacy notice’ are considered to define the same
in the remaining of this work.
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Thus, the following core elements can be defined for a privacy
policy:
• Privacy Policy: Denotes all purposes of processing of personal
data of an individual.
• Data Source: The individual from which the personal data orig-
inates.
• Data Recipient: The entity which processes the personal data.
• Purpose: Denotes the reason and extent of the processing of
personal data.
• Data: Denotes the personal data that is subject to processing.
Therefore, a Privacy Policy denotes the processing of personal Data
of a Data Source for Purposes by Data Recipients (see Figure 2.1). Thus,
a privacy policy regulates what personal information is processed by
whom for which reason.
Figure 2.1: Core structure and elements of a privacy policy.
This core structure of a privacy policy is not only specific to the
GDPR, but a generic description of privacy rules based upon the upon
the individuals’ perception of privacy. Privacy is perceived by indi-
viduals as a time and space in which they can be autonomous and
have a limited and protected communication [274]. Hereby, privacy
is interpreted as the dynamic process which gives or limits access
to (personal) information with the goal to achieve balance between
actual and desired privacy [13]. This interpretation of privacy has been
extended by Petronio [211] with its Communication Privacy Management
(CPM) theory. The CPM theory states that privacy is a range of com-
plete openness to complete closeness, which is regulated by people via
a dialectic approach. Initially personal information is owned by the
individual (data source) itself, but it can be shared and distributed to
others (data recipients) such that the ownership is distributed to many
[211] [212]. If ones’ privacy is violated, then corresponding privacy
rules are adopted by the individual, e.g., information is no longer
shared with specific individuals [67] [68]. Therefore, core elements of
a privacy policy can be matched to the perceived privacy according to
the CPM theory.
Legal frameworks follow similar definitions of privacy. The GDPR
denotes the structure of privacy policies in Art. 12 - 14 [110] and
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uses similar legal terms, i.e. Data Subject [110, Art. 4(1)], Purpose of
Processing [110, Art. 5], Personal Data [110, Art. 4(1)] and Recipient
[110, Art. 4(9)]. The purpose-based approach is hereby one of the
core principals of the GDPR for the processing of personal data [110,
Art. 5(2)]. Hereby, the Controller [110, Art. 4(7)] is responsible and
accountable for the processing of personal data. The generic notation
of the previously introduced core structure of a privacy policy slightly
deviates from the notation of the GDPR to indicate its compatibility
with other legal frameworks. Comparable approaches can be found
in other legal frameworks, e.g., in the Health Insurance Portability and
Accountability Act (HIPAA) [71] [219] which denotes national standards
for the protection of health information. The HIPAA covers health plans
and health care providers in the USA. Furthermore, the California
Consumer Privacy Act (CCPA) [63] follows several principles of the
GDPR and intends to strengthen the privacy rights of individuals.
Unlike the HIPAA, the CCPA applies to all businesses that collect
personal data. Its key aspects are, that individuals are informed about
the collection of personal data and personal data trading including
the right to refuse the sale of personal data. Furthermore, individuals
have the right to access their personal data.
Therefore, the detailed core structure of privacy policies follows both
the individuals’ perception of privacy as well as the legal requirements
of the GDPR for privacy policies, but should also be applicable for
other legal frameworks.
2.2 legal compliance
The next requirement for privacy languages that express privacy poli-
cies is:
R2 A privacy language has to comply with the in-
tended legal framework.
Considering the scope of the thesis, the creation of a privacy lan-
guage that complies with the legal framework of the GDPR is the
goal. The GDPR denotes Data Subject Rights in its third chapter, which
information has to be provided to the Data Subject. Furthermore, it
details the different rights of the Data Subject. In the following, this
chapter of the GDPR is analysed and several requirements for privacy
languages are derived.
2.2.1 Information to be Provided
General provisions are defined in Art. 12 GDPR, which enable the
Data Subject to exercise his rights [110, Art. 12]. Furthermore, Art. 13
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denotes the information that has to be provided to the Data Subject
iff his data is collected [110, Art. 13]. Similarly structured is Art. 14
GDPR, denoting the information that has to be provided iff personal
data is not collected directly from the individual, e.g. personal data is
collected by a third party [110, Art. 14]. Although none of the above
explicitly denotes privacy policies as the instrument to fulfil the legal
requirements, in practice privacy policies are the de-facto standard for
it. In the following, relevant legal requirements are denoted (see Table
2.1) which are derived from Art. 12 - 14 of theGDPR by an in detail
analysis of Gerl and Pohl [119].
First, it is stated that the information provided to the Data Subject
for both the privacy policy, but also the later detailed Data Subject
Rights [110, Art. 15 - 22], have to be provided in an easy and plain
language; this is especially important for children [110, Art.12 (1)
Sentence 1]. Furthermore, the privacy policy can be provided in a
written or electronic form, but an oral presentation of the information
is also considered [110, Art.12 (1) Sentence 2].
Unless the Controller is not able to identify the Data Subject, the Data
Subject Rights have to be implemented [110, Art. 12 (2)]. Further details
on a required response time [110, Art. 12 (3)] and the protection of the
Controller from excessive requests [110, Art. 12 (5)] are given.
Lastly, Art. 12 denotes that the information, which has to be pro-
vided according to the Art. 13 and 14 requirements, can be provided in
combination with standardised icons. Those Privacy Icons shall hereby
provide an overview over the intended processing. Iff they are pro-
vided electronically, they should be machine-readable [110, Art. 12
(7)].
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Table 2.1: Legal requirements of information to be provided by privacy poli-
cies according to Art. 12 - 14 [110, Art. 12 - 14] [119].
GDPR
Article Requirement
Art. 12(1) Sentence 1 Clear and Plain Language
Art. 12(1) Sentence 2 Written or Electronic Information
Art. 12(2) Data Subject Rights Realization
Art. 12(7) Standardised Icons
Art. 13(1)(a), Art. 14(1)(a) Contact Details of Controller
Art. 13(1)(b), Art. 14(1)(b)
Contact Details of
Data Protection Officer (DPO)
Art. 13(1)(c), Art. 14(1)(c) Purpose and Legal Basis
Art. 13(1)(d), Art. 14(2)(b) Legitimate Interest
Art. 14(1)(d) Categories of Personal Data
Art. 13(1)(e), Art. 14(1)(e) Recipients of Personal Data
Art. 13(1)(f), Art. 14(1)(f) Third Country Transfer
Art. 13(2)(a), Art. 14(2)(a) Storage Period
Art. 13(2)(b), Art. 14(2)(c) Information: Data Subject Rights
Art. 13(2)(c). Art. 14(2)(d) Information: Withdraw Consent
Art. 13(2)(d), Art. 14(2)(e) Information: Lodge a Complaint
Art. 13(2)(e) Information: Required Data
Art. 14(2)(f) Source of Personal Data
Art. 13(2)(f), Art. 14(2)(g) Automated Decision-Making
Due to the similar structure and content of Art. 13 and Art. 14
requirements can be described combined in the following. The privacy
policy shall provide the identity and contact details of the Controller
(or several if Joint Controllers [110, Art. 26]) [110, Art. 13 (1)(a), Art. 14
(1)(a)] and the responsible Data Protection Officer (DPO) [110, Art. 13
(1)(b), Art. 14 (1)(b)] have to be provided.
The Purposes of Processing and their legal basis have to be given [110,
Art. 13 (1)(c), Art. 14 (2)(c)], whereas the legitimate interests have to
be defined if pursued by the Controller or a third party [110, Art. 13
(1)(d), Art. 14 (2)(b)]. Furthermore, the Data Subject has to be informed
about the data categories of his collected personal data [110, Art. 14
(1)(d)]. Additionally, the Recipients of such data [110, Art. 13 (1)(e), Art.
14 (1)(e)] have to be stated. Iff data is transferred to a Third Country,
a country which does not fall under the legislation of the GDPR, the
destination of the transfer as well as implemented Safeguards to ensure
protection have to be made transparent [110, Art. 13 (1)(f), Art. 14
(1)(f)]. The duration of the storage of personal data has to be provided,
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i.e. when personal data is deleted [110, Art. 13(2)(a), Art. 14(2)(a)]. The
Data Subject has to be further provided with information on his right to
conduct Data Subject Rights [110, Art. 13(2)(b), Art. 14(2)(c)], withdraw
Consent [110, Art. 13(2)(c), Art. 14(2)(d)], and lodge a complaint [110,
Art. 13(2)(d), Art. 14(2)(e)]. Furthermore, the Data Subject has to be
informed about whether or not the provision of personal data is
required for the purpose [110, Art. 13(2)(e)]. The source of personal
data has to be defined whereas it has to be denoted if this source is
publicly available [110, Art. 14(2)(f)]. Lastly, the Data Subject has to
be informed if automated decision-making is performed [110, Art.
13(2)(f), Art. 14(2)(g)].
Thus, a wide variety of information has to be encapsulated within
the privacy policy to inform the Data Subject about the processing
of his personal data. A privacy language, which intends to comply
with GDPR, has therefore to consider and model several complex
requirements (see Table 2.1). Furthermore, the implementation of Data
Subject Rights has to be considered because their fulfilment can be
supported by information that corresponds to the already detailed
information required by Art. 12 - 14 GDPR.
2.2.2 Data Subject Rights
Data Subject Rights are intended to empower the Data Subject to be in
control of the usage of his personal data. Although Data Subject Rights
should rather be seen as processes and therefore do not explicitly have
impact on a privacy language, they should also be considered due to
their dependency to the previously defined requirements.
For example, the Right of Access by the Data Subject denotes that the
Data Subject has the right to receive the information if his personal
data is processed by the Controller. If this is the case, the Data Subject
shall be granted access to the personal data as well as additional
information, e.g., Purposes of Processing, categories of personal data,
Recipients, or the information to the right to lodge a complaint. The
information shall be provided as a copy or by electronic means in a
commonly used electronic form [110, Art. 15]. It can be observed, that
the required information that has to be provided to the Data Subject is
also postulated by Art. 13 and 14 of the GDPR. A privacy language
containing all this information also contains personal data on the Data
Subject. Therefore, for each Data Subject, an instance of the privacy
language, i.e. personal privacy policy, is correlated. Furthermore, the
privacy language can be queried to fulfil the Data Subject Right request.
Because, the privacy policies contain personal data, it has to be ensured
that the requesting entity has to be identified beforehand to authorize
access to his personal data, otherwise private information may be
inferred.
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Table 2.2: Overview of Data Subject Rights of Art. 15 - 22 GDPR [110, Art. 15 -
22].
Article Data Subject Right
Art. 15 Right of Access by the Data Subject
Art. 16 Right to Rectification
Art. 17 Right to Erasure
Art. 18 Right to Restriction of Processing
Art. 19 Notification Obligation
Art. 20 Right to Data Portability
Art. 21 Right to Object
Art. 22 Automated Individual Decision-making
The creation of adequate processes is hereby not trivial, although it
might seem so for the Right of Access by the Data Subject, as other rights
require a deeper integration into business processes of the Controller,
e.g., the Right to Restriction of Processing [110, Art. 18], or even some
standardization between Controllers, e.g., the Right to Data Portability
[110, Art. 20]. An overview over all Data Subject Rights is given in Table
2.2, which should be considered for the design of a privacy language
to enable or at least facilitate their implementation.
2.3 human-readability
Privacy languages, commonly designed to be machine-readable, that
intend to represent privacy policies require to be understandable by
common users [120]. This is not only required by the GDPR [110, Art.
12], but is a general concern to close the gap between the expression
of policy statements and their enforcement. Otherwise, additional
processes have to be put into place to synchronize the human-readable
privacy policy with the enforcing privacy language, e.g., for updates
in the privacy policy, introducing overhead and error-proneness. Thus,
it can be concluded that systematic usage of privacy languages for
privacy policies has the requirement:
R3 A privacy language has to be human-readable.
Several aspects related to the term ’human-readable’ are considered
essential for a privacy language, representing both the textual repre-
sentation of the privacy policy as well as the usage of pictograms for
visual stimuli, namely Privacy Icons.
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2.3.1 Textual Representation
The textual representation of the privacy policy shall facilitate the user
to understand its contents. Therefore, it is necessary that the privacy
language incorporates the possibility to define human-readable text.
But this shall not only be done by a unique occurrence, e.g., adding
one text element for representing the whole policy, but thoughtfully
integrated within required elements of the privacy language. In other
words, several elements of the privacy language should have human-
readable texts such that not only the texts themselves but also the struc-
ture of the privacy language improve the understandability. Therefore,
the privacy language structure shall be enhanced by several human-
readable texts. Additionally, internationalization is a concern and has
to be tackled, such that several human languages can be supported.
The key intention for providing human-readable text within the
privacy language is transparency and understandability, which has in
the context of privacy policies several facets. Bertino et al. [36] denote
five key dimensions:
• Record Transparency: The user has to be informed about all aspects
of the collection of personal data, e.g., what data is collected and
by whom.
• Use Transparency: The user has to be informed about the usage
of his data, including the purpose and recipients of data, and
applications processing the data.
• Disclosure and Data Provisioning Transparency: The user has to be
informed about the transfer of his data to other entities, e.g.,
companies, and the terms of the transfer. Therefore, it has to be
communicated if the data is sold and what mechanisms are used
for the transfer of data, e.g., an encrypted connection.
• Algorithm Transparency: The user has to be informed about the al-
gorithms processing his personal data for, e.g., recommendations
or automated decisions.
• Law and Policy Transparency: The user has to be informed about
the available laws and regulations applicable to his personal
data.
This complex topic is also subject of the GDPR, which covers various
aspects as detailed before [110, Art. 12 - 14].
Furthermore, Article 29 Working Party recommends the usage of the
Layered approach in digital environments to ensure transparency for
the Data Subject (see Figure 2.2). This approach is intended to provide
the user with several linked layers of information, instead of providing
all information at once, trying to avoid to overwhelm the Data Subject
[18]. This shall make privacy information more accessible. The first
2.3 human-readability 21
layer can hereby provide concise information on the key elements of
the privacy policy, e.g., the purposes of the processing. Furthermore,
the first layer should focus on information that could surprise the
user or has the most impact on the processing of the personal data.
Therefore, the most important information for the user is presented in
the first layer. The second layer on the other hand, would give more
details on specific elements, whcih have lesser importance for the
user, to cover all legal requirements of Art. 13 and 14 [124] [99]. This
approach is not a novelty within the context of GDPR, but has been
already proposed alongside other recommendations for the design of
privacy policies [65] [190].
Figure 2.2: Visualization of the Layered approach as proposed by the Article
29 Working Party [18] [124].
2.3.2 Privacy Icons
Next to textual representation of the required information, also stan-
dardised icons are considered by the GDPR for transparency [110, Art.
12(7)]. They are intended to give the Data Subject an overview on the
processing of his personal data. Furthermore, privacy icons have to
be machine-readable. A privacy language should hereby enable the
usage of privacy icons or incorporate them as detailed by Gerl [112].
Currently, no privacy icon set is officially standardised for the GDPR,
but several approaches have been proposed. The ’official’ proposal of
privacy icons has been evaluated with a negative result, showing that
they are not suitable for broad public use [213]. But other privacy icon
sets have been proposed, e.g., DaPIS [234], Privacy Icons Project from
Mozilla [189], or Iconset for Data-Privacy Declarations [183]. Furthermore,
methodologies have been proposed to develop privacy icons [206]
[233]. For the design of privacy icons, or privacy policies in general,
the target user group has to be considered. Therefore, dedicated design
decisions have to be taken for each of the user groups, e.g., children
[84].
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Because no standardised set of privacy icons is given yet, showing
that the design of such icons is not trivial, no detailed requirement for
the incorporation of privacy icons in privacy languages can be given.
It can be noted though, that privacy icons should give an overview
over the processing of personal data for transparency purposes.
2.4 access control
Considering the before mentioned Communication Privacy Management
(CPM) theory, which states that privacy is perceived as a range from
complete openness to complete closeness [211], mechanisms for con-
trolling who has access to personal data have to be incorporated in a
privacy language. Access control mechanisms allow exactly this, thus
the requirement states that:
R4 A privacy language has to enable purpose-based
access control.
A privacy language should hereby consider both the source, e.g., a
user, and the recipient, e.g., a company, as identifiable entities. The
data flow should be hereby controllable between any combinations
of such entities, e.g., user and company, user and user, or company
and company. Furthermore, access to personal data should be pur-
pose specific, e.g., a company can use the phone-number of Bob for
emergency contacts but not for advertisement.
Therefore, fine-grained access control is required for authenticating
and authorizing the requesting entity to access personal data. Similar
problem statements have been worked on various other domains,
e.g., privacy policies for mobile devices [59], access control in cloud
[236] and IoT [103] [278] environments. GDPR requires a purpose-
based processing of personal information [110], thus a differentiation
is necessary. This has been addressed for relational databases [62].
Especially in the domain of health care, in which very sensitive and
private information is stored and processed, purpose-based access
control mechanisms are required. Therefore, hippocratic database
systems have been proposed [9] [39], which goal is to enable privacy
[122]. Privacy meta-data, which could be expressed using a privacy
language, is hereby utilized to strengthen the access constraints to the
data [7].
2.5 de-identification capabilities
Next to access control mechanism, privacy can be guaranteed by
de-identification methods. De-identification hereby relates to the alter-
ation of data in such a way that the corresponding individual cannot be
2.6 provenance 23
identified. Considering the Communication Privacy Management (CPM)
theory [211] again, the de-identification of data allows the Data Subject
to define in a fine-grained manner the condition of the information
that is shared with others. For example Bob can specify that his friends
know his exact address, while his colleagues know only the city he
lives in. Therefore, partial reduction of information can be achieved.
Thus, the requirement states that:
R5 A privacy language has to define de-identification
methods.
De-identification can be achieved by two basic approaches, anony-
mization and pseudonymization.
• Pseudonymization replaces the original value with a pseudonym,
which can be related or unrelated to the original value, for later
authorized re-identification [196] [217] [216] [95] [201].
• Anonymization hides the information of the original value to a
certain degree to preserve its semantic, so that on the one hand
the privacy of the individual is preserved and on the other hand
the information is still useful, e.g., for data mining [226] [181]
[57] [283].
GDPR mentions pseudonymization as a viable method for securing
the processing of personal data, but it does not restrict the usage of
other methods [110, Art. 4 (5), Art. 32, Recital 28]. Furthermore, it is
noteworthy that Pseudonymization according to GDPR specifies that
personal data is processed that is no longer associated with the indi-
vidual [110, Art. 4 (5)], which can be both achieved by anonymization
and pseudonymization as defined before. Real anonymization (no risk
or re-identification) of personal data is questioned due to the various
sources of publicly available data that can be utilized to identify indi-
viduals [271]. But, several advanced methods have been based upon
anonymization and pseudonymization, which offer various properties
to express privacy, limit the risk of re-identification, and are used in
practice. A background on relevant de-identification methods and
concepts is detailed in Chapter 3.
2.6 provenance
When data is transferred to other Controllers the origin, i.e. the Data
Subject, of the personal data may be lost resulting in the loss of the
rights of the Data Subject due to the missing proof of his ownership.
Thus, the requirement states that:
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R6 A privacy language has to enable provenance.
After personal data is transferred, the origin of the personal data
should be identified, such that Data Subject Rights of the corresponding
user can be preserved and checked. Therefore, it is necessary that
the policy remains linked to the personal data. A Controller must be
accountable for the handling of personal data, especially if it is traded
or transferred to third parties, e.g., in cloud context scenarios [154]
[170] or for scientific purposes [81] [83] [82]. Hereby, two use cases –
Data Processing and Data Production – have to be considered, which are
detailed in the following.
2.6.1 Data Processing
When personal data is processed as is, e.g., transferred or sold to a
third party, it has to be ensured that the data source, as well as the
agreed privacy policy, is also transferred. The data source, e.g., the
user expressed by the privacy policy, has to be identifiable to claim
his Data Subject Rights [110, Art. 12]. The privacy policy has to be
transferred (and enforced) to guarantee that the personal data is only
processed according to its purposes, e.g., a policy defines that the
personal data may only be used for marketing purposes by a specific
recipient. Assuming this policy is not transferred to this recipient,
the recipient may process the personal data for other unauthorized
purposes.
Furthermore, the agreed policy may be further refined in an addi-
tional policy, e.g., limiting the processing rights for third parties. The
refinement of the privacy policy must always be within the scope of
the previously agreed upon policy, therefore refined policies and their
verification and validation processes is required [110, Recital 50].
2.6.2 Data Production
However, personal data is not only transferred, but also merged and
processed producing new data which can be used for advanced pro-
cesses, e.g., decision making, statistics or machine learning. Hereby,
the data may be processed from various data sources each with their
own privacy policy.
Thus, the combination of different policies and their validation have
to be considered while new data values are produced based on them.
The goal is hereby to be able to trace the data flow back to individual
sources of data, to allow verifiable results and processes. Furthermore,
attacks which address the data to be processed, e.g., poisoning attacks
in machine learning [23], can be mitigated or unveiled.
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In the following, de-identification methodology is detailed, which is
considered for the R5 De-identification Capabilities of the Layered Privacy
Language and the Policy-based De-identification process.

3
D E - I D E N T I F I C AT I O N B A C K G R O U N D
This chapter gives an overview on state-of-the-art de-identification
methodology. Various concepts and approaches are detailed that
are used for privacy-preserving processing of personal data. De-
identification methods are applied on the personal data of a user
with the goal to either hide his identity or any correlation between
the personal data and the user. Therefore, others cannot have access
to the identity of the user but cannot relate any personal information
to it. Or personal information is available but cannot be correlated to
the user. In general, it can be differentiated between anonymization
and pseudonymization methods. Pseudonymization, the replacement
of original values with a substitute value, enables the restoration of
the original value if the correlation between the original value and
substitute value is preserved. Anonymization, the partial hiding of
original value, is not intended for the later restoration of the original
value. While pseudonymization be part of an overall GDPR com-
pliance strategy. In contrast to anonymization, pseudonymized data
remains affected by GDPR obligations, because the link to the original
value remains. Thus, companies should carefully balance the usage of
pseudonymization and anonymization [133].
In the following, the notion of personal data is introduced from a
computer science perspective before an overview on de-identification
methods is given including anonymization, privacy models, pseudo-
nymization and personal privacy.
3.1 personal data categorization
In general, data is classified in the privacy-preserving domain into
four categories, i.e. privacy groups (see Table 3.1) [257] [266]:
• Explicit Identifiers (EI) defines attributes that identify a user
uniquely. Examples for EI are the passport ID (identifier), or
social security number.
• Quasi-Identifiers (QI), as indicated before, defines attributes
which in combination with other QI enable the identification of
a user. Examples of QI are the IP-address, postal-code, birthday,
age, gender and other demographic information. QI are often
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publicly available for example in phone books, voters databases
or other sources.
• Sensitive Data (SD) defines attributes which are confidential to
the user. Examples for SD attributes are health data, financial
data or other information that should not be correlated to the
user at any cost depending on the purpose.
• Non-Sensitive Data (NSD) defines attributes which do not identify
the user nor are sensitive for the user. Therefore, NSD attributes
are all attributes which cannot be classified as any of the other
data categories EI, QI, or SD.
The GDPR defines personal data as any information related to
an identified or identifiable natural person, whereas an identifiable
natural person is one who can be identified, directly or indirectly [110,
Art. 4 (1)]. Furthermore, GDPR defines special categories of data which
are by default prohibited from processing, unless special requirements
are given, e.g., consent is given by the user or the processing is required
for the public interest like research. The special categories of data cover
for example personal data revealing racial or ethnic origin, political
opinions, religious or philosophical beliefs, genetic and biometric data,
health data or data concerning sexual orientation [110, Art. 9].
Comparing the legal definition of personal data [110, Art. 4 (1)] with
the previously given classification of personal data, it can be observed
that the GDPR addresses with its definition both EI and QI classified
data. EI attributes correspond to personal data that identifies persons.
Furthermore, QI attributes correspond to personal data that indirectly
identifies persons. Special categories of data correlate to SD attributes,
but may also be associated with QI attributes as they can be used
to identify a person, e.g., the gender. Lastly, NSD attributes are not
directly covered by GDPR, because they do not fall under this legal
framework. Moreover, it is stated in the recitals that the principles of
data protection do not affect anonymous information. Anonymous
information is described as information that does not directly nor indi-
rectly identify a natural person. Additionally, anonymous information
is described as personal data that is altered in such a way that it can
no longer be attributed to a person. According to the GDPR, this does
not apply to pseudonymous data, if the mapping of the pseudonym
and original value is preserved, because it is possibly identify the
person with additional information [110, Recital 26].
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Table 3.1: Example of a multidimensional data-set detailing various attributes
classified as explicit identifier (EI), quasi-identifier (QI), sensitive
data (SD) and non-sensitive data (NSD). Each row represents
personal data of a user for a lottery. TheNSD ′Lucky# ′ is randomly
assigned to the person.
EI QI SD NSD
ID Name Sex Age Postal-Code Salary Lucky#
1 Alice F 27 94032 30.000 1234
2 Bob M 33 94036 35.000 1337
3 Charlie M 29 94405 28.000 404
Therefore, data-set scheme T is defined as a set of attributes.
T = (a1, · · · ,an) (3.1)
Each attribute can be assigned to one of the previously defined
privacy groups, such that each privacy group is a set of attributes.
ai ∈ (EI|QI|SD|NSD) (3.2)
Therefore, an alternate representation of a data-set scheme is a tuple
of all attributes of EI, QI, SD and NSD.
T = (EI,QI,SD,NSD) (3.3)
Different kinds of data exist. In the following, different data types
are presented alongside with with their properties that have to be
considered during de-identification [266].
3.1.1 Multidimensional Data
Multidimensional data, also referred to as relational data, is the most
common format of data. Considering Table 3.1 as an example for
multidimensional data, the properties are that each record, i.e. row in
the table, refers to one user. Each attribute, i.e. column of the table,
is related to the user and is made up of attributes of the previously
described privacy groups EI, QI, SD and NSD. Furthermore, it has to
be considered that each record is independent of other records of the
data-set. Additionally, the de-identification of an attribute of a record
does not affect the other attributes of the record. Due to the common
nature of multidimensional data it has been closely paid attention by
researchers in privacy-preservation. The challenges have been hereby,
the differentiation between QI and SD, the high dimensionality of the
data, the clusters of sensitive data, and finding the trade-off between
privacy and utility of the data [257] [177] [238] [4] [267] [5].
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3.1.2 Transaction Data
Databases holding transactions of users, e.g., diagnosis results of
patients in a hospital or sales of an online shop, can be referred to
as holding transactional data. This type of data usually has high
dimensionality and shows sparsity of data. High dimensionality can
hereby be caused due to the various products an online shop may
offer and sparsity is caused due to the customers only buying a small
subset of the available goods (see Table 3.2). These properties prevent
the application of privacy-preserving methods for multidimensional
data [8] [186] [266].
Table 3.2: Example of data-set of transactional data for an online shop selling
french food specialities. Each transaction is represented by a ′1 ′,
while no transaction is denoted by a ′0 ′. For example Alice bought
′Baguette ′ and ′Cheese ′.
Name Baguette Croissant Cheese Coffee Wine
Alice 1 0 1 0 0
Bob 0 0 0 0 1
Charlie 0 1 0 1 0
3.1.3 Longitudinal Data
Continuous studies are the main sources of longitudinal studies, which
can be found in, e.g., the health care domain. For example diabetic pa-
tients have to measure their glucose level over a specific time frame for
adjusting their insulin dose (see Table 3.3). Such data helps to identify
changes in the behaviour of the patient or a disease process. A longi-
tudinal data-set usually contains EI, QI, and SD attributes. The data
is hereby correlated and clustered due to repeated measurements of
the same patient, while temporally ordered. These characteristics have
to be preserved during the de-identification process while disclosure
of identity and attributes is prevented [107] [242] [266].
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Table 3.3: Example of data-set of longitudinal data in the context of continu-
ous blood glucose measurements. Each row represents a measure-
ment for a patient representing date and time of the measurement,
as well as the measured blood glucose level. For example, Bob
measured his blood glucose level six times over the course of two
days.
Name Date Time Diabetes
Blood Glucose
mg/dL
Bob 01.03.2019 10:00 Type 1 110
Bob 01.03.2019 14:00 Type 1 95
Bob 01.03.2019 19:00 Type 1 130
Alice 01.03.2019 20:00 Type 2 110
Bob 02.03.2019 11:00 Type 1 100
Bob 02.03.2019 14:00 Type 1 130
Bob 02.03.2019 18:00 Type 1 110
3.1.4 Graph Data
Graphs model relationships between different entities. A graph hereby
consists of a set of vertices and a set of edges (pairs of vertices) de-
noting a relationship. Graphs can be found in many domains, e.g.,
networking, transportation, telecommunication and social networks.
Social networks connect many users which share their personal data
(see Figure 3.1). Thus, social networks are a valuable source of in-
formation for companies analysing user behaviour and preferences.
Therefore, companies create own accounts on social networks to con-
nect to users and receive feedback and opinions. The created data is
used for data mining and analysis to provide insights. This poses a
threat to the privacy of users, e.g., the data may be used to identify
individuals. Therefore, graph data has to be de-identified. It has been
shown that more complex graph data makes it easier to identify a
user, which has to be considered creating de-identification methods
for graph data. To preserve the privacy of graph data the following
aspects have to be considered while the properties of the graph are
preserved, e.g., path length, betweenness, and closeness. First, the
identity of the user may be disclosed. Second, the link between users
may be disclosed which is highly sensitive information as relation-
ships between users are expressed. Lastly, each node in the graph
representing a user has sensitive content assigned to it which can
be used to identify the person, e.g., gender or other demographic
information [244] [176] [281] [187] [283] [142].
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Figure 3.1: Example of graph data in the context of a social network. A
′friend ′ relationship is expressed between the different users.
3.1.5 Time Series Data
Time series data is the result of taking regular measurements, e.g.,
measure the temperature every day in different cities or weekly sales
of a company. But also other domains like smart grid produce time se-
ries data. Compared to longitudinal data, which also have a temporal
order, time series data is distinguished by the measurement of a single
variable on a regular basis. Furthermore, time series data has a high
dimensionality compared to longitudinal data, which is continuously
growing. Assuming the regular measurement of the yearly income of
users (see Table 3.4) it can be seen that in comparison to multidimen-
sional data, the attributes of the record have a semantic relationship.
For example the difference in salary, relative increase or decrease, is
of interest. This dependency of attributes has to be considered for the
de-identification process. This dependency is to retain the statistical
properties of the data-set while privacy is preserved, for which the
high dimensionality and possible large size of the data-set has to be
considered [245] [144] [284] [104] [228] [105].
Table 3.4: Example of data-set of time series data regularly measuring the
yearly salary of individuals. Each row represents the regular mea-
surements for one person. The dimensionality of the data-set is
growing regularly with each measurement, e.g., each year in this
example.
ID Name Postal-Code
Salary
2016
Salary
2017
Salary
2018
Salary
2019
1 Alice 94032 25.000 27.000 29.000 30.000
2 Bob 94036 30.000 30.000 35.000 35.000
3 Charlie 94405 26.000 31.000 31.000 28.000
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3.1.6 Summary
The classification of personal data in the privacy groups EI, QI, SD,
and NSD has been presented. Furthermore, different typical types of
data-sets have been presented showing that next to the preservation
of privacy, the properties of the data-set have also to be preserved
for further processing (see Table 3.5). For the remaining of this thesis,
the focus is on multidimensional data, or relational data, as it is the
most common type of data. Next, de-identification methods including
anonymization, privacy models, and pseudonymization are detailed
in the following.
Table 3.5: Summary of personal data-set categories.
Data Category Properties
Multidimensional Data
Record Independence
High Dimensionality
Clustered Data
Transaction Data
High Dimensionality
High Sparsity
Longitudinal Data
Temporal Order
Correlated Data
Clustered Data
Graph Data Graph Properties
Time Series Data
High Dimensionality
Attribute Dependency
3.2 anonymization
The goal of anonymization is the prevention of the leakage of the
identity of a user based upon personal data. In other words, the
personal data of a user should not reveal the identity of the user.
Processing of personal data is required in many domains, therefore
multiple anonymization methods have been developed that intend to
preserve the anonymity of the user while the processing of personal
data remains possible.
The hereafter presented anonymization methods reduce the quality
of the data, while its semantics is preserved for later processing.
3.2.1 Suppression
Suppression can be described as the replacement of parts of the orig-
inal value with replacement characters. The replacement character
as well as the replacement strategy have to be carefully chosen to
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preserve the semantics of the original value in its specific domain. The
replacement character has to be chosen appropriately to avoid any con-
fusion in the interpretation of the value, e.g., assuming postal-codes
only consist of numerical characters then no numerical replacement
character should be chosen. The replacement strategy is important
based on the structure and format of the original value, e.g., for a date
in the German date format dd.mm.yyyy a replacement sequence that
puts priority on the year could first replace the days dd, then month
mm and then the year yyyy beginning from the last character yyyy
[185] [258] [159] .
Assuming the previously detailed example data-set of multidimen-
sional data (see Table 3.1), suppression is used for the anonymization
of the postal-code of Bob. Therefore, the asterisk ′∗ ′ is used for the
replacement character. Furthermore, for the German postal-code a
sequential replacement strategy beginning from the last character is
used. Thus, the region covered by the postal-code is steadily increasing.
This results in an anonymization hierarchy for the postal-code value
′94032 ′ resulting in five additional anonymized values as depicted
in Figure 3.2. The original value is defined as anonymization level
′0 ′ and it is increased for each sequential anonymization step up to
anonymization level 5. Continuing the example, suppression of the
postal-code is assumed to the arbitrarily chosen anonymization level
′2 ′ resulting in following Table 3.6.
Figure 3.2: Anonymization hierarchy for the German postal-code for Passau
′94032 ′ based on suppressing first the last character of the postal-
code using the replacement character ′∗ ′. The anonymization
level is steadily increasing starting with level ′0 ′ and ending with
level ′5 ′.
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Table 3.6: Suppression of the postal-code of Bob to anonymization level ′2 ′
based on the example multidimensional data-set in Table 3.1.
EI QI SD NSD
ID Name Sex Age Postal-Code Salary Lucky#
1 Alice F 27 94032 30.000 1234
2 Bob M 33 940** 35.000 1337
3 Charlie M 29 94405 28.000 404
3.2.2 Generalization
Generalization can be described as the replacement of the original
value with another value of a taxonomy denoting a more general
description of the value. The creation of the taxonomy is hereby
essential and cannot be chosen arbitrarily to preserve the semantic of
the value which is processed in the later. Given the nominal domain
of sex, a simple taxonomy can be given (see Figure 3.3).
Figure 3.3: Anonymization hierarchy for the domain ′sex ′. The scope of
original values at the anonymization level ′0 ′ is limited. The
anonymization of the original value leads to the replacement of it
with ′ANY ′ denoting a generic upper class for both ′M ′ for male
and ′F ′ for female.
Furthermore, considering a cardinal domain like the age, inter-
vals can be utilized for creating a taxonomy. The generation of the
taxonomy heavily influences the quality of the de-identified data-
set considering the intended usage. Thus, the taxonomy has to be
carefully crafted with the intended usage in mind. For example, the
anonymization of the location (longitude/latitude) has to be more
fine-grained to enable navigation services, in contrast for the deter-
mination of points-of-interest a relatively rough location, i.e. the city,
may be sufficient [185] [258] [195] [159] [127].
Assuming the previously suppressed example data-set for multi-
dimensional data (see Table 3.6), generalization can be used for the
anonymization of the sex and age of Bob. Hereby, the previously de-
tailed taxonomies are used. The sex and age value is anonymized to
anonymization level ′1 ′. This results in the replacement of the value
′M ′ for the domain sex with the value ′ANY ′ and the replacement of
the value ′33 ′ for the domain age with the value ′25− 37 ′ resulting in
following Table 3.7.
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Figure 3.4: Anonymization hierarchy for the domain ′age ′. The scope of
original values at the anonymization level ′0 ′ has a broad range.
Each subsequently higher anonymization level covers a sub-range
of the original values. The generic value ′ANY ′ is used for the
highest anonymization level.
Compared to suppression, taxonomies have to be defined before-
hand with the intended usage in mind, while for suppression, the
anonymization hierarchy can be calculated on-the-fly iff the suppres-
sion strategy and replacement value are given. Both generalization
and suppression hide potentially important details in the QI that can
influence further processing.
Table 3.7: Generalization of the sex and age of Bob to anonymization level
′1 ′ based on the previously suppressed data-set in Table 3.6.
EI QI SD NSD
ID Name Sex Age Postal-Code Salary Lucky#
1 Alice F 27 94032 30.000 1234
2 Bob ANY 25 - 37 940** 35.000 1337
3 Charlie M 29 94405 28.000 404
3.2.3 Deletion
Deletion is basically the extreme version of both Suppression and
Generalization, leaving no trace of the original value. The probably
easiest and straight-forward way to anonymize personal data is to
delete it, which stretches the point of anonymization ad absurdum.
Deletion of personal data has the advantage to remove any information
from the data value that can identify an individual person. But because
no semantic information is preserved, it may be argued against the
classification of Deletion as an anonymization method. Nevertheless,
Deletion is necessary to preserve the privacy of individuals.
Deletion(Value) −→ ∅ (3.4)
Assuming a data-set T with all privacy groups EI, QI, SD and NSD,
both EI and QI have to be anonymized to preserve the identity of
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the users. On QI either Suppression or Generalization can be applied to
create QI ′ in a way that the identity of each user is hidden. But EI,
which explicitly identify a user, also have to be de-identified. There-
fore, Deletion can be used, simply deleting each value that explicitly
identifies a user. Therefore, the anonymized data-set T ′anonymized is
created, including generalization and suppression of QI [257] [258].
Assuming the previously suppressed and generalized example data-
set for multidimensional data (see Table 3.7), deletion is used for the
anonymization of the ID and name of Bob. The removal of the ′2 ′ for
the ID and the name ′Bob ′ results in following Table 3.8.
Table 3.8: Deletion of both the ID and name of Bob based on the previously
generalized data-set in Table 3.7.
EI QI SD NSD
ID Name Sex Age Postal-Code Salary Lucky#
1 Alice F 27 94032 30.000 1234
ANY 25 - 37 940** 35.000 1337
3 Charlie M 29 94405 28.000 404
The EI ′ may be included in T ′anonymized with empty values, but
even the existence of EI attributes may allow attackers to gain informa-
tion, e.g., the information that data-set contains an explicit identifier,
therefore the complete removal of EI is assumed.
An alternate approach to de-identify EI values is suppression, which
is shown in section 3.5.
3.2.4 Summary
In this section different strategies to anonymize personal data have
been detailed (see Table 3.9). Although the presented anonymization
methods hide information of original data values, privacy is not guar-
anteed by either of them if not applied considering the other records
of the data-set. External knowledge can indeed be used to identify
Bob in the data-set easily even though suppression, generalization
and deletion have been applied on the EI and QI. For example, if the
external knowledge exists that Bob is older than 30 years, then an
attacker can derive from the de-identified data-set (see Table 3.8) that
both Alice and Charlie are younger than 30. Thus, the second entry
must be Bob and the attacker can learn sensitive information, e.g., the
salary of Bob. To prevent such attacks, privacy models are introduced
in the literature using the detailed basic anonymization methods. An
overview on attacks models and privacy models mitigating them is
given in the following.
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Table 3.9: Summary of anonymization methods.
Anonymization
Method
Target Strategy
Suppression EI, QI, SD
Replacement
Strategy/Character
Generalization QI, SD
Generalization
Hierarchy
Deletion EI Value Removal
3.3 privacy models
Previously, anonymization methods have been introduced that alter an
original value of personal data hiding information to preserve privacy.
But anonymization methods are not sufficient to preserve the privacy
of a data-set because users can be identified through unique properties
of their record, especially when external knowledge is available. To
tackle this challenge, privacy models have been proposed.
It has to be noted that usage of the term ’privacy model’ is contested
by the term ’confidentiality criteria’. The term ’confidentiality criteria’
is based on the the work of Sicherman et al. [248] and is used in the
works of Biskup and Bonatti [41] [43] [42] [44]. It is argued that ’privacy
models’ are defining privacy via a probabilistic indistinguishable
definition, while ’confidentiality criteria’ define privacy via precise
indistinguishable definitions. The term ’privacy model’ is used in the
remaining of this work.
Privacy models define properties a de-identified data-set has to fulfil
such that the privacy of individuals is guaranteed to a certain degree
while the utility is preserved. Privacy models can be hereby classified
according to their privacy guarantees, i.e. what attack models they
mitigate.
To fulfil the properties of privacy models, previously introduced
anonymization methods are applied. In general, an original data-set T
is anonymized to T ′anonymized. Typically, the EI attributes are com-
pletely removed, while QI attributes are anonymized to QI ′. Sensitive
attributes SD are usually preserved as they are required for further
processing, e.g., data mining. Because NSD attributes have no impact
on both utility or privacy, they are not further discussed within this
section.
T ′anonymized = (QI
′,SD,NSD) (3.5)
In general, four attack models are used in the literature to catego-
rize privacy models – Record Linkage, Attribute Linkage, Table Linkage
and a Probabilistic Attack [108]. Each attack model, as well as exam-
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ples for privacy models mitigating them, is detailed in the following.
Furthermore, the trade-off between privacy and utility is discussed.
3.3.1 Record Linkage
Record Linkage defines an attack pattern in which it is assumed that
a data-set T is released. In this released data-set, a small number of
records can be identified by a set of values corresponding to QI at-
tributes. The set of records, with the same values for the QI attributes,
is denoted as QI-group. If the values of a user, the victim, matches
the values of the vulnerable QI-group, the linkage of the user to the
small number of records in the QI-group is possible. An attacker can
use this vulnerability with additional external knowledge to have the
chance to uniquely identify the record of the user from the QI-group.
Thus, anonymity can be broken [239] [240] [108].
Let us assume an accessible data-set from which EI attributes are re-
moved, to prevent identification of the users, but QI and SD attributes
are given. For example a table with the diseases of patients is given
with additional demographic information about the sex, age and job
of the patients (see Table 3.10). Furthermore, it is assumed that an
attacker has access to external knowledge about patients that went
to the hospital, e.g., the attacker is a hospital employee working at
the hospital (see Table 3.11). The attacker can match the QI-groups of
the patient table with the QI-groups of his external knowledge. This
allows the attacker to identify individuals within the patient table.
Within this example, the attacker is able to uniquely identify Bob in the
patient table according to the matching age ( ′33 ′), sex ( ′M ′), and job
( ′Engineer ′) and infer the sensitive information SD about his disease
( ′HIV ′).
The privacy model k-Anonymity has been proposed by Samarati
and Sweeney to prevent Record Linkage [239] [240]. Hereby, Record
Linkage is mitigated by requiring every record of a data-set to be in a
QI-group with at least k− 1 other records. Thus, each QI-group has
the minimum size of k, so each record cannot be distinguished from
at least k− 1 other records considering the QI-group. This reduces the
probability of an attacker to infer the identity of the user to at most 1k .
Therefore, k-Anonymity does not prevent Record Linkage but reduces
the risk for identification of a user. A data-set fulfilling this criteria is
denoted as k-anonymous.
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Table 3.10: Patient table with EI at-
tributes deleted to prevent
identification.
QI SD
Job Age Sex Disease
Engineer 35 M HIV
Engineer 33 M HIV
Lawyer 29 M Flu
Lawyer 33 M Flu
Writer 42 F Cancer
Singer 45 F Cancer
Writer 42 F Cancer
Table 3.11: Available external knowl-
edge with EI and QI at-
tributes.
EI QI
Name Sex Age Job
Alice F 42 Writer
Bob M 33 Engineer
Charlie M 29 Lawyer
Donna F 45 Dancer
Erich M 37 Engineer
Franz M 35 Lawyer
Gabi F 44 Writer
Heidi F 42 Dancer
Igor M 32 Lawyer
Figure 3.5: Anonymization hierarchy for the QI attribute job for the patient
table (see Table 3.10).
Continuing the previously introduced patient data example, the
patient table is anonymized to be 3-anonymous (see Table 3.12). To
achieve the properties of the privacy model, the anonymization hi-
erarchies given in Figures 3.3, 3.4 and 3.5 are used to anonymize
QI attributes. This results in two QI-groups ( ′Professional ′, ′ (25−
37) ′, ′M ′), containing 4 records and ( ′Artist ′, ′ (38− 50) ′, ′ F ′) , con-
taining 3 records. Thus, the resulting data-set is 3-anonymous, because
each QI-group has at least 3 records assigned to it.
The attacker having the external knowledge (see Table 3.11) can
no longer uniquely identify the individual Bob according to his QI-
group ( ′Engineer ′, ′ 33 ′, ′M ′), which now correlates to 4 records of
the QI-group ( ′Professional ′, ′ (25− 37) ′, ′M ′). Thus, the property of
k-Anonymity, that the probability of an attacker to infer the identity
of the user is as most 1k , is fulfilled with the risk being
1
4 in this case.
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Other privacy models which mitigate Record Linkage can be found in
the literature, e.g., k-Map [94], MultiR k-Anonymity [193], (c, t)-Isolation
[66], and Average Risk [93].
Table 3.12: 3-anonymous patient table based on Table 3.10. Anonymization is
conducted with the anonymization hierarchies shown in Figures
3.3, 3.4, and 3.5.
QI SD
Job Age Sex Disease
Professional (25 - 37) M HIV
Professional (25 - 37) M HIV
Professional (25 - 37) M Flu
Professional (25 - 37) M Flu
Artist (38 - 50) F Cancer
Artist (38 - 50) F Cancer
Artist (38 - 50) F Cancer
3.3.2 Attribute Linkage
The Attribute Linkage attack considers that the attacker may not pre-
cisely identify the individual, but infer sensitive information about
it using published data. Therefore, the attacker inspects the records
of the QI-groups that the target belongs to correlating sensitive at-
tributes SD to the target. If a sensitive value is predominating within
the QI-group, then the attacker determine with a high probability
that it correlates to the target. To mitigate this attack the correlation
between QI-groups and SD attributes has to be decremented [108].
Considering the patient table (see Table 3.10) from previous example,
the QI-group ( ′Writer ′, ′ 42 ′, ′ F ′) indicates with a 100% probability
that the individual has the disease ′Cancer ′. Considering Table 3.11,
the attacker can determine that Alice has cancer, assuming that the
population of both tables is correlated.
To mitigate this attack, the diversity principle has been introduced
by Machanavajjhala et al., and denoted as l-Diversity [177]. It requires,
that each QI-group has at least l ’well-represented’ sensitive values. It
is noteworthy, that a similar idea was previously discussed by Ohrn
and Ohno-Machado [203]. The term ’well-represented’ can hereby
be defined in different ways instantiating different definitions of l-
Diversity, e.g., distinct l-Diversity [262], entropy l-Diversity [177], and
recursive (c, l)-Diversity [177].
The definition of distinct l-Diversity, also known as p-Sensitive k-
Anonymity [262], is used in the following. This definition states that
each QI-group has to have at least l distinct values for the sensitive
attribute, considering only one sensitive attribute. This definition of
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l-Diversity also fulfils the properties of k-Anonymity if k = l, because
each QI-group also contains at least l records. A data-set fulfilling
these properties is denoted as distinct l-diverse.
Continuing the example, a distinct 3-diverse data-set is created (see
Table 3.13) from Table 3.10. The QI of the data-set are anonymized
such that only the QI-group ( ′ANY ′, ′ (25 − 50) ′, ′ANY ′) exists for
which 3 distinct sensitive values are present { ′HIV ′, ′Cancer ′, ′ Flu ′}.
Therefore, the data-set is distinct 3-diverse and the attacker can no
longer infer with 100% certainty that Alice has cancer. Furthermore,
it can be observed that the entries in Table 3.10 are very generic and
therefore the utility, i.e. possible usage, of the anonymized data-set is
limited.
Table 3.13: Distinct 3-diverse patient table based on Table 3.10. Anonymiza-
tion is conducted with the anonymization hierarchies shown in
Figures 3.3, 3.3, and 3.5.
QI SD
Job Age Sex Disease
ANY (25 - 50) ANY HIV
ANY (25 - 50) ANY HIV
ANY (25 - 50) ANY Flu
ANY (25 - 50) ANY Flu
ANY (25 - 50) ANY Cancer
ANY (25 - 50) ANY Cancer
ANY (25 - 50) ANY Cancer
Considering the overall distribution of sensitive values with the
local distribution of sensitive values within a QI-group, l-Diversity
may not be sufficient to prevent Attribute Linkage attacks when the
overall distribution is skewed. Assuming a patient table in which 90%
of the patients have the flu and only 10% have HIV. Furthermore,
assuming a QI-group that has a distribution of 50% HIV and flu
patients. The data-set satisfies 2-Diversity, but the mentioned QI-group
poses a risk, because every record owner could be inferred with
a 50% probability with HIV instead of 10% in the overall data-set.
This is denoted as skewness attack, for which the privacy model t-
Closeness has been developed for mitigation [167]. This privacy model
requires the distribution of sensitive attributes in the overall table
to be t close to the distribution in any QI-group, i.e. the distance
between the distribution of a sensitive attribute and distribution of
the attribute in the whole table is no more than the threshold t. The
calculation of the closeness is based on the Earth Mover Distance (EMD)
function. But using t-Closeness also has disadvantages regarding the
utility of the resulting data-set. Furthermore, it lacks flexibility for
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specifying different protection levels for different sensitive values,
e.g., ′Flu ′ requires less protection than ′HIV ′. Other privacy models
mitigating Attribute Linkage are, e.g., Confidence Bounding [269], (X,Y)-
Privacy [268], δ-Disclosure [58] and β-Likeness [64]. Confidence Bounding
[269] is proposed to protect against threats based on data mining
capabilities and limits the confidence of inferring sensitive, hereby
the information is preserved such that it can be used for analysis
but unwanted sensitive information is limited. (X,Y)-Privacy [268] is
introduced to cope with sequential releases, i.e. publication, of data
such that current release is anonymized such that it cannot be linked
with the previous releases. (X,Y)-Privacy defines that value in X is
linked to at least k distinct values on Y, whereas it is assumed that
X and Y are disjoint sets of attributes that describe individuals and
sensitive properties in any order. The authors of δ-Disclosure [58]
question if anonymization of QI attributes is advantageous over trivial
sanitization of the data-set. Therefore, they introduce the alternative
δ-Disclosure, which defines that a data-set is δ-disclosure private, if the
distribution of SD attributes within each QI-group is about the same
as the distribution of SD attributes in the complete data-set. β-Likeness
[64] assumes that SD attributes of the data-set are public knowledge.
Therefore, β-Likeness assures that the relative distance between SD
values to a given QI-group does not exceed the distance to the overall
population of SD by the threshold β.
3.3.3 Table Linkage
In the Table Linkage attack, the goal of the attacker is to gain knowl-
edge about the presence or absence of an individual within a data-set,
which differs from the assumption of both Record Linkage and Attribute
Linkage, which assume that the attacker already knows that the indi-
viduals record is within the data-set. But the presence (or absence) of
a record within a data-set can reveal sensitive information. Assuming
a hospital releases a data-set with a particular type of disease, e.g.,
HIV, then the attacker can reveal sensitive information about an indi-
vidual if the presence of the individual in the data-set can be shown.
Therefore, Table Linkage occurs if an attacker can infer the presence or
absence of an individuals’ record in the data-set with confidence.
For example let us assume the 3-anonymous patient data-set (see
Table 3.12). Furthermore, the related external knowledge data-set is
4-anonymous is assumed (see Table 3.14). The probability that Alice
is present in the patient data-set is 34 because there are 3 records in
the patient data-set with the QI-group ( ′F ′, ′ (28− 50) ′, ′Artist ′) and
4 records in the external knowledge data-set. Similarly, the probability
that Bob is in the patient data-set is 45 .
The privacy model δ-Presence intends to prevent Table Linkage by
bounding the probability of inferring the presence within a speci-
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fied range δ = (δmin, δmax) [194]. Assuming an external knowledge
data-set EK and a private data-set T, with T being a subset of EK
T ⊆ EK. The generalized data-set T ′ satisfies (δmin, δmax)-Presence
if δmin 6 P(t ∈ T |T ′) 6 δmax for all t ∈ EK. Although δ-Presence is
valid as-is, i.e. it assumes that the owner, e.g., company, of T has access
to the same external knowledge EK as the attacker, which might not
be true in practice. Other privacy models that mitigate Table Linkage
are, e.g., Distributional Privacy [48], or -Differential Privacy [90]. This
latter is detailed for the following attack model, the Probabilistic At-
tack. Whereas, Distributional Privacy [48] is stronger than -Differential
Privacy.
Table 3.14: 4-anonymous external knowledge table based on Table 3.11. Ano-
nymization is conducted with the anonymization hierarchies
shown in Figures 3.3, 3.3, and 3.5.
EI QI QI QI
Name Sex Age Job
Alice F (38 - 50) Artist
Bob M (25 - 37) Professional
Charlie M (25 - 37) Professional
Donna F (38 - 50) Artist
Erich M (25 - 37) Professional
Franz M (25 - 37) Professional
Gabi F (38 - 50) Artist
Heidi F (38 - 50) Artist
Igor M (25 - 37) Professional
3.3.4 Probabilistic Attack
Unlike Record Linkage, Attribute Linkage and Table Linkage, the Prob-
abilistic Attack does not focus on what records can be linked to an
individual, but on how the attacker would change his probabilistic
beliefs on the sensitive information of an individual. The goal in pre-
venting the Probabilistic Attack is to keep the difference between prior
and posterior beliefs as small as possible [108]. In other words, it has
to be prevented that an attacker gains information, which corresponds
to the uninformative principle introduced by Machanavajjhala et al.
[177].
Assuming statistical databases, an attacker should not gain any ben-
efits from being able to access a published anonymized data-set. There-
fore, the privacy model (c, t)-Isolation has been proposed by Chawla
et al. [66]. This privacy model considers the distances between data
records, which is suitable for numerical attributes statistical databases
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but less suitable for multidimensional data. Therefore, -Differential
Privacy is detailed, which has been proposed to compare the risk with
and without the record owner’s data in the published and anonymized
data-set. Dwork [90] introduced a new privacy notion, that is very
promising. It differs from the previous privacy notion comparing the
prior and posterior probability before and and after accessing the
data-set. Thus, -Differential Privacy has been developed to compare
the risk with and without the addition of an individuals’ record in the
published data-set. Therefore, it has to be ensured that the addition or
removal of a record does not significantly affect the outcome of any
analysis. This allows for additional beneficial properties, e.g., the join
of different data-sets does not increase the risk for privacy.
According to Dwork [90] [91] a randomized function K gives -
Differential Privacy if for all data-sets D1 and D2 differing on at most
one element, and all S ⊆ Range(K),
Pr [K(D1) ∈ S] 6 exp()× Pr [K(D2) ∈ S] (3.6)
In practice, this notion of Differential Privacy often induces too much
noise within the data-set, thus decreasing its utility. Therefore, its
definition has been relaxed to (, δ)-Differential Privacy allowing for
an error probability δ [168]. The relaxed version of Differential Privacy
denotes, that a randomized algorithm A satisfies (, δ)-Differential
Privacy, if for any pair of neighboring datasets D and D ′ and for any
O ⊆ Range(A) [92].
Pr [A(D) ∈ O] 6 e × Pr [A(D ′) ∈ O]+ δ (3.7)
The small error probability of (, δ)-Differential Privacy enables higher
data quality in comparison to -Differential Privacy [40]. According to
Fung et al. [108], Differential Privacy mitigates Table Linkage and the
Probabilistic Attack.
3.3.5 Privacy and Utility Trade-off
If only privacy would have to be considered it could be stated that
personal data shall just not be collected and processed nor existing
personal data shall be deleted. But the processing of personal data is
required for many processes to gain valuable insights, e.g., research,
or marketing. Therefore, the usefulness has to be considered while
the privacy requirements of individuals are met. In the following, it is
detailed how the usefulness, or utility, of data can be quantified. The
challenges for finding a trade-off between both privacy and utility are
furthermore detailed.
3.3.5.1 Utility
The usefulness of a data-set for a specific purpose, e.g., data mining,
is denoted as utility. Therefore, the measurement of utility requires a
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context in the best case, which makes the measurement heavily related
to the data-set, the de-identification process and the intended usage
of the data, if specified. But this context can not always be determined
beforehand. In the literature several aspects for measuring utility can
be found, namely Accuracy, Completeness and Consistency [38].
Accuracy measures the proximity of a sanitized (de-identified) value
to the original value. In other words, Accuracy measures the loss of
information after the de-identification process has been applied.
The height of anonymization hierarchies was utilized as the basis
for one of the first Accuracy focused utility metrics denoted as Height
Metric (HM) [238]. For each anonymization of a data value, information
loss is assumed. Hereby, height is measured by how often the original
value has been anonymized, i.e. how many anonymization levels are
iterated (see Equation 3.8). The fewer anonymizations are required
the lesser information is lost. A downside of this metric is that the
information loss of each anonymization level is considered equal.
HM(T ′) =
n∑
i=1
max(anonymizationLevelsi(T)) (3.8)
The General Loss Metric (LM), a successor to HM, intends to measure
the average information loss of all data cells of an anonymized data-set
T ′ [139]. In Equation 3.9 f is a function that based on a data cell value
T ′[i][j] returns the number of distinct values that can be generalized
to T ′[i][j], and g is a function that based on an attribute ai, returns the
number of distinct values of ai. The proportion of f to g for each value
is summed and put into relation with the data-set size to calculate the
average information loss.
LM(T ′) =
∑n
i=1
∑|T |
j=1
f(T ′[i][j])−1
g(ai)−1
|T | ·n
(3.9)
Various other Accuracy focused utility metrics have been introduced,
e.g., the Discernibility Metric (DM) [29] which assigns a penalty to a
tuple based on how many tuples in T ′ are indistinguishable from it, or
for statistical-based perturbation which measure the loss of precision
in T ′ [6].
Completeness evaluates the degree of missed data in T ′, while Con-
sistency evaluates the internal properties and constraints of a data-set,
e.g., relationships among different attributes of a record or among a
group of records within a data-set. Both aspects are only rarely sub-
ject of utility metrics in the literature. Bertino et al. propose a utility
metric that not only considers Completeness and Consistency, but also
the relevance of the data as well as the structure of the database [37].
It can be concluded that the measurement of utility requires the
consideration of Accuracy, Completeness and Consistency, while often
only Accuracy is covered. Thus, utility metrics could rather be denoted
as information loss metrics, because measuring the utility, i.e. the
usefulness of a data-set for a specific purpose, is not always conducted.
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3.3.5.2 Privacy
Privacy is measured quantitatively by the degree of uncertainty ac-
cording to which personal data can be inferred [169] [171] [229]. As
shown by the previously introduced attack models and privacy mod-
els, the notion of privacy is manifold. For example for Record Linkage
the risk of identifying an individual within a data-set is mitigated
by k-Anonymity such that it can be quantified to be 1k at maximum.
Similarly, the risk for a successful Attribute Linkage, Table Linkage or
Probabilistic Attack can be quantified with other privacy models.
Although, privacy can be quantified, it is hard to determine which
level of privacy is required in practice. Assuming k-Anonymity, the
question is which value for k is sufficient to protect the privacy. Stating
that all privacy requirements must be met would imply that k is
maximized. Although this approach would preserve the privacy of
the data-set, requiring a strong anonymization, a high penalty on its
usability for further processing would be induced.
An important aspect for the anonymization process is to keep the
data usable for companies while privacy is preserved. Therefore, pri-
vacy requirements, which require personal data to be hidden, and
utility requirements, which require personal data to be available, have
to be balanced.
A direct comparison of privacy and utility is flawed as shown
by Brickell and Shmatikov, because it would directly indicate that
a gain in privacy would equal loss in utility [58]. Both privacy and
utility differ in their concepts and characteristics so much that a direct
comparison is not possible. First, specific data, e.g., concerning a small
group of individuals, has larger impact on privacy, while aggregated
data has a larger impact on utility. Secondly, privacy is an individual
concept which should be measured separately for every individual,
while utility is an aggregated concept which should be measured
accumulatively for all useful knowledge. Lastly, privacy loss can be
caused by any information that deviates from the prior belief, false or
true, but only true information contributes to utility [169].
Thus, an appropriate trade-off between utility and privacy has to be
approximated, considering the privacy requirements of individuals
while the data-set is still usable for the intended purpose of the
company [178] [224].
3.3.6 Reasoning on Privacy Models
Comparing the before mentioned privacy models according to the
mitigated attack models (see Table 3.15), it can be observed that no
privacy model covers all attack models. Furthermore, it can be stated
that the notion of privacy differs according to privacy models, even
mitigating the same attack model, such that no “single privacy model
fits all” option exists, especially if different scenarii and data-set types
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have to be considered. Thus, a privacy language has to express privacy
models in a generic and extensible approach to cover various scenarii.
Furthermore, a privacy language expressing privacy policies and
thus both the privacy requirements of the user and the data processing
requirements for specific purposes has to be considered. In other
words, the company shall be able to express limitations for the de-
identification of personal data for specific purposes. Hereby, it has
to be considered that the measurement of utility seems not to be
fully developed in the literature due to its focus on Accuracy. It has
also to be considered that many privacy models use a derivative of
other basic utility metrics, e.g., height metric, which leads to varying
utility definitions and measurements. It can be boldly stated that for
many privacy model approaches a specifically suitable utility metric is
developed. Thus, as no uniform baseline is given, a privacy language
has to consider both privacy and utility requirements.
Privacy models define properties a de-identified data-set has to
fulfil, but the introduced privacy models do not consider an individu-
als’ privacy requirements. Therefore, the personal privacy concept is
detailed and discussed in the following.
Table 3.15: Non-exhaustive list of privacy models and their classification
according to the attack models they mitigate.
Privacy Model
Record
Linkage
Attribute
Linkage
Table
Linkage
Probabilistic
Attack
k-Anonymity x
k-Map x
MultiR k-Anonymity x
Average Risk x
Distinct l-Diversity x x
Entropy l-Diversity x x
Recursive (c, l)-Diversity x x
t-Closeness x x
Confidence Bounding x
(X, Y)-Privacy x x
δ-Disclosure x x
β-Likeness x x
δ-Presence x
Distributional Privacy x x
-Differential Privacy x x
(, δ)-Differential Privacy x x
(c, t)-Isolation x x
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3.4 personal privacy
The concept of personal privacy, or personalized anonymity, has been
detailed by Xiao and Tao [277]. Instead of assuming a consistent level
of privacy protection for all users in a multidimensional data-set,
personal privacy enables each user to specify the degree of privacy
protection of his sensitive values SD. Therefore, the corresponding
anonymization hierarchy has to be accessible by the user to express
his anonymization level preference when his data is collected.
In the following, approaches for the implementation of the per-
sonal privacy concept are detailed. Based on the detailed technical
approaches and the legal perspective on personal privacy, require-
ments for a holistic approach are detailed.
3.4.1 Personal Privacy Approaches
Only few works have been published on personal privacy anonymi-
zation. Both [230] and [21] address dynamically privacy concerns in
the context of Privacy-Preserving Data Publishing (PPDP) taking into
account personal privacy. Reddy et al. in [230] implement personal
privacy at the record level only allowing the user to set a binary
consent flag. If consent is not given by the user, the whole record is
removed from the data-set during the anonymization process. For the
anonymization process, multidimensional data-sets are considered for
which common privacy models can be used, e.g., k-Anonymity [257]
or l-Diversity [177]. This approach considers the consent of the user
during the anonymization process, which may lead to a coarse loss
of information because the binary consent flag affects the complete
record.
Similarly, in the context of recommender systems, Saji et al. [237]
propose a web search engine in which each user takes the binary
decision to set his whole profile, that is utilized for queries, public
or private. This allows the search engine to either consider the user
profile for personalized query results or regular queries only using
the users’ input. This approach considers only the search engine, i.e. a
single purpose, for the scenario limiting its scope. Consequently, there
is no more general approach proposed in the literature.
Ma et al. [175] introduce a scheme for assessing personal privacy
in the context of ubiquitous computing. Hereby, the user can set a
threshold value determining the disclosure of his personal data in
different scenarios, e.g., in scenario A only the name is provided but
in scenario B, the e-mail is additionally provided. Depending on the
scenario, i.e. the purpose of the processing, the user can define which
of his data is processed expressing his personal privacy requirements.
This work extends the work of Reddy et al. [230]. Therefore, instead
of only considering binary consent for the record, a more fine-grained
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decision can be made for each of the attributes. Although not explicitly
stated, all attributes of the data-set are possibly affected, thus increas-
ing the scope from only SD attributes as previously defined by Xiao
and Tao [277] to possibly all EI, QI, SD, and NSD attributes. However,
the user has full control over his personal data, this approach does not
consider any follow up anonymization mechanisms.
Ashoka and Poornima [21] introduce Sensitivity Flags to be set by
the users to indicate the minimum anonymization level for sensitive
attributes SD. For each sensitive attribute, the user chooses the value
that should be published from an anonymization hierarchy. The way
the anonymization hierarchy is presented to the users, is hereby not
detailed. To maintain a minimum level of data utility, the authors
propose a Stipulation-Based Anonymization Algorithm that produces the
data-set to be anonymized according to the data miners needs by
reconsidering user anonymization choices for data that are not consid-
ered as sensitive by the company. This approach overrules the users’
personal decision on the anonymization level, i.e. the Sensitivity Flag,
to increase the utility for later processing, e.g., data mining. Therefore,
the proposed solution encourages the users to decide on their indi-
vidual privacy settings on the hand, but enables the processor of the
data to override the aforementioned privacy settings. This approach is
highly questionable, because the processing of personal data is valued
higher than the privacy of users in this approach. Furthermore, this
solution neither considers anonymization in the context of multiple
purposes nor in the presence of different privacy models. Neverthe-
less, the approach can be seen as an improved approach for personal
privacy compared to binary purpose decisions, because it allows the
user to determine the privacy at the attribute-level, which is desirable
for a fine-grained control of privacy.
Khan et al. [153] implement personal privacy as a variation of k-
Anonymity. But instead of assuming a uniform privacy level k for
the whole data-set, the privacy level is individual for each user u
such that the privacy level is dependent on each user k(u). This is de-
noted as adaptive anonymity. Adapting the definition of k-Anonymity,
in order to fulfil the privacy guarantee for adaptive anonymity, the
record of each user u cannot be distinguishable from the record of
k(u) - 1 users in the data-set. This approach considers for each record
individual privacy requirements in form of a user dependant k. Com-
pared to previous approaches, it does not consider personal privacy
on attribute-level, but used privacy model concepts to preserve the
privacy of the complete data-set.
In the context of distributed systems, Neumann et al. [198] model
personal privacy preferences of the user by including consent for ser-
vices, attribute specific sensitivity, and overall sensitivity. Personal
privacy preferences are analysed to identify privacy risks in the
distributed system based upon the selected pseudonymization ap-
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proaches. The personal privacy preferences are modelled based on
the data flow between different systems and stakeholders generating
a formal model of privacy. This model is then analysed to identify
privacy risks, which are based upon the personal privacy preferences
and the pseudonymization method choice. The approach is intended
for usage by system designers and developers during the development
of applications to support the understanding of privacy risks for an
early mitigation. This system considers pseudonymization, commonly
used to preserve privacy in the health care domain, instead of anony-
mization methods or privacy models to preserve the personal privacy
of users.
3.4.2 Reasoning on Personal Privacy
In the following, the notion and different approaches to realizes per-
sonal privacy in the literature are positioned within the regulations of
the GDPR. Considering the GDPR, the personal privacy preference,
e.g., personal anonymization level, may be negotiated and expressed
within the privacy policy, although GDPR does not require the specifi-
cation of any de-identification mechanisms within the requirements
for a privacy policy [110, Art. 12 - 14]. An argument for personal
privacy settings in privacy policies is the notion of Consent enabling
the user to control for which purposes his data is processed [110, Art.
7].
Following and extending the concept of consenting purposes, it can
be argued for control over the quantity and quality of the processed
data for each purpose by the user. Therefore, fine-grained control over
the processing of personal data is given by the user.
Furthermore, this rationale is supported by the Communication Pri-
vacy Management (CPM) theory, opting for a dialectic approach, e.g.,
negotiation of consent and personal anonymization levels, expressing
privacy as a range of complete openness to complete closeness [211].
Hereby, openness can be considered as the consent to the processing
of personal data, while closeness can be considered as the rejection
of the processing of personal data. The decision on the processing of
personal data can hereby include the purpose, data recipient, data
attributes and quality of the data, e.g. only parts of the address are
provided.
Moreover, the utility requirements for processing have to be con-
sidered limiting the de-identification of certain attributes required
for processing. Thus, an upper limit for the anonymization level is
desirable, but this upper limit shall not override the preference of
the user, i.e. in contrast to Ashoka and Poornima [21], but be consid-
ered during the negotiation of the privacy policy. The personalization
should furthermore consider all aspects of the processing of personal
data, including purpose-based consent as well as attribute-based per-
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sonalization of privacy requirements (see Table 3.16). As previously
detailed, personal privacy settings for SD attributes is considered by
Ashoka and Poornima [21], while personal privacy settings for QI
attributes is considered by Khan et al. [153]. Ma et al. [175] consider all
attributes (EI, QI, SD and NSD), but the anonymization of NSD does
not increase the privacy and EI attributes should commonly either
be deleted or pseudonymized (see Section 3.5). Therefore, personal
privacy settings, i.e. anonymization requirements for attributes, can in
theory affect all attributes, but should only be considered for QI and
SD attributes.
T ′personalPrivacy = (EI
′,QI ′,SD ′,NSD ′) (3.10)
Next, an overview over pseudonymization methods and approaches
is detailed.
Table 3.16: Summary of personal privacy approaches.
Work User Decision
Xiao and Tao [277] Anonymization Level for SD
Reddy et al. [230] Consent Flag on Record
Saji et al. [237] Consent via Profile
Ma et al. [175] Threshold for EI, QI, SD, NSD
Ashoka and Poornima [21] Sensitivity Flags for SD
Khan et al. [153] Personal k for k-Anonymity
Neumann et al. [198]
Service Consent
Attribute Sensitivity
Overall Sensitivity
3.5 pseudonymization
As shown by Gerl and Bölz [113], various pseudonymization methods
and variations exist. Pseudonymization replaces the original value
with a replacement pseudonym. Pseudonymization is applied to make
data useless outside its application scope, while it remains useful.
Furthermore, authorized re-identification is possible. In general, an
original data-set T is pseudonymized to T ′pseudonymized. It consists
of previously mentioned privacy groups of data. In T ′, attributes are
replaced with uniquely identifiable pseudonyms.
T ′pseudonymized = (EI
′,QI,SD,NSD) (3.11)
Usually, only EI attributes are pseudonymized to replace the identi-
fying value with a pseudonym such that a person cannot be identified.
Therefore, EI attributes are commonly pseudonymized, while on QI,
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SD and NSD attributes usually no pseudonymization is applied. In
the following, an overview of pseudonymization techniques is pre-
sented.
3.5.1 Pseudonym Generation
Pseudonymization (or tokenization) swaps distinct original values
with a pseudonym (token). The generation of the pseudonym can
hereby vary. It can be differentiated between one-way pseudonyms,
that cannot be reversed, and reversible pseudonyms enabling re-
identification. Reversible pseudonym generation, which is based on a
function, requires that the parameters, i.e. the secret, of that function is
kept secret. Thus, reversible pseudonyms require additional protection
to prevent unauthorized identification of the user.
Reversible Generator(Value, Secret) −→ Pseudonym (3.12)
Re-identification(Pseudonym, Secret) −→ Value (3.13)
One-way pseudonym generation is usually based on hash functions,
which are also used in other domains, e.g., cryptography, database
indexing, or blockchains. A one-way hash makes it hard to determine
the original value from the hash value within a reasonable amount of
time, but allow a fast computation of the hash [201].
One-Way Generator(Value) −→ Pseudonym (3.14)
Re-identification(Pseudonym) X−→ Value (3.15)
Furthermore, a distinction can be made between dependent and
independent pseudonym generation. Dependent pseudonym gener-
ation retains a relationship of the pseudonym with the original data
value. The original data value is used as an input for the generation of
the pseudonym. In contrast, independent pseudonym generation se-
lects the pseudonym randomly and matches it with the original value.
Therefore, no correlation between pseudonym and original value can
be monitored. As a result, pseudonyms based on independent tokens
are more secure, because re-identification with given pseudonyms
only is not possible. Thus, attack patterns like injection attacks can be
prevented [57].
Independent:Pseudonym Generator −→ Pseudonym (3.16)
Dependent:Pseudonym Generator(Value) −→ Pseudonym (3.17)
In general, the generation of a token is based on random seeds,
cryptographic methods or hashing [266]. An overview is given in the
following.
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3.5.1.1 Random Seeds
In health care scenarii, it is necessary to correlate data from different
sources to the same patient without revealing the identity of the
patient to unauthorized entities. Therefore, Lablans et al. [165] propose
a RESTful pseudonymization interface which assigns new or existing
pseudonyms to patient records (see Figure 3.6). The generation of
pseudonyms is hereby based on the Patient Identifier (PID) generator of
Faldum and Pommerening [101]. The PID generator is mainly based
on random seeds allowing fast data processing. Furthermore, the
hereby generated PIDs allow for error detection and correction.
Figure 3.6: Example scenario for Patient Identifier (PID) generation based on
Lablans et al. [165] using pseudonymization.
3.5.1.2 Cryptographic Methods
Cryptographic methods encrypt the original value to generate the
pseudonym. Therefore, they can be classified as dependent pseudo-
nym generators. Cryptographic methods themselves can be differenti-
ated as symmetric or asymmetric approaches.
Asymmetric approaches utilize a public key for encryption and
a private key for decryption. In the literature the usage of the
Rivest–Shamir–Adleman (RSA) algorithm can be found for pseudo-
nymization in a smart grid scenario. The data of meters is vital for
the upkeep of the grid, but it also allows one to infer information
about the activity of the observed household, e.g., when people go
to work or if they are on a holiday trip. This private information has
to be protected for which the meter information is pseudonymized
considering time windows enabling third parties to process temporal
sequentially correct data while the identity of users is protected [235].
Symmetric approaches utilize the same key for both encryption
and decryption. Noumeir et al. [201] propose and discuss several
architectures to enable de-identified clinical data to be exported to a
research system based on the consent of the patient. Hereby, symmet-
ric encryption utilizing Data Encryption Standard (DES) or Advanced
Encryption Standard (AES) is used for pseudonymization to preserve
the privacy of patients while data is used both by authorized medical
personnel as well as researchers [132]. To secure the approaches the
keys have to be securely stored [132]. In general, the disadvantage of
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cryptographic methods is an increased computational cost compared
to other approaches. To definitively prevent re-identification of the
pseudonyms, the key used for decryption can be deleted. Furthermore,
it has to be considered that the output of cryptographic methods can
have a varying size, which has to be considered during the selection
of the pseudonym generation method.
3.5.1.3 Hashing
Hash functions usually map the original value of an input set to a value
of a smaller target set, creating dependent pseudonyms. Thus, hash
functions are often not injective. However, due to the hash function’s
nature, collisions are possible allowing different original values to
be assigned to the same pseudonym. Therefore, collision-resistant
hash algorithms are preferred for pseudonymization. But contrary to
cryptographic methods, the generated pseudonyms have the same
size regardless of the size of the original value. Hashing methods can
further be classified in keyed and non-keyed hashing.
Non-keyed hash functions have the disadvantage that the same
original value is always assigned the same pseudonym, even across
multiple systems using the same hashing function. This allows for
rainbow table attacks, in which for a specific non-keyed hash function,
e.g., Message-Digest Algorithm (MD5), a finite amount of possible origi-
nal value and hashed value combinations are calculated and stored.
An attacker can use these stored combinations to look up possible
original values for a hash and therefore approximate the original value.
This attack can be mitigated by using hash functions wich have a very
high number of possible hashed values [163].
Keyed hashing methods combine cryptographic methods with hash-
ing utilizing a key. The exchange of the key results in different
pseudonyms for the same original value. Thus, dictionary attack like
the rainbow table attack for MD5 algorithm are not applicable iff the
key remains secret. Therefore, the key has to be stored securely. In the
health care domain, medical records of patients used for research and
personalized medicine. On the one hand, results should be offered
to patients for clinical treatment requiring the re-identification of the
individuals. On the other hand, research data must not be associated
with the individual, which is a contradiction. This challenge is tackled
by Aamot et al. [1] proposing an architecture using Password-Based Key
Derivation Function 2 (PBKDF2) with a deterministic salt, derived from
the Hash Message Authentication Code (HMAC) of the patient identifier,
to preserve the privacy of the patient while the individual patient can
be re-identified to receive feedback. The re-identification is hereby
strongly regulated requiring the involvement and agreement of an
ombudsman.
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3.5.1.4 Use Case Specific Techniques
Further specializations for the generation of pseudonyms exist, which
are tailored to specific use cases. Such specializations are intended to
preserve specific operations on the de-identified data-set and therefore
increase the utility.
For example, network traffic is essential for research of the Internet,
but collecting and making available network traffic proses a privacy
risk to the users. To tackle this challenges, IP-addresses have to be de-
identified in such a way that privacy is preserved while IP-addresses
can still be used for research. Fan et al. [102] propose a cryptographic
scheme using a mix of pseudonymization and anonymization ap-
proaches to preserve the prefix of IP-addresses. Thus privacy of users
can be preserved while prefixes of IP-addresses, required for research,
are preserved in large scale distributed scenarii.
Furthermore, Kerschbaum [152] proposes a pseudonymization tech-
nique for timestamps preserving the distance, which is also applicable
for network traffic. This distance-preserving pseudonymization tech-
nique is additionally applicable on two-dimensional spatial data and
as such usable for different domains.
3.5.2 Implementation Patterns
To gain additional features, like an increased degree of privacy or the
possibility of re-identification, the generation of the pseudonym can
be coupled with additional implementation patterns.
To enable re-identification of the original value based on the pseudo-
nym it is either possible to use a reversible pseudonym generator, e.g.,
based on RSA, or to implement bijective mapping with a one-way
pseudonym generator, e.g., based on MD5. Bijective mapping stores
and maps the generated pseudonym with the original value.
Value←→ Pseudonym (3.18)
Therefore, bijective mapping enables re-identification of the one-
way generated pseudonym. Assuming the previously suppressed and
generalized example data-set for multidimensional data (see Table
3.7), deletion is used for the anonymization of the ID and name of
Bob. If pseudonymization is used instead, the anonymity of the iden-
tity of Bob is preserved while authorized re-identification is enabled.
Therefore, the usage of a one-way hash function is assumed creating a
5-digit hash for both the ID and the name of Bob, which 1) replaces
the respective original value and 2) is stored for later authorized re-
identification using bijective mapping. Therefore, the hash function
generates the pseudonym ′12345 ′ for the ID ′2 ′ as well as the pseudo-
nym ′40404 ′ for the name ′Bob ′. The corresponding mapping is stored
(see Table 3.17 and Table 3.18) and the original values replaced, thus
resulting in Table 3.19.
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Table 3.17: Mapping store for ID for
the data-set in Table 3.1 in
which the ID of the record
of Bob is stored.
Mapping Store ID
Original Value Pseudonym
2 12345
Table 3.18: Mapping store for name
for the data-set in Table 3.1
in which the name of the
record of Bob is stored.
Mapping Store Name
Original Value Pseudonym
Bob 40404
Table 3.19: Pseudonymization of the ID and name of Bob replacing the cor-
responding original values based on the previously generalized
data-set in Table 3.7.
EI QI SD NSD
ID Name Sex Age Postal-Code Salary Lucky#
1 Alice F 27 94032 30.000 1234
12345 40404 ANY 25 - 37 940** 35.000 1337
3 Charlie M 29 94405 28.000 404
To prevent any unauthorized re-identification, it is necessary that
the generated mapping is secured, e.g., by encryption [165]. For each
entry to be pseudonymized, the original value can be looked up in the
mapping store and, iff a corresponding pseudonym exists, returned.
Otherwise, a new pseudonym is generated and appended to the
mapping. As the performance of the pseudonym generator depends
on the underlying algorithm, the lookup of the original value in the
mapping store usually has run-time advantages compared to the
generation of pseudonyms for each value. Additionally, this depends
on the amount of distinct original values in the data-set.
To enable the processing of pseudonyms without alteration of the
application, the format of the original value has to be preserved. Lim-
ited token generation mimics the original value format by exclusively
calculating pseudonyms with the same character set and the same
structure. For instance, an input date is also structured as a date after
pseudonymization [266].
Additional privacy and security enhancing techniques can be com-
bined with pseudonymization. Noise addition strengthens the pseudo-
nym by adding pseudo-random noise to the generation in addition to
the original value [17]. However, anomaly detection or similar tech-
niques may counter the noise. Salting adds an entropy, i.e. salt, to
the pseudonym generation process to mitigate dictionary attacks and
therefore reduces the risk of re-identification [1]. The salt value can
either be generated deterministically from a given value [1], or as a
random value [235].
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3.5.3 Reasoning on Pseudonymization
Summarizing, pseudonymization has several noteworthy benefits.
First, data values are always transformed consistently, assuming the
same method is used, allowing distributed generation of pseudonyms
that are uniform. Pseudonyms can be generated such that their format
is preserved and thus no adaptation of the applications is required
to store and process pseudonyms. Furthermore, different data types
are supported. Based on the chosen algorithm, the strength of pseudo-
nymization can be high, especially when independent pseudonym
generation is chosen. A great strength of pseudonyms lies in their
ability to be reversible, due to bijective mapping or reversible pseudo-
nym generation. Lastly, the generation of pseudonyms, especially in
comparison to anonymization, is relatively simple demanding only a
small CPU cost [251] [266].
The selection of the pseudonymization method is highly dependent
on the intended use case. Several aspects have to be considered, in-
cluding the format and length of the original data value, the intended
usage of the pseudonym, the performance requirements, as well as the
security and privacy requirements. If pseudonyms shall be reversible,
the secure storage of the secret is essential to avoid unauthorized
re-identification.
Similarly to anonymization and privacy models, no de-facto best
pseudonymization method can be derived, because various options
are available (see Table 3.20). Therefore, a privacy language expressing
pseudonymization methods has to generically express several types,
while the secure storage of the secrets or bijective mappings has to be
handled by an overarching application. Next, related works on privacy
languages are classified utilizing the previously detailed requirements
for a privacy language (see Chapter 2).
Table 3.20: Summary of approaches for pseudonymization.
Pseudonym Generator Method
Reversible Generation
or
One-Way Generation
Independent
or
Dependent
Random Seed
or
Cryptographic-Function
or
Hash-Function
Bijective-Mapping
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In this chapter, the derived set of requirements for a privacy language
modelling privacy policies of Chapter 2 is used to to evaluate and clas-
sify state-of-the-art privacy languages. Hereby, a research gap of the
integration of de-identification methodology in privacy languages is
identified. Furthermore, the approach for the Layered Privacy Language
is positioned within the state-of-the-art literature.
4.1 classification of privacy languages
Several privacy languages have been proposed in the literature, each
with their own distinct focus. In this chapter, the classification for
privacy languages is based on a broad literature research as well as
the previously defined requirements (see Chapter 2).
Indeed existing classifications for privacy languages [164] [151] lack
a focus on privacy but privilege a security focus.
Kumaraguru et al. [164] classify privacy languages according to
their target use cases as Sophisticated Access Control Languages, Web
Privacy Policy Languages, Context Sensitive Languages, and Enterprise
Privacy Policy Languages. Furthermore, they create a sub-categorization
for each of their categories, except Enterprise Privacy Policy Languages,
denoting if the privacy language expresses the privacy requirements
of the User, e.g., privacy preferences, or of the Enterprise, e.g., privacy
policies.
Morel and Pardo [188] surveyed privacy languages and classified
them according their Features, Audience, i.e. Data Subject or Controller,
Conditions, i.e. if Time or Space constraints can be defined, and Content.
For Features it is considered if the language is intended for Usability, if
theSyntax is XML or a formal language is used, if Enforcement of the
policy is defined, if the privacy language is Implemented, and which
Tools are available.
Kasem-Madani and Meier [151] introduce a multidimensional cat-
egorization for security and privacy languages. The first category
is the Type of the privacy language which considers the intended
purpose of the privacy language in a similar way to the survey of
Kumaraguru et al. [164]. They differentiate for the Type between Secu-
rity, Accountability, Availability, Privacy, Data carriage, Data usage control,
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and Network and device management. Compared to Kumaraguru et al.
[164], they consider in the second category, i.e. the Intention of Use, not
only the User requirements and the Enterprise policies, but also consider
Multiple parties interaction, e.g., policies that are intended to be used
from a user and company perspective. The category Scope represents
the number and scope of actors of the use case, which has the sub-
categories Data exchange, Service requester/service provider, Agreement
descriptions, Authorization, Access control, and Application Monitoring.
Lastly, they introduce sub-categories for Design and Implementation
Details which are composed of Usability, Context sensitivity, Syntax, and
Extensibility sub-category. It can be seen that privacy languages are
more fine-grained classified in this approach, but the basic principle
of classifying privacy languages according to their intended use case
remains alongside with the focus on the user or the company.
This concept is followed but the overall complexity of the classi-
fication is reduced by considering only the intended usage and the
previously introduced requirements for a privacy language (see Chap-
ter 2). Therefore, a classification of privacy languages is developed
according to their intended usage (see Figure 4.1). Hereby, it is dif-
ferentiated between a focus on Privacy and Security of the privacy
language based on Gerl et al. [121]. It is further differentiated accord-
ing to the specific intended purpose of the privacy language. Privacy
languages with a Security-focus are differentiated in Access Policies and
Service-Level-Agreement (SLA) Policies (see Table 4.1). Privacy languages
associated to Access Policies intend to prevent unauthorized access
to data or files utilizing access control mechanisms. Although access
control is required to ensure privacy, it is designated to the security
focus, because it was developed more within the security domain. SLA
Policies describe contracts and agreements for, e.g., B2B processes in
order to ensure a reliable and secure environment. Hereby SLA policies
can express various requirements both functional and non-functional.
Privacy languages with a focus on Privacy are differentiated accord-
ing to their intended purpose in Privacy Policy Transparency, Privacy
Policy Preferences, and Privacy Policy Enforcement (see Table 4.2).
In the following, noteworthy privacy languages are shortly pre-
sented and classified according to requirements for a privacy policy
expressing privacy language from Chapter 2 while the privacy lan-
guages are differentiated based on their focus on privacy or security.
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Figure 4.1: Classification of privacy languages in categories with Security-
Focus and Privacy-Focus [121]. The classification is based on the
works of Kumaraguru et al. [164] and Kasem-Madani and Meier
[151].
4.1.1 Access Control Policy
Access Policies are categorized as a subset of privacy languages with a
focus on security (see Table 4.1). Their main intention is to formulate
rules that define which entities can access which resources, such that
only authorized accesses are possible. Therefore, they mainly fulfil the
Privacy Policy Structure and Access Control requirement.
Examples for Access Control Policy languages are XACL [128], Ponder
[78], Rei [145], Polymer [28], SecPAL [30], AIR [156], XACML [96] and
ConSpec [11], which are presented and discussed in the following
according to the requirements for a privacy language.
The XML Access Control Language (XACL) specifies security rules to
be enforced on specific XML documents. These security rules define
CRUD (Create, Read, Update, Delete) actions on objects of the XML
document. The core element is ACL defining access to Objects. An
XACL Policy contains several Rules each holding several ACL elements.
Because several ACLs can be defined for the same Object, conflict
resolution is implemented [128].
Ponder defines role-based access control (RBAC) for networks and
distributed systems. It supports obligation policies that are event
triggered condition-action rules. Supported operations for policies are
authorisation, delegation, information filtering and refrain. The base
structure of Ponder consists of an Operation, e.g., the authorization
given to a Subject on a Target with a corresponding Action. Roles are
hierarchically structured and defined via a tree [78].
Contract Specification Language (ConSpec) allows fine-grained access
control on sensitive resources of, e.g., mobile devices, and is based on
an automata formalism. For the language design, a trade-off between
clean semantics and expressiveness has been made. A ConSpec policy
selects a set of acceptable executions from all defined executions
and can therefore define different conditions under which sensitive
resources can be accessed [11].
Rei is based on deontic logic, i.e. formalism for obligations and
permission, for access control, which is defined with RDF (Resource
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Description Framework). A policy is a tuple of Action and Condition,
whereas Action and Condition are respectively a domain specific action
and restriction on the actor or environment. The policy is referencing
both a Subject and a Policy Object allowing RBAC on objects, each
with a unique identifier. Additional constructs for Rights, Prohibitions,
Obligations and Dispensatios exist [145].
Similar to Rei, Accountability in RDF (AIR) is a privacy language
intended for the semantic web. Nested rules express the reasoning
for actions to perform. Furthermore, AIR allows the explanation of
inferred information and contextualized reasoning. AIR allows the
specification of natural language explanations for rules. Lastly, AIR
supports Linked Rules, so that rules can be reused in a manner similar
to Linked Data [156] [146].
SecPAL is a logic-based privacy language which supports complex
access control requirements of large scale distributed systems. Pred-
icates are used to define policies and credentials as triples. Access
requests are mapped to logical authorization queries, consisting of
predicates and constraints combined by conjunctions, disjunctions,
and negations. Thus, fine-grained access control to data can be defined,
but purposes cannot be expressed [30].
The eXtensible Access Control Markup Language (XACML) is a generic
privacy language for fine-grained policy-based access control, which
is standardised. XACML policies can be defined and managed in
a distributed manner, such that different individuals can manage
separate parts of the policy, while a combined access decision can be
found. In its core, XACML stipulates boolean expressions (Conditions)
with corresponding Effects in the form of Rule-elements. Rule-elements
are combined within a Policy-element to form access rules, which can
be merged within a Policy-Set. XACML Rules operate on Attributes,
which define known values by identifier, e.g., a document that should
be accessed [96].
Polymer is different from other Access Policies. Instead of express-
ing access rules, it monitors actions with triggers. If an untrusted
application intends to execute a secured action, it is trigerred and a
suggestion for handling the incident is generated [28].
The presented privacy languages can be classified as Access Policies,
because they allow the regulation of access to (personal) data in
different domains, e.g., XACL protects access to XML documents,
Rei is intended for the semantic web, while generic approaches exist,
e.g., XACML. It can be observed that all presented languages, except
Polymer, fulfil the Access Control requirement partly, whereas different
access control schemes are used, e.g., RBAC is used by Ponder and
Rei. The Access Control requirement is only fulfilled partially, because
the legally required purpose is not considered for the access control
decision.
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The Privacy Policy Structure can be supported completely by XACL,
AIR, and XACML, while the others can be interpreted on focusing only
on data or purposes. The R1 Privacy Policy Structure requirement is
fulfilled by several Access Control Policy languages, e.g. AIR or XACML,
but others are missing either the explicit definition of purposes or
attributes. The requirement R3 Human-readability is only considered
by AIR, which allows for human-readable descriptions of its rules.
The requirements R5 De-identification Capabilities, R6 Provenance, or R2
Legal Compliance in the context of the GDPR are not covered by any of
the presented privacy languages. The Access Control Policy languages
are specialized on in detail access control mechanisms and show that
the R4 Access Control requirement is covered well in the literature (see
Table 4.1). Especially in the emerging field of IoT, various promising
approaches for fine-grained access control can be observed [204] [272]
[282] [12]. Because this requirement is well covered in the literature,
only basic purpose-based access control mechanisms are realized for
LPL. The extension of LPL by additional access control elements is
possible, e.g., integrating obligations, conditions, or effects.
4.1.2 SLA Policy
Service Level Agreement (SLA) Policy languages can be categorized as
a subset of privacy languages with a focus on security (see Table
4.1). Their main intention is to formulate agreements or contracts for
B2B processes. Therefore, they consider aspects of the Privacy Policy
Structure and are focused on Legal Compliance.
Examples for SLA Policies are SLAng [166] [184] and USDL [202].
SLAng describes SLAs, which accommodate end-to-end quality
of service (QoS), typically for B2B cloud use cases. QoS has many
facets and requires complex agreements between network, storage
and middle-ware services. This includes the definition of the retention
of data, which is part of the requirements for legal compliance [166]
[184].
The Unified Service Description Language (USDL) describes business,
operational and technical parameters of services while context spe-
cific legal requirements, e.g., terms of use or copyright, are taken
into account. Its Legal Module addresses the need for legal compli-
ance in service networks and in trading services on marketplaces.
USDL is designed to incorporate business processes that can be easily
comprehended by its users [202].
Although, SLA Policies can be classified as privacy languages, their
main focus is formulating inter business agreements instead of policies
between users and companies. But, this is also essential in terms
of the legal framework of GDPR, which states that technical and
organizational measures have to be applied and documented to ensure
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secure and private processing of personal data [110, Art. 32, Recital
78].
SLAng may be mapped to the structure of a privacy policy, whereas
USDL fulfils this requirement only partially. Both, SLAng and USDL
only partially cover legal compliance of privacy policies through their
definition of data retention. USDL can be presented in an easily ac-
cessible human-readable format, which covers the human-readability
requirement. Other requirements are not covered by either SLAng or
USDL (see Table 4.1).
4.1.3 Privacy Policy Transparency
Privacy languages which specialize in informing about services’ pri-
vacy conditions or privacy policy are classified as Privacy Policy Trans-
parency (see Table 4.2). Therefore, they fulfil the Privacy Policy Structure
and Access Control requirement, furthermore a focus on Legal Compli-
ance and Human-readability is given.
The privacy languages P3P [273],and CPExchange [49] are presented
for this category.
The privacy language Platform for Privacy Preferences Project (P3P)
defined a protocol to inform users about the privacy policy of web-
sites, e.g., online shops. P3P expresses its policies in the machine-
readable XML format. Its elements, i.e. Policy, Entity, Purpose and Data,
can cover the base structure of privacy policies. Legal compliance is
partially covered by the Retention element. Access control mechanism
are enabled by the Access element. Furthermore, human-readability is
partially given, e.g., by the CONSEQUENCE-element, which optionally
details the intention of the web-sites. But, P3P policies are mainly
intended to be automatically compared to machine-readable privacy
preferences of users. A separate human-readable privacy policy is
required. Although P3P has been standardised and has been popular,
it has several downsides including a fixed, thus limited, vocabulary,
e.g., for purposes, a lack of formal semantics, and the possibility to
define conflicting statements within a P3P policy [273] [260] [72] [280].
Customer Profile Exchange (CPExchange) is intended to exchange pri-
vacy information as meta-data attached to business data, whereas the
privacy information is encoded as P3P policies. CPExchange provides
a comprehensive view of the customer as an entity who interacts with
multiple facets of a company instead of a user of a specific service
of a company. A fine-grained authorization and privacy model sup-
ports the exchange of aggregated information of different data stores.
Various profile data elements can be associated with multiple privacy
policies. Next to the elements of P3P, additional information is stored
to determine the partners for the exchange of the information as well
as jurisdictional definitions. The jurisdictional information is intended
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for use cases in which an exchange of data is realized which falls
under different legal frameworks [49] [110, Art. 44 - 50].
Comparing the presented privacy languages, it can be observed that
the basic structure of privacy policies is considered by all, but the legal
compliance is only partially considered. Both P3P and CPExchange
have been proposed before the enforcement of the GDPR, thus it
is no surprise that its legal aspects could not be fully considered.
Both P3P and CPExchange mostly rely on machine-readable policies
with few human-readable information. Lastly, access control rules are
considered by both presented privacy languages (see Table 4.2).
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4.1.4 Privacy Policy Preferences
Privacy languages, which specialize in the expression of the users’
privacy preferences regarding services, are classified within the Privacy
Policy Preferences category (see Table 4.2). Therefore, they focus on
the Privacy Policy Structure, but also the Legal Compliance, Human-
readability, and Access Control requirement is focused on by some
privacy languages depending on their intended use.
The privacy languages APPEL [179], XPref [10], XPACML [34], S4P
[32] [33], and YaPPL [264] are detailed and discussed.
A P3P Preference Exchange Language (APPEL) enables users to define
privacy preferences. It is intended to support the decision-making if
a P3P policy complies to a users’ privacy preference. The concept of
APPEL is that a user imports privacy preference rule-sets from third
parties or shares its own privacy preference definition. The vocabulary
of APPEL is limited to the scope of P3P. Furthermore, users can only
specify what is not acceptable and not what is acceptable, which can
be compared to a blacklist and limits the expressiveness of APPEL.
Lastly, APPEL privacy preferences are error prone and hard to define
[179] [10].
XPref is a successor to APPEL which intends to enhance the decision-
making based on P3P policies while overcoming the downsides of
APPEL. It is based on XML Path Language (XPath), which is a query
language for selecting nodes from an XML document as well as to
compute values from the content of an XML document. This enables a
faster matching between P3P policies and XPref privacy preferences,
which are formulated as Rules of a Ruleset. Furthermore, XPref is as
expressive as APPEL [10].
The eXtensible Privacy Access Control Markup Language (XPACML)
expresses users’ preferences and privacy terms of the service provider
to enable negotiation between both. XPACML is a combination of
the previously presented privacy languages XACML and P3P, thus
inheriting the access control capabilities of XACML as well as the ca-
pabilities to represent privacy policies of P3P. But XPACML is lacking
support for human-readability, e.g., the expression of the contents of a
privacy policy. Furthermore, no mechanisms for de-identification nor
provenance are considered [34].
Similar to XPACML, S4P expresses both users’ preferences and pri-
vacy policies of the service. S4P is based upon the previously described
SecPAL, which is used to express preferences and policies as assertions
and queries written. Additionally, permissions and obligations are
introduced. To verify if a users’ preference is satisfied by a services’
policy, queries are evaluated against the assertions. The abstract vocab-
ulary and semantics of S4P enable its expressivness and application
in various domains [32] [31] [33].
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YaPPL is a privacy preference language which is designed for
use in the IoT context to enable GDPR-compliant consent. For each
preference rule, the recipient of the data as well as the purpose of
the processing are expressed. Furthermore, the (temporal) validity of
the processing of personal data is explicitly expressed and stored for
accountability and archiving purposes. Several preference rules can
be combined, which allows dealing with complex scenarii [264].
It can be observed that APPEL, XPref, and XPACML are either
based on P3P or complementary to it, whereas XPref is a successor
of APPEL and XPACML furthermore considers access control mech-
anisms due to its basis on XACML. S4P follows a similar concept
like XPACML, both defining users’ preferences as well as the privacy
policy of the service. Among the introduced privacy languages, only
YaPPL considers human-readability as a core feature. YaPPL requires
human-readability, because it specializes in enabling GDPR-compliant
consent in the context of IoT. But other legal requirements are also
given by the GDPR, such that the legal compliance of YaPPL to GDPR
is only classified as partially fulfilled. Neither de-identification nor
provenance requirements are considered in any of the presented pri-
vacy languages classified under Privacy Policy Preferences (see Table
4.2).
4.1.5 Privacy Policy Enforcement
Privacy languages which specialize in the realization of privacy, ei-
ther in terms of the users’ privacy preferences or services’ privacy
policies are classified as Privacy Policy Enforcement (see Table 4.2).
Therefore, they focus on the Privacy Policy Structure and Access Control
mechanisms to realize privacy guarantees. The Legal Compliance and
Human-readability requirement is focus of only a few Privacy Policy
Enforcement privacy languages. But only in this category, privacy lan-
guages can be found that consider the Provenance and De-identification
Capabilities requirements with basic approaches.
The privacy languages DORIS [45], E-P3P [19], EPAL [20], PPL
[16], P2U [140] [141], SPECIAL [54] [53] [50], and PrivPolicy [270] are
detailed and discussed.
Datenschutz-orientiertes Informationssystem (DORIS) is an information
system with focuses on privacy. A data model and a data manipulation
language are introduced, which are based on the right of informa-
tional self-determination, i.e. users have the authority to limit the
extent of sharing information about his private life to others [126]. To
the extent of our knowledge, DORIS is the first systematic approach
to model a privacy language and use it within an information system.
The concept considers only an application as its scope, in contrast to a
scope that considers the exchange of personal data between various
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applications. Hereby, the application details the persons and relation-
ships. A person knows things about himself and his relationship to
others. Furthermore, a person is acquainted with other persons repre-
senting a social environment. A person, which can have several roles,
can furthermore interact with others by sending messages to query
information or perform tasks. The privacy policy of DORIS models the
rights of a person, which consists of acquaintances and role authorities
and determines which information is obtained for a query. The privacy
language describes persons and their interaction with others through
several operations, e.g., insert, tell, or revoke. But the concept of the
Purpose has not been introduced. Additionally, data protection officers,
representing the legal responsibility, are also considered within the
concept of DORIS [45].
The Platform for Enterprise Privacy Practices (E-P3P) defines fine-
grained purpose-based access control for personal data. Unlike P3P,
although the name indicates close similarity, E-P3P defines the pri-
vacy practices that are implemented inside a company. Because of
companies’ internal description of details is expressed, the syntax
and semantics are more detailed than P3P allowing automatic en-
forcement and audit. E-P3P expresses the privacy policy as a set of
terms and rules, which defines actions, obligations, and conditions on
data groups for specific purposes and users. Although purposes are
defined, only data groups instead of specific data items are addressed
by E-P3P. E-P3P extends P3P mainly by access control rules to be
enforced, such that an automatic translation of E-P3P policies to P3P
policies is possible to inform users (externals of the companies) about
the processing of personal data [150] [19]. E-P3P could also be consid-
ered as an Access Control Policy language, but the focus lies more on
the enforcement of privacy policies, which includes access control.
The Enterprise Privacy Authorization Language (EPAL) intends to al-
low companies only to process data according to legal regulations.
Therefore, actions on purposes are defined which the user has to
consent to. EPAL includes authorization mechanisms, while both the
data model and authentication are abstracted. Hereby, EPAL defines
hierarchies of data, user and purposes which are used as the basis for
access decisions. A peculiarity of EPAL is that the rules are sorted by
descending precedence, such that more specific rules, e.g., for a single
user, should be put before more general rules, e.g., for a department
of a company, to realize exceptions [20] [255] [14].
The PrimeLife Policy Language (PPL) is an extension of XACML, thus
inheriting its access control capabilities. PPL focuses on the description
of the usage of personal data of users by companies. It tackles the
following main challenges:
• Detection of inconsistent policies: The policy creator is warned
about missing obligations, e.g., missing retention of personal
data.
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• Consideration and expression of users’ privacy preferences: The
user can agree to a full policy or consent to parts of the privacy
policy by ticking check-boxes.
• Expression and enforcement of obligations: The policy denotes
obligations to users, linked to their personal data, that have to
fulfilled, thus are enforced.
When data is transferred to third parties, denoted as downstream
users, the policy is attached to the personal data, thus enabling the
enforcement of PPL during secondary use, which is only interpreted
as a partial fulfilment of the provenance requirement, because the
Data Production use case is not considered. The linkage of personal
data with a corresponding policy is denoted in the literature as the
sticky policy concept [207]. To enable the negotiation with users the
Send Data? user interface has been introduced, visualizing the usage of
personal data for different purposes in a layered approach [16] [261]
[15].
The goal of the Scalable Policy-aware Linked Data Architecture For
Privacy, Transparency and Compliance (SPECIAL) project is to address
the contradiction between the processing of personal data to create
innovative technology and the preservation of users’ privacy. Trust in
the processing of personal data should be enabled due to transparency
while companies can gain insights from the processing of personal
data. Within the SPECIAL project, a usage policy language [54] and a
policy log vocabulary [53] are defined, which are based on PPL. Usage
policies describe the general usage of data for a specific purpose,
whereas the operation itself is described, where and how long the data
is stored and which entities can access the data. Thus, the basic privacy
policy structure is given. Furthermore, the processing of data can be
expressed, e.g., the anonymization or transfer of data [51]. Therefore,
the expression of de-identification of data is partially possible with
anonymization, but no details or scope of possible anonymization
methods is given. Furthermore, the expression of pseudonymization
methods is missing. Lastly, the vocabulary of the usage policy language
of SPECIAL does take into account consent, but fine-grained control
on the quality, i.e. anonymization level, of attributes is not given (see
Section 3.4).
Although compliance to GDPR is striven for, the usage policies
express only basic information on the processing of personal data, e.g.,
the identity and the contact details of the processing company is not
expressed [110, Art. 13(1), Art. 14(1)]. Furthermore, the processing of
personal data is logged using the policy log vocabulary. This enables
users to trace the processing of their personal data according to their
consent decisions, while the company has a full documentation which
can be used in possible reviews by supervisory authorities to prove the
compliance to GDPR. Thus, Provenance is also partially fulfilled within
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the scope of a SPECIAL enabled application because it can be tracked
down from which individual personal data is processed for which
purpose, but the exchange and processing of personal data beyond
the application cannot be fully traced. Appropriate user interfaces for
consent-management and transparency are introduced based on the
privacy languages of SPECIAL [227] [54] [53] [50].
The purpose-to-use (P2U) privacy language, which is inspired by P3P,
is designed for secondary data sharing of personal data. Therefore,
its focus lies on the negotiation of the value or price of personal data
between companies. The user is assumed to explicitly edit the policy
which defines the sharing of his personal data for a specific purpose,
with a retention period and price. The definition of retention is hereby
interpreted as a partial fulfilment of the legal compliance requirement.
This negotiation process is core of P2U for which an overarching
framework is proposed [140] [141].
PrivPolicy [270] is a policy specification language inspired by
LEGALEASE [243]. With PrivPolicy a set of clauses can be defined, each
defining which personal data can be processed for which purpose
by which data recipients. Instead of a purpose-based approach for
defining the clauses, a data-based approach is used. Furthermore,
in PrivPolicy it can be defined if the user is notified or consent
is required, but no human-readable texts can be defined. Privacy
guarantees, e.g., the use of a privacy model, can be defined by the
DECLASS attribute. But, this only partially fulfils the De-identification
Capabilities requirement, because 1) it is undefined which attributes
are anonymized or pseudonymized and 2) personal privacy settings
cannot be defined for specific attributes. PrivPolicy is used for privacy
compliance checking and enforcement via an overarching framework
PrivGuard.
It can be observed that EPAL, PPL, SPECIAL, P2U, and PrivPol-
icy fulfil the requirement set regarding the privacy policy structure.
But DORIS, as the probably first privacy language, and E-P3P both
lack structure. Expression of several legal frameworks is considered
by E-P3P, P2U inherits the correlating properties of P3P, while PPL,
PrivPolicy and SPECIAL consider some concepts of GDPR but not all.
Furthermore PPL is considered for interaction with users through
the Send Data? user interface; this capability is also inherited by the
SPECIAL privacy languages. SPECIAL introduced user interfaces for
consent-management and transparency. The usage of sticky policies is
considered by PPL and SPECIAL, thus the provenance requirement
is considered as partially fulfilled by these privacy languages. All
presented privacy languages of the Privacy Policy Enforcement cate-
gory utilize access control mechanisms for their enforcement. Only
SPECIAL and PrivPolicy express the processing of personal data, i.e.
anonymization of data. This is only a partial fulfilment of the require-
ment denoting the the enforcement of de-identification methods on
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personal data (see Table 4.2), because it is undefined which anonymi-
zation (or de-identification) methods (see Chapter 3) can be expressed.
Furthermore, it is unclear if the concept of personal privacy can be
expressed. Thus, it can only be speculated which de-identification
methods can be expressed with the privacy languages of SPECIAL
and PrivPolicy.
4.1.6 Discussion
A classification of privacy languages in the categories Access Control
Policy, SLA Policy, Privacy Policy Transparency, Privacy Policy Preferences,
and Privacy Policy Enforcement was detailed. Furthermore, each related
privacy language was categorized according to the previously given
requirements for a privacy language expressing privacy policies in
Chapter 2.
It can be observed that privacy languages not only focus on the mod-
elling of privacy policy, but also on correlated properties like technical
and organisational measures via SLA Policies. Furthermore, access
control mechanisms, including authentication and authorization, are
currently the state-of-the-art mechanism to preserve privacy within
privacy languages. Hereby, various access control mechanisms have
been proposed to enable the definition of rules expressing basically
what data can be processed by which entity for which purpose.
Informing the individual transparently has been factored in by
relatively few privacy languages in the past, but has become an essen-
tial feature for more current privacy languages like PPL or SPECIAL.
Hereby, a strong effort is made in creating privacy languages that al-
low users to interact with the privacy policy to express their personal
privacy requirements and to express consent, which is an essential
requirement for legal compliance to GDPR.
The sharing and trading of personal data is furthermore considered
by several privacy languages. P2U proposes a concept to enable the
negotiation of a price for personal data trading, while PPL, A-PPL and
SPECIAL consider the processing of personal data for secondary use.
Hereby, the concept of sticky policies is introduced to link personal
data with the corresponding data even after it has been transferred.
The legal compliance according to GDPR is partially fulfilled and
partially pursued by several privacy languages, but especially regard-
ing the privacy policy the presented privacy languages lack expressive-
ness to define all required information. For example, the possibility to
define the responsible Data Protection Officer and Controller is missing,
or the definition of automated decision-making is not possible.
Finally, all of the given requirements for a privacy language have
been considered by a privacy language in the literature, but the intro-
duction of de-identification capabilities for a fine-grained control over
the quality of a data that is to be processed in a privacy-preserving
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way is only schematically introduced by SPECIAL and PrivPolicy. This
is identified as a research gap, which is addressed within this work
in order to allow users not only to control access to their personal
data but also to control the quality of the processed personal data.
Considering this research gap, the approach of this work is positioned
to the related works in the following.
4.2 positioning
In the following, this work is positioned according to the privacy
language requirements and related works. Requirements for a privacy
language that models privacy policies according to GDPR are defined
in Chapter 2. According to these requirements, a privacy language
has to model the base structure of privacy policies (R1 Privacy Policy
Structure). Furthermore, the privacy language has to comply with legal
requirements, i.e. the GDPR (R2 Legal Compliance). To allow users to
easily understand the privacy policy, the privacy language has to be
human-readable, for which both a textual and visual representation
of its contents is considered by the R3 Human-readability requirement.
Furthermore, to enable the expression and enforcement of privacy
guarantees, a privacy language has not only to be able to integrate
R4 Access Control mechanisms, but also R5 De-identification Capabilities
considering the personal privacy concept (see Section 3.4). Addition-
ally, when data is transferred or processed, the R6 Provenance has to be
maintained such that the user can identify himself as the owner of the
personal data and claim his Data Subject Rights, while companies are
accountable and can show their compliance to the legal regulations.
In this chapter, state-of-the-art privacy languages have been cate-
gorized and classified according to the introduced requirements of
Chapter 2 and concluded that no privacy language fulfils all of them
to the full extent. The requirements of the Privacy Policy Structure and
Access Control have been fully covered by most privacy languages in
the literature. Furthermore, Legal Compliance has been considered by
several privacy languages while only few considered the legal frame-
work of the GDPR due to its relatively novel enforcement. But, the
legal requirements for the content of a privacy policy, have not been
fully covered by any privacy language. Furthermore, the Provenance
requirement is partially covered due to the usage of sticky policies.
Lastly, the requirement De-identification Capabilities has not been cov-
ered by any privacy language to its full extent, which is identified as
an important research gap.
This research gap is addressed by extending the shown approaches
in the literature for privacy, which mainly focus on access control
mechanisms, to express privacy requirements in a privacy policy with
the definition of de-identification methods. Therefore, privacy is not
only the definition of binary access decisions on personal data, i.e.
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as it is realized in the literature, but also fine-grained control on
the quality of information that is shared and processed. Hereby, a
dialectic approach on privacy has to be considered taking into account
the personal privacy requirements of the users and the data quality
requirements for processing of personal data for specific purposes.
To preserve the individuals’ privacy during processing, de-
identification methods are applied. Furthermore, the concept of
personal privacy, i.e. the possibility that the user can influence the
quality of his personal data, complements the existing concept of
consent management, i.e. the binary decision for processing, by addi-
tional fine-grained decisions (see Section 3.4). Hereby, the intention is
that the user can directly influence the anonymization level of each
of his attributes, thus denoting the quality of personal data that is
processed. Taking into account the trade-off between privacy and
utility, the business processes of a company may require a minimum
data quality for processing. Therefore, the company has to be able to
set a limit for the anonymization level to cap off the minimal required
data quality for a specific purpose. By utilizing a privacy language
for the expression of these personal privacy preferences, it can be
assuming that the company first defines the privacy policy and sets
limits for data quality. Then, users are presented the privacy policy
and are allowed to negotiate, i.e. personalize, the privacy policy to
express their personal privacy settings. If a user requires a higher
anonymization level than allowed by the company, the user is free to
decide not to consent to the purpose or even not to use the service of
the company.
For example, considering the earlier introduced anonymization hi-
erarchy for the postal-code (see Figure 3.2), the creator of the privacy
policy would define the maximum anonymization level for the at-
tribute such that it is still usable for the intended purpose, e.g., to
level ′3 ′. The user can then personalize his personal privacy settings
for postal-code as long as it does not exceed the defined maximum
level of ′3 ′. Thus, a user defining his Minimum Anonymization Level
to ′1 ′ would create a valid personalization (see Figure 4.2). Contrary,
a user defining his Minimum Anonymization Level to ′4 ′ would break
the policy requirements which would not lead to an agreement on
the policy between the user and the company. The inclusive range
between Minimum Anonymization Level and Maximum Anonymization
Level expresses the range of possible values for the later anonymization
of the value.
Furthermore, fine-grained personalization of privacy policies is
considered, which bears challenges for the processing of personal
data, especially the de-identification process. Assuming a data-set
with a million records is processed for a specific purpose in which de-
identification is required, each record has a personalized sticky policy
expressing differing privacy guarantees that has to be considered
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Figure 4.2: Anonymization hierarchy for the German postal-code for Passau
′94032 ′ (see Figure 3.2) with both the Minimum Anonymization
Level ′1 ′ and Maximum Anonymization Level ′3 ′ detailed. Further-
more, the possible range for values during later anonymization is
denoted.
during the de-identification process. But also the data quality limit
set by the company for the process has to be considered. Therefore,
several aspects for the guarantee of the individuals privacy have to be
taken into account.
First, the combination and integration of de-identification processes
has to be achieved in a way that they do not interfere with each other.
This includes pseudonymization, personal privacy anonymization and
application of privacy models. Especially, the combination of personal
privacy anonymization and privacy models has to be carefully con-
sidered, because they influence the same data. In the same way, also
pseudonymization, which replaces EI attributes with pseudonyms,
and privacy models, which usually delete EI attributes, influence each
other.
Second, the expression and control of personal privacy decisions,
either binary consent or more fine-grained data quality control, in
a machine-readable privacy language has to be achieved, such that
the user can directly influence the processing of his personal data
at any time. Therefore, classical assumptions that personal data is
de-identified once for a defined privacy level are no longer applicable,
because the privacy level can change at any time due to the direct
influence of the user on it. Thus, the definition of privacy is dynamic
over time for a data-set and has to be reconsidered each time the
data-set is processed possibly altering the de-identified data-set T ′.
Furthermore, it has to be taken into account that the privacy and
utility requirements can vary for different purposes.
Lastly, the execution of the de-identification of the whole data-
set, while for each record an additional personalized privacy policy
has to be achieved, which poses the risk of a significant execution
time overhead compared to the fixed privacy definition approach,
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e.g., usage of 3-Anonymity. Hereby, both the processing of additional
data, i.e. privacy policies expressed by the privacy policy, and the
introduction of varying privacy definitions in the de-identification
process may pose an exhausting processing overhead. Thus, the the
influence of both the volume of privacy policies and the effect of
personal privacy on the execution time of the de-identification process
is evaluated to demonstrate the feasibility of this approach.
To enable such a policy-based de-identification process, a suitable
privacy language is required. Therefore, the following chapter de-
tails the privacy policy expressing Layered Privacy Language (LPL)
that defines privacy guarantees using de-identification methodology,
while the R1 Privacy Policy Structure, R2 Legal Compliance to GDPR, R3
Human-readability, R4 Access Control and R6 Provenance are considered.
The fulfilment of the requirements is either discussed in detail or
demonstrated with proof-of-concept implementations. The realization
of the R5 De-identification Capabilities requirement is covered by the
Policy-based De-identification process in Chapter 6. With the fulfilment
of the requirements for a privacy language (see Chapter 2), the first
research question RQ1 is addressed.
The second research question RQ2 is addressed by the Policy-based
De-identification (PD) process, which demonstrates how various indi-
viduals’ privacy settings defined by LPL are used to de-identify a
data-set in which each record has a linked LPL privacy policy. The
efficiency of the PD process is quantitatively evaluated in comparison
to the sole anonymization of a data-set to match the properties of a
privacy model (see Chapter 7). Furthermore, the evaluation details the
effects of various personal privacy settings on the run-time of the PD
process.

5
L AY E R E D P R I VA C Y L A N G UA G E ( L P L )
In this chapter, the derived requirements for a privacy policy in Chap-
ter 2 are leveraged to detail the reasoning for the proposed Layered
Privacy Language (LPL), the formalization of LPL and its intended
life-cycle. Furthermore, detailed examples are given which show the
fulfilment of the requirements of Chapter 2.
5.1 concepts
In Chapter 2, the requirements R1 Privacy Policy Structure, R2 Legal
Compliance, R3 Human-readability, R4 Access Control, R5 De-identification
Capabilities, and R6 Provenance for a privacy language that aims to ex-
press privacy policies have been introduced. In Section 4.1, it has been
shown that other works in the literature, but the R5 De-identification
Capabilities has been never the focus. Therefore, the focus is on this
research gap, while considering the other requirements. Next, the core
of the privacy language, the R1 Privacy Policy Structure, is detailed.
5.1.1 Privacy Policy Structure
In Section 2.1, the basic privacy policy structure has been introduced
consisting of the Privacy Policy, Data Source, Data Recipient, Purpose,
and Data. Naturally, this structure as the backbone for the LPL.
The root-element is the LayeredPrivacyPolicy, which corresponds to
the Privacy Policy (see Figure 5.1). Furthermore, a DataSource-element
and a set of Purpose-elements is defined to be referenced by the Layered-
PrivacyPolicy. The DataSource-element can hereby represent the user,
from whom the data originates, or a company which holds the data
and shares it, e.g., with other entities. The Purpose-element represents
a legal purpose, denoting a set of DataRecipient-elements and a set of
Data-elements. A Data-element corresponds to exactly one attribute,
e.g., a column in a relational database, such that for each Purpose, one
can define which attributes are processed. The DataRecipient-element
denotes the entities that have the right to process the Data for the
specific Purpose, e.g., a company, department, or an individual person.
Thus, the R1 Privacy Policy Structure requirement is fulfilled. Next,
the R2 Legal Compliance requirement is considered.
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Figure 5.1: Core privacy policy structure of the Layered Privacy Language.
5.1.2 Legal Compliance
Fundamentally, the usage of privacy languages for the representation
of privacy policies is allowed according to the GDPR, because it falls
under the category of an electronic form [110, Art.12 (1) Sentence 2].
Moreover, to comply with the legal framework of the GDPR, several
aspects have to be considered. In Section 2.2, the information that has
to be provided according to Art. 13 and 14 is pointed out. To pro-
vide this information, elements are created according to the detailed
requirements given in Table 2.1 and added to privacy language.
Moreover, to enable Data Subject Rights, which can be interpreted
as actions performed upon the agreed privacy policy and provided
personal data, is the second goal to achieve. It is necessary that the
user can be identified and authorized to make use of his Data Subject
Rights. For example, if a user wants to make use of his Right of Access
by the Data Subject, then several details about the processing of the
personal data of the user has to be provided in a human-readable
format including the categories of data and the purposes. To answer
such a request, LPL is intended to contain all necessary information.
A detailed analysis of the fulfilment of the R2 Legal Compliance
requirement is given in Section 5.4.2.
5.1.3 Human-readability
To enable R3 Human-readability of a privacy language the introduction
of human-readable texts and Privacy Icons is proposed (see Section
2.3).
To introduce human-readable text in an uniform way for elements,
the abstract super-element UIElement is defined from which all other
human-readable text requiring elements inherit, e.g., LayeredPrivacy-
Policy or Purpose. To enable internationalization support, i.e. support
for multiple languages, the UIElement denotes a set of Header- and
Description-elements. The Header-element defines a human-readable
header and the language of the header while the Description-element
defines a human-readable description for the element as well as the
language for the description. Thus, all essential information are pro-
vided with human-readable texts in order to enhance transparency
of privacy policies. Naturally, the privacy language cannot guarantee
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that the human-readable texts are produced in an easy to understand
manner such that the target audience is sufficiently informed.
Furthermore, in LPL the expression of Privacy Icons is possible.
Because no standardization of icons is achieved yet (see Section 2.3),
a generic definition of Privacy Icons is realized in LPL through the
introduction of the Icon-element. The positioning of the Icon-element
within the LPL privacy language has to be decided on. Privacy Icons are
intended to give meaningful overview of the intended processing [110,
Recital 60]. Therefore, the Icon-element can be either referenced by
the Purpose-element denoting the intended processing of the specific
purpose or it can be referenced by the LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element
denoting the intended processing of the policy. The reference of a set
of Icon-elements by the LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element is used to give
a distinct overview of the processing. Furthermore, the Icon-element
inherits from UIElement, allowing for detailed description of their
meaning in the context of the specific policy.
Lastly, the presentation of the privacy policy has to be considered
for which the Layered approach has been suggested. A prototype
implementations for user interface to create, present and negotiation
LPL privacy policies is detailed in Section 5.6 to demonstrate the
fulfilment of the R3 Human-readability requirement.
5.1.4 Access Control
In general, a privacy policy expresses what personal data can be
used by which entities for which purpose. To ensure only authorized
access, these entities, i.e. expressed via the DataRecipient-element, have
to authenticate themselves. Similarly, the DataSource has to be able
to perform the same actions to, e.g., make use of his Data Subject
Rights. Furthermore, the Controller-element and DataProtectionOfficer-
element are also concerned by access control mechanisms, e.g., the
Controller can create a new privacy policy. Therefore, the R4 Access
Control requirement affects several aspects of LPL.
The intention is to create LPL such that it is agnostic to the authen-
tication method, e.g., private/public keys or user-name/password can
be used, and authorization method, e.g., RBAC. In general, an iden-
tifier and a secret are required for authentication and authorization
which is uniformly defined via the super-element Entity. Other ele-
ments – DataSource, DataRecipient, Controller, and DataProtectionOfficer
– inherit from this element.
Additionally, to the defined entities, the Purpose and Data is consid-
ered during the authorization. Thus, only the specified set of Data can
be processed for a specific Purpose. The integration of elements detail-
ing obligations, conditions, or effects for access control are omitted for
LPL, because they are covered by related works like XACML [96]. An
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extension of LPL by such elements is possible. The fulfilment of the
R4 Access Control requirement with LPL is shown in Section 5.5.
5.1.5 De-identification Capabilities
In Chapter 3, pseudonymization, anonymization, privacy models and
personal privacy have been introduced. All these concepts are related
to the R5 De-identification Capabilities requirement. Each of these de-
identification methods has its distinct usage for preserving privacy,
which are all intended to be expressed via LPL.
The concept of personal privacy allows the user to specify their
own required privacy requirements, which can differ from other users.
Therefore, for each user, a personal privacy policy has to be defined.
In the literature, personal privacy has been either expressed by binary
consent decisions for the whole record of the user or by allowing
the user to specify a desired anonymization level for his sensitive
attributes (SD).
Not only are both variants considered, but they are also extended
to a holistic approach for personal privacy in the context of privacy
policies. First, LPL allows the user to consent to the processing of
his personal data based on the Purpose of the process, which corre-
sponds to the notion of binary consent decisions. Hereby, the attribute
required defines if the Purpose-element is necessary for the usage
of the service or if it is optional and requires consent. This allows
companies or service providers to distinguish between required and
optional purposes of processing, while users are enabled to control for
which purposes their data are processed. Furthermore, the personal
privacy concept is adopted to the Data- and DataRecipient-elements.
Thus, users can make fine-grained decisions on which of their personal
data is processed for a specific purpose and by whom, provided that
the Data or DataRecipient are optional.
Additionally, personalization of the anonymization level for each
attribute is enabled and not only for SD attributes to enable the user
to define for each attribute how it is processed. Therefore, for each
Data-element, an AnonymizationMethod-element is referenced which
defines how the value can be anonymized. Within the Anonymization-
Method-element both a Minimum Anonymization Level and Maximum
Anonymization Level is specified. The Maximum Anonymization Level is
set initially by the creator of the policy, e.g., a company, and defines
the maximum anonymization level that can be set by the user. In other
words, the minimal data quality level required for a specific purpose
is defined by the Maximum Anonymization Level.
The user can set the Minimum Anonymization Level during the nego-
tiation of the privacy policy in order to define his minimum privacy
requirements. The Minimum Anonymization Level must not exceed the
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Maximum Anonymization Level or otherwise the privacy policy cannot
be agreed on.
Therefore, in LPL the policy can express the data requirements of
the company for processing personal data while personal privacy
requirements can be set by the user for Purpose, DataRecipient, Data
including the anonymization level. Thus, fine-grained control over the
privacy-preserving processing is enabled during the negotiation of the
privacy policy.
Furthermore, LPL allows specifying pseudonymization and pri-
vacy models. In contrast to the definition of the AnonymizationMethod-
element which targets a specific Data-element, the pseudonymization
method and privacy model may affect the whole record. Consider-
ing a data-set with several records, pseudonymization replaces the
original values of EI attributes with a pseudonym (see Section 3).
Because both de-identification methods require a more global view
on the data-set compared to the personal privacy anonymization,
LPL integrates a set of PseudonymizationMethod-elements and a set of
PrivacyModel-elements which are referenced by the Purpose-element.
Each of the elements expresses the respective de-identification
method in a generic way, such that the various methods can be defined.
The PseudonymizationMethod-element and PrivacyModel-element do not
feature any possibility for the user to negotiate, because these methods
require expert knowledge to be defined.
The efficient processing of various personalized privacy policies
in combination with pseudonymization and privacy models for the
de-identification of a requested data-set is detailed in Chapter 6.
5.1.6 Provenance
To allow users to assume their rights regarding their personal data,
the personal data has to be linked to the user. Furthermore, it has
to be ensured that for the processing of personal data, the agreed
privacy policy is actually considered. These aspects are considered in
the context of the R6 Provenance requirement.
As shown in Section 4.1, sticky policies are commonly utilized to
create the link between the privacy policy and the related personal
data. But this concept does not consider that the privacy policy is used
as the basis for secondary processing. In the Data Processing use case,
e.g., personal data may be transferred and processed by a third party
only if additional stricter conditions are met, which are expressed by
an additional policy. In the Data Production use case, e.g., personal data
from several users is processed producing new data which is used for
decision-making. To backtrack the source for the decision-making it is
necessary to store all sources, i.e. users, of the original personal data
within the processing policy of the newly generated data.
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These two use cases are addressed in LPL through the introduction
of a set of UnderlyingPrivacyPolicy-elements for each LayeredPrivacyPol-
icy-element. The UnderlyingPrivacyPolicy-element is hereby equal to
the LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element. In other words, each privacy policy
can reference several underlying privacy policies which it is based on.
An underlying privacy policy serves hereby as the base for the top
policy, whereas the top policy must be stricter or equally strict as the
underlying privacy policies. Additional layers can be added.
The layering of privacy policies, which is unique to LPL, in combina-
tion with the well-known sticky policy concept, models and enforces
R6 Provenance. This allows not only to backtrack to the origins of per-
sonal data, i.e. the user, but also to the previously agreed on privacy
policies. An in depth example is discussed in Section 5.7.
5.1.7 Naming
Lastly, the name of the Layered Privacy Language (LPL) is elaborated.
The name of the proposed privacy language, i.e. the term ′layered ′,
is based upon two features that are enabled by LPL. On the one hand,
the term ′layered ′ describes the concept of presenting privacy policies
in several layers for transparency, i.e. the first layer informs the user
about the key elements while the second layer covers details [18] [124]
[99]. Human-readability is considered as one of the key requirements
from a users’ perspective, for which this Layered approach is suitable
(see Section 2.3).
On the other hand, the term ′layered ′ is introduced as one unique
feature of LPL, which allows to specify underlying privacy policies,
i.e. privacy policies that the current privacy policy is based upon
and has to be compliant with. As previously reasoned, this feature is
introduced alongside the usage of the sticky policy concept to fulfil
the Provenance requirement (see Section 2.6).
LPL is formalized in the following section, detailing all elements
and attributes, before the concept of the life cycle of LPL is detailed.
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5.2 formal definition
In this section, the formal description of the Layered Privacy Language
(LPL) is defined, which satisfies the requirements presented in Chapter
2. The structure, including elements and attributes, of LPL is depicted
in Figure 5.2. All the elements presented in the diagram are detailed in
the following subsections, whereas first Super-elements are introduced
from which other elements inherit. For clarity of the description, Table
5.1 provides, for each element, notations that are used for a single
element, a subset of elements and the complete set. The formalization
of LPL is based on the works of Gerl et al. [121], Gerl and Pohl [119],
Gerl [112], and Gerl and Bölz [113].
5.2.1 Super-elements
Super-elements from which other LPL elements inherit are introduced
. None of the Super-elements are utilized standalone within LPL. On
the one hand, the UIElement is introduced, which allows for human-
readability of elements. On the other hand, Entity inherits attributes
to represent and identify an individual, role, or organization like a
company for access control purposes within LPL. Both are detailed in
the following.
5.2.1.1 UIElement
The UIElement ui encapsulates human-readable text,
ui = (ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.1)
is a tuple consisting of ĤEAD and D̂ESC. Both the set of Header-
elements ĤEAD and set of Description-elements D̂ESC are structured
the same way,
head = (lang, value) (5.2)
desc = (lang, value) (5.3)
as a tuple with the following attributes:
• lang: Defines the language for the human-readable text using
the international standard ISO 639-1 utilizing the Alpha-2 code,
representing languages with two letters [134]. For example ′en ′
for English, ′de ′ for German, or ′fr ′ for French.
• value: Denotes the human-readable text in the language speci-
fied by lang. An understandable language, instead of a language
requiring expert knowledge to understand, should be used to
allow users to easily access information [110, Art. 12(1)].
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Thus, an exemplary set of Description-elements stating ′Hello World ′
in English, German, and French would be defined as follows:
D̂ESC = {( ′en ′, ′Hello World ′), ( ′de ′, ′Hallo Welt ′),
( ′fr ′, ′ Bonjour le monde ′)}
(5.4)
The set of all Header-elements, each denoting a concise header for
the element, is denoted by HEAD and ĤEAD denotes a subset of
HEAD. The set of all Description-elements is denoted by DESC and
D̂ESC denotes a subset of DESC.
5.2.1.2 Entity
The Entity-element e, representing persons, companies or any other
entity having some processing rights on the data,
e = (name, classification,authInfo, type, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.5)
is a tuple consisting of the following attributes:
• name: Used for authorization in access control.
• classification: Classifies the Entity in either ′Person ′ or
′Legal Entity ′.
• authInfo: The challenge used for authentication of the Entity,
e.g., a hashed password for which the original password has to
be provided, or a public key for which a corresponding private
key exists. Thus, LPL is agnostic of the authentication methodol-
ogy.
• type: Specifies the type of entity, which can be either a
′DataSource ′, a ′DataRecipient ′, a ′Controller ′, or a
′DataProtectionOfficer ′.
The Entity-element e inherits from UIElement and therefore references
a set of Header-elements ĤEAD as well as a set of Description-elements
D̂ESC representing the human-readable information on the entity.
The set of all Entity-elements is denoted by E and Ê denotes a subset
of E.
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Table 5.1: Overview over all elements and their formal definition. Bold styled
sets are tuples inheriting an order.
Element
Single
Element
Subset of
Elements
Set of
Elements
UIElement ui ÛI UI
Header head ĤEAD HEAD
Description desc D̂ESC DESC
Entity e Ê E
LayeredPrivacyPolicy lpp L̂PP LPP
UnderlyingPrivacyPolicy upp ÛPP UPP
Icon i Î I
DataSource ds D̂S DS
Controller c Ĉ C
DataProtectionOfficer dpo D̂PO DPO
DataSubjectRight dsr D̂SR DSR
LodgeComplaint lc L̂C LC
Purpose p P̂ P
LegalBasis lb L̂B LB
DataRecipient dr D̂R DR
Safeguard sg ŜG SG
AutomatedDecisionMaking adm ÂDM ADM
Retention r R̂ R
PrivacyModel pm P̂M PM
PrivacyModelAttribute pma P̂MA PMA
PseudonymizationMethod psm P̂SM PSM
PseudonymizationMethodAttribute psma P̂SMA PSMA
Data d D̂ D
DataGroup dg D̂G DG
AnonymizationMethod am ÂM AM
AnonymizationMethodAttribute ama ÂMA AMA
HierarchyEntry he ĤE HE
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5.2.2 Elements
All elements from which LPL is composed of are detailed and formal-
ized in the following. The basic privacy policy structure is given by
the LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element referencing a DataSource-element and
a set of Purpose-elements. Furthermore, the Purpose-element denotes a
set of DataRecipient-elements and a set of Data-elements. Complemen-
tary elements are added to fulfil all requirements, e.g., Legal Compliance
for GDPR or De-identification Capabilities.
5.2.2.1 LayeredPrivacyPolicy
The root-element of LPL is the LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element lpp, which
represents a legal privacy policy, e.g., between a user and a company.
Only a single lpp is supposed to be defined for a LPL compliant file,
e.g., privacy policy. A LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element
lpp = (version,name, lang,ppURI, ĤEAD, D̂ESC, Î,ds,
P̂, Ĉ, D̂PO,dsr, lc,upp)
(5.6)
is a tuple consisting of the following attributes:
• version: Version number for future version management of LPL.
• name: Identifier for the privacy policy.
• lang: Defines the default language for the privacy policy, consid-
ering human-readable headers HEAD and descriptions DESC
contained within the LPL privacy policy.
• ppURI: An optional reference to a correlated common privacy
policy, i.e. written document, to assure compliance with the
current law, which is implemented as a static human-readable
description of the privacy policy.
The LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element lpp references a set of Header-
elements ĤEAD as well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC
representing the human-readable information on the policy, e.g., for a
short introduction of the policy. Furthermore, lpp references a set of
Icon-elements Î, a DataSource-element ds, a set of Purpose-elements
P̂, a set of Controller-elements, a set of DataProtectionOfficer-elements,
a DataSubjectRight-element dsr, and a LodgeComplaint-element lc.
Additionally, each LayeredPrivacyPolicy lpp can have a reference to an
UnderlyingPrivacyPolicy upp. Let an UnderlyingPrivacyPolicy-element
be
upp = (version,name, lang,ppURI, ĤEAD, D̂ESC, Î,ds,
P̂, Ĉ, D̂PO,dsr, lc,upp ′)
(5.7)
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where upp ′ is another UnderlyingPrivacyPolicy-element denoting a
previously consented privacy policy. The set of all UnderlyingPrivacy-
Policy-elements is denoted by UPP and ÛPP denotes a subset of UPP.
This allows to create layers of privacy policies to satisfy the objective
of being able to track privacy policies over multiple entities.
Let the deepest (’most underlying’) leaf-LayeredPrivacyPolicy
lppleaf = (version,name, lang,ppURI, ĤEAD, D̂ESC, Î,ds,
P̂, Ĉ, D̂PO,dsr, lc, ∅)
(5.8)
be the first privacy policy for which consent is given. In other words,
the LayeredPrivacyPolicy with no UnderlyingPrivacyPolicy is the initial
privacy policy, which is usually a consent between a user and a legal
entity. If an additional privacy policy lppnew, e.g., for a data-transfer
to a third party, has to be added to an existing lppexisting, then the
lppexisting is wrapped by lppnew. This results in
lppexisting = (version,name, lang,ppURI, ĤEAD, D̂ESC,
Î,ds, P̂, Ĉ, D̂PO,dsr, lc, ∅)
(5.9)
lppnew = (version
′,name ′, lang ′,ppURI ′, ĤEAD ′, D̂ESC ′,
Î ′,ds ′, P̂ ′, Ĉ ′, D̂PO ′,dsr ′, lc ′, lppexisting)
(5.10)
which is valid for each additionally added privacy policy lpp ′new.
In this case, the data source (ds ′) is the Controller (c or Ĉ) of the
policy lppexisting and P̂ ′ can equal P̂ or a be subset of P̂. Naturally,
the remaining elements and attributes may also differ, which are
described in the following. An alternative approach to layering the
LayeredPrivacyPolicy-elements lpp is to layer Purpose-elements, but
this has the disadvantage that elements referenced by lpp cannot be
layered, i.e. updated, without creating a new lpp, which has to take
into account the predecessor lpp. The same argumentation can be
made for any other element, thus LayeredPrivacyPolicy-elements are
layered instead of other elements.
The set of all LayeredPrivacyPolicy-elements is denoted by LPP and
L̂PP denotes a subset of LPP.
5.2.2.2 Icon
The Icon-element i, representing a Privacy Icon,
i = (name, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.11)
is a tuple consisting of the following attribute:
• name: The identifying name of the Privacy Icon to display the
correct icon. To the current date no official standardization of
Privacy Icons is given, thus no fixed set of values is given.
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The Icon-element i references a set of Header-elements ĤEAD as
well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC representing the human-
readable information on the Privacy Icon.
The set of all Icon-elements is denoted by I and Î denotes a subset
of I.
5.2.2.3 DataSource
The DataSource-element ds inherits from the Entity-element e, whereas
the type is set to ′DataSource ′.
ds = (name, classification,authInfo, ’DataSource’,
publiclyAvailable, ĤEAD, D̂ESC)
(5.12)
Next to the attributes inherited by the Entity-element it has the
additional attribute:
• publiclyAvailable: A boolean defining if the data has been
received from a publicly available source. This requirement is
given by GDPR to allow the differentiation between personal
information directly derived from a Data Subject and information
that is already published [110, Art. 14(2) f)].
The DataSource-element describes the current authority granting
data recipients the processing of data, based upon its own process-
ing rights. For example, this can be the user (person) for whom the
personal data is dedicated to or a company (legal entity) that has
collected the personal data for a specific purpose. The set of all Data-
Source-elements is denoted by DS and D̂S denotes a subset of DS.
5.2.2.4 Controller
The Controller-element c inherits from Entity, whereas the type is set
to ′Controller ′.
c = (name, classification,authInfo, ’Controller’,
firstName, lastName,address,phoneNumber, email,
ĤEAD, D̂ESC)
(5.13)
Next to the attributes inherited by the Entity-element, it has the
additional attributes:
• firstName: First name of the representative of the Controller.
• lastName: Last name of the representative of the Controller.
• address: Address of the Controller. A further differentiation in
e.g., postal-code, street and house number has been avoided for
both clarity and generality.
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• phoneNumber: Phone number of the Controller. For clarity in-
ternational standards like the ITU E.123 [135] and E.164 [136] or
national standards like the DIN 5002 [74] should be considered.
• email: E-mail address of the representative of the Controller. The
format should comply with the standards denoted in RFC 5322
[205], RFC 5321 [158] and RFC 3696 [157].
Note that the attributes address, phoneNumber and email have been
chosen as common ways of communication to allow a Data Subject to
contact the Controller and could be further extended by other contact
possibilities like a fax number or alternative contact possibilities.
The Controller-element c represents a legal Controller. This can be
either a natural or legal person. The Controller determines the purposes
and means of the processing of personal data. A Joint Controller [110,
Art. 26] can be represented by a set of Controller-elements Ĉ.
The set of all Controller-elements is denoted by C and Ĉ denotes a
subset of C.
5.2.2.5 DataProtectionOfficer
The DataProtectionOfficer-element dpo inherits from Entity, whereas
the type is set to ′DataProtectionOfficer ′. The DataProtectionOfficer-
element dpo represents a Data Protection Officer (DPO).
dpo = (name, classification,authInfo,
’DataProtectionOfficer’, firstName, lastName,
address,phoneNumber, email, ĤEAD, D̂ESC)
(5.14)
Next to the attributes inherited by the Entity-element, it has the
additional attributes:
• firstName: First name of the DPO.
• lastName: Last name of the DPO.
• address: Address of the DPO. A further differentiation in e.g.,
postal-code, street and house number has been avoided for both
clarity and generality.
• phoneNumber: Phone number of the DPO. For clarity inter-
national standards like the ITU E.123 [135] and E.164 [136] or
national standards like the DIN 5002 [74] should be considered.
• email: E-mail address of the DPO. The format should comply
with the standards denoted in RFC 5322 [205], RFC 5321 [158]
and RFC 3696 [157].
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Note that the attributes match the additional attributes of the Controller-
element both in wording and function.
The DataProtectionOfficer-element dpo represents the Data Protection
Officer (DPO) that is responsible for the privacy policy. This can be
either a natural or legal person, e.g., a company acting as an external
DPO [110, Art. 37]. The lpp allows the definition of several DPOs
D̂PO, due to the possibility of one or several stand-ins.
The set of all DataProtectionOfficer-elements is denoted by DPO and
D̂PO denotes a subset of DPO.
5.2.2.6 DataSubjectRight
The DataSubjectRight-element dsr, representing the information for
the Data Subject about his rights according to Art. 12 - 23 GDPR [110,
Art. 12 - 23],
dsr = (name, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.15)
is a tuple consisting of the following attribute:
• name: A textual representation of the identifying name, e.g.,
′GDPR data subject rights ′. A differentiation of Data Subject
Rights is necessary due to the various readings of the law on
international, national and intra-national level [162].
The DataSubjectRight-element dsr references a set of Header-elements
ĤEAD as well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC representing
the human-readable information on the rights of the Data Subject.
Note that a set of DataSubjectRight-elements D̂SR would have been an
alternative option for modelling LPL, in which each element would
specify one Data Subject Right. This alternative has not been chosen
because the statement for Data Subject Rights is concise in practice.
The set of all DataSubjectRight-elements is denoted by DSR and D̂SR
denotes a subset of DSR.
5.2.2.7 LodgeComplaint
The LodgeComplaint-element lc, representing the information for the
Data Subject about his right to lodge a complaint with a supervisory
authority according to Art. 77 GDPR [110, Art. 77] and Art. 12 - 14
[110, Art. 12 - 14],
lc = (name, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.16)
is a tuple consisting of the following attribute:
• name: A textual representation of the identifying name, e.g.,
′GDPR lodge complaint ′. A differentiation of lodge complaint
statements is necessary because the supervisory authority differs
for, e.g., different nations and states.
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The LodgeComplaint-element lc references a set of Header-elements
ĤEAD as well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC representing the
human-readable information on the right of the Data Subject to lodge
a complaint.
The set of all LodgeComplaint-elements is denoted by LC and L̂C
denotes a subset of LC.
5.2.2.8 Purpose
The Purpose-element p, representing the purpose of the processing,
p = (name,optOut, required,pointOfAcceptance,
ĤEAD, D̂ESC, D̂, P̂M, P̂SM, D̂R, L̂B, ÂDM, r)
(5.17)
is a tuple consisting of the following attributes:
• name: A textual representation of the identifying name, e.g.,
′Marketing ′ or ′Research ′. In the set of purposes there should
be no duplicate names.
• optOut: A boolean defining if the Purpose is opt-out for true
or opt-in for false. Opt-out implies that the user has to actively
deny this purpose. In the opposite, opt-in implies that the user
has to actively accept this purpose. Although GDPR only allows
opt-in purposes, this option is included to 1) explicitly state
how the purpose has to be consented to and 2) to support the
opt-out option for possible compliance to other legal privacy
frameworks.
• required: A boolean defining if the Purpose has to be accepted
by the user. If the user does not accept a required Purpose then
there cannot be a consent for the corresponding lpp.
• pointOfAcceptance: The date and time for when the purpose
has been accepted (or consented to). The information is stored
for accountability.
The Purpose-element specifies which Data D̂ can be processed for
which Purpose p by which DataRecipients D̂R. Furthermore, it is speci-
fied which de-identification methods are applied, e.g. PrivacyModels
P̂M or PseudonymizationMethods P̂SM, and how long the data Retention
r is.
Therefore, the Purpose-element p references a set of Header-elements
ĤEAD as well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC representing the
human-readable information on the purpose. Furthermore, p refer-
ences a set of Data-elements D̂, a set of PrivacyModel-elements P̂M, a
set of PseudonymizationMethod-elements P̂SM, a set of DataRecipient-
elements D̂R, a set of LegalBasis-elements L̂B, a set of AutomatedDeci-
sionMaking-elements ÂDM, and a Retention-element r all presented in
the following paragraphs.
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The set of all Purpose-elements is denoted by P and P̂ denotes a
subset of P.
5.2.2.9 LegalBasis
The LegalBasis-element lb denotes the legal basis for the processing
of personal data, which can also be the requirement for consent [110,
Art. 13(1)(c), Art. 14(1)(c), Art. 13(1)(d), Art. 14(2)(b)],
lb = (name, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.18)
is a tuple consisting of the following attribute:
• name: A textual representation of the identifying name for the
legal basis. A differentiation legal basis is necessary because
several laws and regulations may apply.
The LegalBasis-element lb references a set of Header-elements ĤEAD
as well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC representing the human-
readable information on the legal basis, e.g., how or why the law
applies for a purpose.
The set of all LegalBasis-elements is denoted by LB and L̂B denotes
a subset of LB.
5.2.2.10 DataRecipient
The DataRecipient-element dr inherits from Entity, whereas the type is
set to ′DataRecipient ′.
dr = (name, classification,authInfo, ’DataRecipient’,
required, thirdCountryTransfer, ĤEAD, D̂ESC, ŜG)
(5.19)
Next to the attributes inherited by the Entity-element it has the addi-
tional attributes:
• required: A boolean defining if the DataRecipient has to be ac-
cepted by the user. If the user does not accept a required DataRe-
cipient then there cannot be a consent for the corresponding lpp.
This attribute allows the user, if it is set as ′false ′, to personalize
the policy.
• thirdCountryTransfer: A boolean defining if the represented
data recipient is in a Third Country and therefore not under the
jurisdiction of the GDPR. If this is the case, the Data Subject has
to be informed about it [110, Art. 13(2)(a) and Art. 14(2)(a)],
which is the rationale behind this attribute.
Furthermore, the DataRecipient-element references a set of Safeguard-
elements SG, which have to be defined if the data recipient is located
within a Third Country.
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The DataRecipient-element represents the authority that gets specific
processing rights (defined by the Purpose) granted. This can be a
person or a legal entity. For example, given the DataSource-element
representing the user (person) to whom the personal data is referring
to, then this authority can grant the DataRecipient all processing rights.
Assuming dsC represents a Controller C that has collected the data
from a user dsU under specific processing rights P̂C and intends
to grant a third party drT processing rights P̂T , then dsC can only
grant drT the usage within the limits of its own processing rights
P̂T ⊆ P̂C. It has to be noted that the processing rights of dsC are a
subset of the processing rights of the user, who has all the processing
rights, P̂T ⊆ P̂C ⊆ P̂U This follows the principle of the right to
informational self-determination [126]. The set of all DataRecipient-
elements is denoted by DR and D̂R denotes a subset of DR.
5.2.2.11 Safeguard
The Safeguard-element sg, representing the description of appropriate
safeguards, i.e. an individual agreement to protect the privacy, for the
transfer of personal data to Third Countries [110, Art. 46],
sg = (name, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.20)
is a tuple consisting of the following attribute:
• name: A textual representation of the identifying name for the
safeguard. A differentiation of safeguards is necessary.
The Safeguard-element sg references a set of Header-elements ĤEAD
as well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC representing the human-
readable information on the implemented safeguard. Safeguards have
to be implemented if no Adequacy Decision for the Third Country is
determined [110, Art. 46]. According to the European Commission lists,
an Adequacy Decision exists only for a few Third Countries including
Canada, Switzerland, and Israel. The United States of America are
limited to the Privacy Shield Framework [97] [69] providing an Adequate
Decision [97].
The set of all Safeguard-elements is denoted by SG and ŜG denotes
a subset of SG.
5.2.2.12 AutomatedDecisionMaking
The AutomatedDecisionMaking-element adm informs the Data Subject
about automated decision-making and profiling. The Data Subject has
the right to be not subject to automated decision-making, therefore
such a processing is explicitly stated [110, Art. 22]. Therefore,
adm = (name, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.21)
is a tuple consisting of the following attribute:
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• name: A textual representation of the identifying name for the
automated decision-making. A differentiation of automated-
decision making is necessary to allow the Data Subject to be
informed about the possibly different processes.
The AutomatedDecisionMaking-element adm references a set of
Header-elements ĤEAD as well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC
representing the human-readable information on the automated
decision-making processes. According to the GDPR, the Data Subject
has to be informed about the existence of automated decision-making,
including profiling, and gets provided with meaningful information
about the logic, significance and envisioned consequences of the
process [110, Art. 13(2)(f), Art. 14(2)(g)].
The set of all AutomatedDecisionMaking-elements is denoted by
ADM and ÂDM denotes a subset of ADM.
5.2.2.13 Retention
The Retention-element r defines when the described data has to be
deleted [110, Art. 13(2)(a), Art. 14(2)(a)].
r = (type,pointInTime, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.22)
The element consists of the following attributes:
• type: Describing the general condition of the retention. Possible
values are Indefinite, AfterPurpose and FixedDate.
• pointInTime: Textual representation describing the exact condi-
tions for the execution of the retention.
Depending on the type, the pointInTime has diverse meanings. The
type Indefinite without a value for pointInTime defines that there
is no time constrained for the deletion of the data. The type Af-
terPurpose defines that after the completion of the corresponding
purpose p, the data has to be deleted within the time-frame spec-
ified by pointInTime. Lastly, the type FixedDate in combination with
pointInTime explicitly defines the date for the deletion of the data
within the corresponding p.
The set of Header-elements ĤEAD as well as the set of Description-
elements D̂ESC represent the human-readable information on the
retention. The set of all Retention-elements is denoted by R and R̂
denotes a subset of R.
5.2.2.14 PrivacyModel
The PrivacyModel-element pm specifies the privacy conditions that
have to be fulfilled by the data-set for a specific purpose p. This
element can be specified but it is not mandatory. Due to the possibility
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to apply more than one privacy model to a data-set [220], different
privacy models may be defined. Alternatively, privacy can also be
defined by AnonymizationMethod-element, defining personal privacy,
by PseudonymizationMethod-element, or even omitted if not necessary.
pm = (name, P̂MA, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.23)
The privacy model is defined by the name, e.g., k-Anonymity [240]
[257] or l-Diversity [177]. Each privacy model can have a set of Priva-
cyModelAttribute-elements P̂MA. The set of Header-elements ĤEAD
as well as the set of Description-elements D̂ESC represent the human-
readable information on the privacy model. This is especially neces-
sary, because privacy models are uncommon for regular users, so that
additional information is required for a better understanding.
The set of all PrivacyModel-elements is denoted by PM and P̂M
denotes a subset of PM.
5.2.2.15 PrivacyModelAttribute
A PrivacyModelAttribute-element pma, represents the configuration of
a privacy model,
pma = (key, value) (5.24)
is a tuple of the following attributes:
• key: Definition of a variable that is required by the correlating
pm, e.g., k for k-Anonymity.
• value: Definition of the actual variable content, e.g., for k the
value ′2 ′, which describes that there have to be at least two
records within the same QI-group values to preserve the re-
quired k-anonymity property [240] [257]
The set of all PrivacyModelAttribute-elements is denoted by PMA and
P̂MA denotes a subset of PMA. The decision for utilizing P̂MA can
be explained by the existence of privacy models that require more
than one variable, e.g., X,Y-Privacy [108].
5.2.2.16 PseudonymizationMethod
The PseudonymizationMethod-element psm specifies a pseudonymiza-
tion method that is applied on specific attributes of the data-set. This
element can be given but it is not mandatory.
psm = (name,attrName, N̂OD, ĤEAD, D̂ESC, P̂SMA) (5.25)
The element consists of the following attributes:
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• name: Identifies the applied pseudonymization method, e.g.,
using the HMAC-SHA-1 algorithm with random seeds [165] or
cryptographic methods using DES or AES [132] [201].
• attrName: Textual representation of the name for the result-
ing attribute. For instance, if the attributes ′prename ′ and
′surname ′ are jointly tokenized and the resulting attribute
should be denoted as ′namePseudonym ′ with the attrName
attribute.
Furthermore, each PseudonymizationMethod-element defines a set of
NameOfData-elements N̂OD and a set of PseudonymizationMethodAt-
tribute-elements P̂SMA. The set of Header-elements ĤEAD as well as
the set of Description-elements D̂ESC represent the human-readable
information on the privacy model.
The set of all PseudonymizationMethod-elements is denoted by PSM
and P̂SM denotes a subset of PSM.
5.2.2.17 NameOfData
A NameOfData-element nod represents a Data-element within the
same Purpose-element,
nod = (name) (5.26)
is a tuple consisting of the name attribute. The intended purpose is
to define all attributes that the pseudonymization method is applied
to. Pseudonymization can be applied on a sole attribute or it can be
applied on several attributes combined. If several attributes have to be
pseudonymized independently, then several PseudonymizationMethod-
elements have to be defined.
The set of all PseudonymizationMethod-elements is denoted by PSM
and P̂SM denotes a subset of PSM.
5.2.2.18 PseudonymizationMethodAttribute
A PseudonymizationMethodAttribute-element psma, represents the con-
figuration of a pseudonymization method,
psma = (key, value) (5.27)
is a tuple of the following attributes:
• key: Definition of a variable that is required by the correlating
psm, which may not even be necessary for some pseudonymiza-
tion methods.
• value: Definition of the actual variable content.
The set of all PseudonymizationMethodAttribute-elements is denoted by
PSMA and P̂SMA denotes a subset of PMA.
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5.2.2.19 Data
The Data-element d, representing a data field that is concerned by a
purpose p,
d = (name,dType, required,pGroup, D̂G,am,
ĤEAD, D̂ESC)
(5.28)
is a tuple of the following attributes:
• name: Distinct name for the stored data field. A duplicate name
within a D̂ of a Purpose is not allowed, because this could lead
to discrepancies in the processing, while it is possible with P3P
DATA-Elements. P3P indeed allows to define contrary rules for
the same data element within one purpose. This makes the
determination of the valid rule unfeasible [280].
• dType: Defines the type of the data. Possible types are Text,
Number, Date, Boolean, Value Set for a set of predefined values
and Other for any data type that doesn’t fit the aforementioned
types.
• required: A boolean defining if the data d is required for the
purpose, or if the user can disagree with the processing of this
attribute. If the user does not accept a required d then the
corresponding p is not accepted. If the purpose p is required,
then the whole privacy policy lpp is not accepted.
• pGroup: This is the classification of the data field as Explicit,
QID, Sensitive and Non-Sensitive. The processing of the data field
by the privacy models is based upon this classification, e.g., for
k-Anonymity the value of a data field which is classified Explicit,
has to be deleted [257].
The Data-element d references a set of Header-elements ĤEAD as
well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC representing the human-
readable information on the data. Furthermore, a set of DataGroup-
elements D̂G is referenced for the categorization of the data. Lastly,
an AnonymizationMethod-element am is referenced which defines the
minimum anonymization for the data in order to enable personal
privacy anonymization. The set of all Data-elements is denoted by D
and D̂ denotes a subset of D.
5.2.2.20 DataGroup
The DataGroup-element dg, representing a group of data, that is used
for categorizing Data-elements,
dg = (name, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.29)
is a tuple consisting of the attribute:
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• name: A textual representation of a logical data group. No pre-
defined values are given. Data groups can be used to specify
data in, e.g., a procedure directory, which usually does not refer
to each data field but groups of it [110, Art. 30]. This enables to
validate record of processing activities [110, Art. 30] with a pri-
vacy policy automatically or even to create one beforehand. For
instance, data elements representing ′street ′, ′postal− code ′,
′city ′ of a person could be categorized as ′address ′.
The DataGroup-element dg references a set of Header-elements
ĤEAD as well as a set of Description-elements D̂ESC representing the
human-readable information on the data group.
The set of all DataGroup-elements is denoted byDG and D̂G denotes
a subset of DG.
5.2.2.21 AnonymizationMethod
The AnonymizationMethod-element am, represents the anonymization
that is applied on a data,
am = (name, ÂMA, ĤE, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.30)
is a tuple of the following attributes. The name represents the chosen
anonymization method. There are several methods available, for
example Deletion, Suppression or Generalization. Additionally, each
AnonymizationMethod has a set of AnonymizationMethodAttributes-
elements ÂMA and an ordered set of HierarchyEntry-elements
ĤE.
The set of Header-elements ĤEAD as well as the set of Descrip-
tion-elements D̂ESC represent the human-readable information on
the anonymization method. This is especially necessary, because the
way data is anonymized is not commonly known and therefore eas-
ily understandable information is required for users. The set of all
AnonymizationMethod-elements is denoted by AM and ÂM denotes a
subset of AM.
5.2.2.22 AnonymizationMethodAttribute
An AnonymizationMethodAttribute-element ama, represents the config-
uration of an anonymization method,
ama = (key, value) (5.31)
is a tuple of the following attributes:
• key: Definition of a variable that is required by the correlating
am.
• value: Definition of the actual variable content.
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The definition of each an ama for a Minimum Anonymization Level and
Maximum Anonymization Level is required. The Minimum Anonymization
Level denotes the anonymization which has to be applied to comply
with privacy requirements. The Maximum Anonymization Level denotes
the anonymization level which must not be exceeded during the de-
identification process, to preserve utility of certain attributes required
for later analysis, e.g. the value must not exceed the anonymization
level ′2 ′ (see Equation 5.32).
ama = (’Maximum Anonymization Level’, ’2’) (5.32)
If enabled by the user interface and if Minimum Anonymization Level
is lower then the Maximum Anonymization Level, then the Minimum
Anonymization Level may be adjusted by the user for personalization
of the policy.
The set of all AnonymizationMethodAttribute-elements is denoted by
AMA and ÂMA denotes a subset of AMA.
5.2.2.23 HierarchyEntry
The HierarchyEntry-element he stores possible pre-calculated values
for one data field and the correlating anonymization method. The
hierarchy he is used during the de-identification process, e.g., for
enabling personal privacy or anonymization for privacy models.
he = (value) (5.33)
The attribute value denotes a possible anonymization of the origi-
nal value for an attribute, including the original value, i.e. the non-
anonymized value. The tuple of all HierarchyEntry-elements is denoted
by HE and ĤE denotes an ordered sub-tuple of HE. Considering the
Minimum Anonymization Level and Maximum Anonymization Level, the
elements are counted starting with level ′0 ′. Thus, the first element
of ĤE is specified as Anonymization Level 0, the second element is
specified as 1, and so on.
Therefore, the definition of all LPL elements an attributes is com-
pleted. In the following, an overview over the life cycle of LPL is given
before the fulfilment of the requirements for a privacy language (see
Chapter 2) is detailed.
5.3 life cycle
LPL is intended to cover the holistic life cycle of privacy policies from
their creation to their realization as denoted by Gerl et al. [121]. To
present the life cycle phases of LPL, following scenario is assumed:
A company eC1 intends to create an online shop, which collects and
uses personal information for various purposes like billing, marketing
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and research. Therefore, eC1 creates a privacy policy and presents it
to the user eU1 via the online shop, e.g., at the registration time of
the user. The user eU1 can freely decide if he agrees to the privacy
policy or not. From a legal perspective, the company eC1 acts as the
Controller and the user eU1 is the Data Subject. Considering the notation
of LPL, the user is the DataSource dsU1 and the company acts as the
Controller cC1. Furthermore, the company may also be defined as the
DataRecipient drC1 for various purposes. Additionally, it is assumed
that the data may be transferred to a third party cC2 for research.
The data transfer between cC1 and cC2 is handled by an additional
policy. In this case, this inter company transfer policy denotes dsC1
as the DataSource and cC2 as the responsible Controller, as well as
DataRecipient.
dsU1 = (’DS_U1’, ’Person’,publicKeyU1, ’DataSource’,
false, ĤEADU1, D̂ESCU1)
(5.34)
cC1 = (’C_C1’, ’Legal Entity’,publicKeyC1, ’Controller’,
firstNameC1, lastNameC1,addressC1,
phoneNumberC1, emailC1, ĤEADC1, D̂ESCC1)
(5.35)
drC1 = (’DR_C1’, ’Legal Entity’,publicKeyC1,
’DataRecipient’, true, false, ĤEADC1, D̂ESCC1)
(5.36)
dsC1 = (’DS_C1’, ’Legal Entity’,publicKeyC1, ’DataSource’,
false, ĤEADC1, D̂ESCC1)
(5.37)
cC2 = (’C_C2’, ’Legal Entity’,publicKeyC2, ’Controller’,
firstNameC2, lastNameC2,addressC2,
phoneNumberC2, emailC2, ĤEADC2, D̂ESCC2)
(5.38)
drC2 = (’DR_C2’, ’Legal Entity’,publicKeyC2,
’DataRecipient’, false, false, ĤEADC2, D̂ESCC2)
(5.39)
Within this scenario, it is differentiated between the following phases
(see Figure 5.3).
• Creation: Company eC1 (Controller) creates a raw LPL privacy
policy lppraw for its service.
• Negotiation: User eU1 (Data Subject) is presented the raw LPL
privacy policy. eU1 can personalize the privacy policy.
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Figure 5.3: Life-cycle of LPL.
• Pre-processing: The personalized LPL privacy policy is verified,
validated and anonymization hierarchies are pre-calculated.
• Storage: The personalized LPL policy is stored alongside the
(personal) data (sticky policy).
• Transfer: The (personal) data and the sticky LPL policy are trans-
ferred to the third party eC2.
• Usage: The personal data is requested for processing by eC1 and
eC2 for which it is de-identified according to the LPL privacy
policy.
These life cycle phases are not intended to be run through linearly,
but may be repeated (see Figure 5.3). The Negotiation phase may be
run through first by the user, e.g., during the registration process
of a service. But the user is intended to revisit the privacy policy at
any time so that he can change his personal privacy settings within
the LPL privacy policy, which triggers the phases Pre-processing and
Storage iff the policy is then updated in any way.
Furthermore, after the Storage phase, the personal data and LPL
policies can be processed several times, such that the Usage phase is
run through repeatedly. Therefore, it is considered that data is not
processed once but several times for several purposes.
Similarly, the Transfer phase, which is optional, may be run through
by eC1 and eC2 for various times. Depending on the use case, the data
may be transferred to a third party and directly processed (Usage) or
it may be stored before it is processed (Storage).
Next, every phase of the LPL life cycle is detailed.
5.3.1 Creation
During the Creation phase, the raw LPL privacy policy lppraw is
created be the responsible entity, namely company eC1. The creation
can be based on an existing legal privacy policy or from scratch.
This process may be facilitated via suitable tools, e.g., user interfaces
(see Section 5.6.3). Hereby, the company defines all properties of the
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privacy policy, e.g., which Data is processed for which Purposes. But a
few attributes and elements cannot be detailed within this phase:
• DataSource-element ds: The user can only be identified and
added to the policy after he agreed to it.
• pointOfAcceptance attribute of the Purpose-element p: This
attribute expresses when the LPL policy has been agreed to by
the user.
• HierarchyEntry: The anonymization hierarchy for each Data-
element d can be pre-processed when an original value is given
by the user.
Note that the Minimum Anonymization Level encapsulated within the
AnonymizationMethodAttribute-element ama has to be set during the
creation of the LPL privacy policy, but is ultimately intended to be
altered by the user to define his personal privacy requirements.
Assuming the given scenario, a policy lppraw (see Equation 5.40)
is created for the purpose ′Research ′. Furthermore, the purposes
′Marketing ′ and ′Billing ′ would defined as Purpose-elements p,
which are omitted for the scope of this example. Additionally, informa-
tive elements and attributes are omitted, e.g., DataSubjectRight-element
dsr or human-readable texts.
The created lppraw expresses the processing of the postal-code
dpostal−code and salary dsalary for research presearch.
lppraw = (version, ’LPP_RAW’, lang,ppURI,
ĤEAD, D̂ESC, Î, ∅, {presearch}, {cC1},
D̂PO,dsr, lc, ∅)
(5.40)
presearch = (’Research’, false, false, ∅,
ĤEAD, D̂ESC, {dpostal−code,dsalary},
P̂M, P̂SM, {drC1,drC2}, L̂B, ÂDM, r)
(5.41)
Within the purpose presearch, it is furthermore specified that both
the companies drC1 and drC2 are allowed to process the data. The
second company drC2 is hereby also defined as optional (see Equation
5.39).
The postal-code dpostal−code is anonymized using Suppression,
whereas the Minimum Anonymization Level is proposed with ′1 ′, which
can be altered by the user up to the Maximum Anonymization Level of
′3 ′ (see Equation 5.42). Furthermore, it is specified that the purpose is
optional with the attribute required set to ′false ′.
dpostal−code = (’postal-code’, ’Text’, false, ’QID’, D̂G,am1,
ĤEAD, D̂ESC)
(5.42)
106 layered privacy language (lpl)
am1 = (’Suppression’, {ama1,ama2,ama3,ama4},
∅, ĤEAD, D̂ESC)
(5.43)
ama1 = (’Suppression Replacement’, ’*’) (5.44)
ama2 = (’Suppression Direction’, ’backward’) (5.45)
ama3 = (’Minimum Level’, ’1’) (5.46)
ama4 = (’Maximum Level’, ’3’) (5.47)
Also the postal-code dpostal−code is optional, but the SD attribute
salary dsalary is required. For salary, Deletion is specified as the
anonymization method with a Minimum and Maximum Anonymization
Level of ′0 ′, which specifies that the value for salary is not altered for
the processing.
dsalary = (’salary’, ’Number’, true, ’Sensitive’, D̂G,am2,
ĤEAD, D̂ESC)
(5.48)
am2 = (’Deletion’, {ama5,ama6}, ∅, ĤEAD, D̂ESC) (5.49)
ama5 = (’Minimum Level’, ’0’) (5.50)
ama6 = (’Maximum Level’, ’0’) (5.51)
5.3.2 Negotiation
Within the Negotiation phase of the LPL life cycle, the raw LPL privacy
policy lppraw is presented to the user eU1, thus enabling an informed
and voluntary consent (see Section 5.6.2).
Following the extension of the personal privacy concept, the user
can at any time decide on the purposes, data, data recipients and ano-
nymization level of personal data that is processed. Thus, the elements
Purpose, Data, DataRecipient and AnonymizationMethodAttribute may be
altered or removed from the policy. Assuming an optional Purpose-,
Data-, or DataRecipient-element is rejected by the user, it is then re-
moved from the policy. If the user alters the Minimum Anonymization
Level for an attribute, then the corresponding AnonymizationMethodAt-
tribute-element is updated.
The Negotiation phase of the life cycle is completed with the user’s
agreement to the personalized LPL privacy policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2}.
If the user eU1 agrees on the policy, then the personalized instance
of the LPL policy is stored. Moreover, the DataSource-object dsU1
representing the user is set (see Equation 5.52).
lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2} = (version, ’LPP_U1’, lang,ppURI,
ĤEAD, D̂ESC, Î,dsU1,
{p ′research}, {cC1}, D̂PO,dsr, lc, ∅)
(5.52)
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Furthermore, for each purpose, the attribute pointOfAcceptance is
filled with the current date ′[CURRENT_DATE] ′. In the given scenario,
it is assumed that the user accepts the processing of his personal data
for research (see Equation 5.53).
p ′research = (’Research’, false, false, [CURRENT_DATE],
ĤEAD, D̂ESC, {dpostal−code,dsalary},
P̂M, P̂SM, {drC1,drC2}, L̂B, ÂDM, r)
(5.53)
Lastly, it is assumed hat the user agrees to the optional dpostal−code
and does not alter the Minimum Anonymization Level. Therefore, no
additional changes have to be conducted on the policy.
If the user does not agree on the policy, the processing of his per-
sonal data is not allowed, e.g., the registration for an online shop
cannot be completed.
5.3.3 Pre-Processing
The Pre-processing phase is conducted after each change of an instance
of the LPL privacy policy in order to verify and validate the privacy
policy. Additionally, the anonymization hierarchy is pre-processed for
each Data-element.
The verification of the LPL structure guarantees the correctness
of the syntax and also verifies that specific conditions of the pri-
vacy policy structure are met. For example, at least one Safeguard-
element sg has to be specified for a DataRecipient-element dr if the
thirdCountryTransfer attribute is set to ′true ′, or it has to be veri-
fied that at least one Controller-element c is specified.
The validation covers the comparison of the personalized LPL pri-
vacy policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2} to the raw LPL privacy policy lppraw.
For example, it has to be verified that all required purposes in lppraw
are also present in lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2}, or that the Maximum Anonymi-
zation Level is not altered.
Lastly, the anonymization hierarchy has to be pre-processed and
added via HierarchyEntry-elements to the corresponding Anonymiza-
tionMethod-elements. Hereby, the original values of the user are re-
quired. Within this scenario, the personal data of Alice (see Table 3.1)
for dsU1 having the postal-code ′94032 ′ and a salary of ′30.000 ′ is
assumed. Therefore, ĤEpostal−code (see Equation 5.54) is added to the
AnonymizationMethod-element am1 for the postal-code of Alice.
ĤEpostal−code = {(
′94032 ′), ( ′9403∗ ′), ( ′940 ∗ ∗ ′),
( ′94 ∗ ∗∗ ′), ( ′9 ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ′), ( ′∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ∗ ′)} (5.54)
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The anonymization hierarchy for the salary is added to the
AnonymizationMethod-element am2, but only consists of the original
value and a place-holder character for its deletion (see Equation 5.55).
ĤEsalary = {(
′30.000 ′), ( ′∗ ′)} (5.55)
This Pre-processing phase has to be repeated if either the privacy
policy or the personal data of the user is updated or altered. The
frequency hereby strongly depends on the specific use case.
5.3.4 Storage
After the personalized LPL privacy policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2} has been
verified, validated and the anonymization hierarchies have been pre-
processed, the policy instance is stored. The storage solution has
to allow the linkage of the sticky policy to the personal data, such
that a logical connection is supported at any time. Although the
policy instance stores the original values of the personal data via the
anonymization hierarchies, the LPL policy is not supposed to act as
the storage solution for the personal data. For the storage of data,
more reliable technologies should be used, i.e. relational databases.
5.3.5 Transfer
Personal data is not only stored within a service but it is also common
that it is transferred intra- or inter-companies, e.g., for publishing,
data trading, or third party processing. This Transfer of personal data
requires the transfer of the corresponding personalized LPL privacy
policies as required by the sticky policy concept. But a company may
alter the conditions for processing the personal data by third parties
to protect its users, e.g., it can require stricter privacy requirements or
remove processable attributes from the data-set. Thus, a corresponding
policy for the transfer is created. This new policy must be at least as
strict as the previously defined policies between the users and the
company (see Section 2.6). Therefore, a validation of the new and
refined policy against the existing policies of the users has to be
conducted.
Considering the R6 Provenance requirement, a refined policy incor-
porates the previous policies such that the source policy for personal
data can be determined. This enables companies to show their compli-
ance to individuals’ consent and agreements, as they are accountable
if the source of personal data cannot be presented.
For the given scenario, it is assumed that a policy between eC1
and eC2 is agreed upon. This secondary policy lppdsC1-{drC2} (see
Equation 5.56) is based upon the original policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2},
but only allows eC2 to process the postal-code dpostal−code for re-
search pC2−research (see Equation 5.57). The policy is altered, such
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that the DataSource is dsC1 and the Controller is cC2 representing the
change of responsibility for the policy. Additionally, the original policy
lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2} is set as the UnderlyingPrivacyPolicy upp.
lppdsC1-{drC2 = (version, ’LPP_C1’, lang,ppURI,
ĤEAD, D̂ESC, Î,dsC1, {pC2−research},
{cC2}, D̂PO,dsr, lc, lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2)
(5.56)
pC2−research = (’Research’, false, false,
[CURRENT_DATE], ĤEAD, D̂ESC,
{dpostal−code}, P̂M, P̂SM, {drC2},
L̂B, ÂDM, r)
(5.57)
The validation and layering of policies has to be conducted for
each record and policy that is transferred. Although this is a slight
overhead, this Transfer phase enables R6 and privacy-aware validation
and usage of each individual record even after it has been transferred.
The Transfer phase may be repeated several times creating a chain of
layered privacy policies, each added policy at least as ’strict’ as the
underlying policy.
5.3.6 Usage
The main intention of collecting and storing personal data is of course
to use it for various purposes to gain added value, e.g., research
or data mining. This phase is denoted as Usage. If a company, i.e.
any of its employees or services, intends to process personal data,
it has to verify that this processing is allowed. Furthermore, it is
possible that this personal data has to be protected by applying
de-identification methods. This is especially challenging in situations
for which high volumes of personal data records are processed,
e.g., in a data-warehouse scenario, due to the possibility of varying
personalized LPL privacy policies for each record.
Section 5.5 details how access control mechanism are realized by
LPL. The derivation of a uniform privacy level from various LPL
privacy policies and its application on the data-set are detailed in
Chapter 6.
Thus, the fulfilment of the requirements for a privacy language
of Chapter 2 is detailed. First, R2 Legal Compliance is detailed. Next,
the previously mentioned R4 Access Control mechanisms are detailed.
For the R3 Human-readability requirement, a proof-of-concept imple-
mentation of user interfaces for the Creation and Negotiation phase
are detailed. The R6 Provenance requirement is detailed in Section 5.7.
Lastly, the fulfilment of the R5 De-identification Capabilities requirement
is detailed in the Chapter 6.
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5.4 legal compliance
In Section 2.2, the requirement R2 Legal Compliance has been detailed,
for which the GDPR is considered as legal framework. In the following,
both the requirements for privacy policies according to Art. 12 - 14
GDPR as well as the Data Subject Rights are considered and used for
the qualitative evaluation of LPL.
5.4.1 Privacy Policy
The main articles of the GDPR dealing with the requirements for
privacy policies are Art. 12 - 14, which are compared to the capabilities
of LPL as detailed by Gerl and Pohl [119] (see Table 5.2).
General provisions for the communication to the user, especially
regarding transparency, are stated in Art. 12 GDPR [110, Art. 12].
It is stated that a privacy policy has to be provided in a clear and
plain language [110, Art.12 (1) Sentence 1], which is enabled through
the UIElement ui. This super-element provides all key elements with
human-readable headers and descriptions. Hereby, the R2 Legal Com-
pliance and R3 Human-readability requirement are complementarily
considered. But, the legal requirement for a clear and plain language
can not be guaranteed by LPL but has to be ensured by the responsible
entity creating the policy, i.e. the Controller. Furthermore, the privacy
policy can be provided in a written or electronic form [110, Art.12 (1)
Sentence 2], under which LPL falls as an electronic format with its
root-element LayeredPrivacyPolicy lpp. The last requirement derived
of Art. 12 GDPR allows the usage of standardized icons [110, Art.
12 (7)], which are covered by LPL through the introduction of the
Icon-element i for Privacy Icons, which is also considered to fulfil the
R3 Human-readability requirement.
The Art. 13 and the Art. 14 have very similar content and are
therefore compared combined in the following. Art. 13 details the
information that has to be provided when personal data is collected
from the user [110, Art. 13], i.e. after the privacy policy has been
agreed/consented to, and Art. 14 describes the information that has
to be provided when personal data is not directly collected from
the user [110, Art. 14], i.e. when the personal data is collected by a
third party. Both articles demand that the identity of the Controller
and its contact details are provided [110, Art. 13 (1)(a), Art. 14 (1)(a)].
This is represented in LPL via a set of Controller-elements c, whereas
the set is required to also represent Joint Controllers [110, Art. 26].
Furthermore, the contact details of the responsible DPO has to be
provided [110, Art. 13 (1)(b), Art. 14 (1)(b)]. Hereby also several DPOs
may be defined, which is covered by the set of DataProtectionOfficer-
elements dpo referenced by the LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element lpp.
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The purposes of the processing of personal data and their legal basis,
including the legitimate interests [110, Art. 13 (1)(d), Art. 14 (2)(a)],
have to be stated [110, Art. 13 (1)(c), Art. 14 (1)(c)]. Therefore, each
Purpose-element p has a set of LegalBasis-elements lb. Furthermore, the
user has to be informed about the collected data categories [110, Art.
14 (1)(d)] modelled by the DataGroup-element dg. Each Data-element
d references a set of DataGroup-elements dg, such that a data can
be associated with several groups. The required personal data has
to be communicated [110, Art. 13(2)(e)], which is modelled by the
Data-element d having the required attribute.
The data recipients for the personal data [110, Art. 13 (1)(e), Art. 14
(1)(e)] and, if the data is transferred in a third country, the applied
safeguards [110, Art. 13 (1)(f), Art. 14 (1)(f)] have to be provided. In
LPL this is modelled with a set of DataRecipient-elements dr which
have the thirdCountryTransfer attribute indicating a third country
transfer and a set of Safeguard-elements sg if the context requires it.
The storage period for the personal data has to be provided to
the user [110, Art. 13(2)(a), Art. 14(2)(a)], which is modelled by the
Retention-element r.
Furthermore, the user has to be informed about his Data Subject
Rights [110, Art. 13(2)(b), Art. 14(2)(c)] and how to lodge a complaint
[110, Art. 13(2)(d), Art. 14(2)(e)]. The Data Subject Rights are imple-
mented by a DataSubjectRights-element dsr and a LodgeComplaint-
element lc, which are referenced by lpp. These elements mainly define
human-readable texts, i.e. Header- and Description-elements, to inform
the users about their Data Subject Rights and how to lodge a complaint.
If personal data of a user is used for automated decision-making,
the user has to be informed about it [110, Art. 13(2)(f), Art. 14(2)(g)].
In LPL, processing for automated decision-making is denoted for each
purposes, such that each p optionally references an AutomatedDecision-
Making-element adm.
The possibility to withdraw consent has to be communicated to the
user [110, Art. 13(2)(c). Art. 14(2)(d)], which is implicitly modelled
by the required attribute in the Purpose-element p based on this
attribute. A suitable user interface (see Section 5.6.2) enables consent-
management. This concept is further extended to the Data-element d
and DataRecipient-element dr, thus enabling several personalization
options. Therefore, the R3 Human-readability requirement also has to
be considered [116] [115].
Lastly, the user, i.e. Data Subject, has to be informed about the source
of personal data and if this source is publicly available [110, Art.
14(2)(f)], which is modelled by the DataSource-element with the public
attribute indicating a public source.
Thus, LPL shows the capabilities to model all information required
by Art. 12 - 14 GDPR. The information contained in LPL has to be pro-
cessed and visualized in a suitable and human-friendly way (see Sec-
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tion 5.6). Therefore, the R2 Legal Compliance and R3 Human-readability
are closely related. The requirement stating the realization of Data
Subject Rights, which implies actions on the data, cannot be covered
by LPL, which only defines the structure of privacy policies. But the
required information to perform the Data Subject Rights actions can be
considered by LPL and is detailed in the following.
Table 5.2: Fulfilled legal requirements of Art. 12 - 14 [110, Art. 12 - 14] by
LPL.
GDPR
Requirement LPL
Clear and Plain Language UIElement ui
Written or Electronic Information LayeredPrivacyPolicy lpp
Data Subject Rights Realization Section 5.4.2
Standardised Icons Icon i
Contact Details of Controller Controller c
Contact Details of DPO DataProtectionOfficer dpo
Purpose and Legal Basis Purpose p, LegalBasis lb
Legitimate Interest LegalBasis lb
Categories of Personal Data DataGroup dg
Recipients of Personal Data DataRecipient dr
Third Country Transfer DataRecipient dr, Safeguard sg
Storage Period Retention r
Information: Data Subject Rights DataSubjectRight dsr
Information: Withdraw Consent Purpose p
Information: Lodge a Complaint LodgeComplaint lc
Information: Required Data Data d
Source of Personal Data DataSource ds
Automated Decision-Making AutomatedDecisionMaking adm
5.4.2 Data Subject Rights
The realization of Data Subject Rights [110, Art. 12 (2)] requires various
information, e.g., the processed personal data, available to answer the
individual requests. In general, the response time to a Data Subject
Right has to be within 1 to 3 months [110, Art. 12 (3)]. It can be
assumed that the response time is so huge, because the process for
answering a Data Subject Right request is commonly not supported
by technical means in practice and therefore can require extensive
manual labour to verify and answer the request. Furthermore, the
Controller, e.g., the company, can refuse to answer excessive requests
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[110, Art. 12 (5)], e.g., if continuous requests are made by a user. Both
requirements can be achieved by technical means. Furthermore, the
identity of the requesting user has to be verified, i.e. authenticated, to
mitigate any misuse of the Data Subject Rights. The authentication may
be conducted using the access control capabilities of LPL (see Section
5.5) or by other means. The validity of the request has to be checked
before the response is generated. Hereby the response can be based on
the individual’s privacy policy and/or his personal data (see Figure
5.4). In the following, each of the Data Subject Rights is discussed.
First, the user has the Right of Access by the Data Subject, which allows
him to request from the Controller if his personal data is processed.
If personal data of the user is processed, then additional information
can be requested. This includes purposes, personal data categories,
data recipients, retention, information on the Right to Rectification and
Right to Erasure, right to lodge a complaint, data source, information
on automated decision-making, and safeguards [110, Art. 15 (1 - 2)].
Each of this information has already been noted within the analysis of
Art. 12 - 14 GDPR and is integrated within LPL.
This information shall be provided to the user in a commonly used
electronic form or via a physical copy [110, Art. 15 (3)], which is trivial
to fulfil. Lastly, the rights and freedom of others should not be affected
[110, Art. 15 (4)], which requires a distinction of this information based
on the user’s identity. This is achieved through individual LPL privacy
policies for each user.
Figure 5.4: Data Subject Right scenario showing a schematic response genera-
tion based on the the individuals’ personal data and LPL privacy
policy.
Next, the user has the Right to Rectification, which gives him the right
to request the correction of inaccurate or incomplete personal data
[110, Art. 16]. Technically speaking, the user can request to update
personal data. Therefore, it is necessary to identify and associate the
data within the storage solution and update it. In LPL, both the user
(DataSource) and data (Data) is uniquely identified, thus a mapping
to the stored data values of the user is feasible and an update can be
achieved.
The Right to Erasure or also denoted as Right to be Forgotten enables
the user to request the deletion of his personal data under certain
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conditions, e.g., when his consent is withdrawn. Note that exceptions
for this right are defined, such that data is not erased, e.g., if it is
required for reasons of public interest [110, Art. 16]. The validity of
the reason for the request has to be decided involving the responsible
entities, e.g., DPO and Controller. The technical realization is enabled
by LPL due to the unique definition and association of personal
data to the user via the DataSource- and Data-elements. The call of a
deletion method with these parameters can be implemented directly
deleting the data from the storage. However, it is common to use
backup strategies, which redundantly store personal data. Thus, it is
an issue that this right also affects backups, for which no standardized
solutions are in place, which can deal with the various mediums and
strategies used for backups. Furthermore, it is subject to an ongoing
debate if backups may be an exception from this right [215] [214] [27].
Furthermore, the Right to Restriction of Processing allows the user
to request a cease to the processing of his personal data. Again, a
request requires a valid reason for the restriction, e.g., the processing
is unlawful. The processing can only be continued if the user consents
to it and the user has to be informed about the continuation of the
processing [110, Art. 18]. Again it has to be first verified if the reason
to restrict the processing is valid, for which the responsible entities are
involved. The processing of personal data can be restricted utilizing the
properties of LPL. Each processing is indeed expressed by a Purpose-
element p defining the entities allowed to process the personal data,
i.e. DataRecipient. The restriction of processing can be implemented
via the deletion of the corresponding DataRecipient from a Purpose,
which enables the partial restriction for a specific entity, or via the
deletion of the corresponding Purpose-element from the policy, which
completely prevents the processing. The restriction can only be lifted if
consent is given, which can be expressed by either a Purpose-element or
DataRecipient-element added to the policy with the attribute required
set to ′false ′. Thus, an explicit action is required by the user. To inform
the user about the lifted restriction, a simple notification about the
purpose can be sent to him, whereas the user is identified via the
DataSource-element. Thus, a technical realization is feasible based on
LPL.
The Data Subject Rights for rectification, erasure and restriction are
furthermore covered by the Notification Obligation, which requires the
communication of the request to any other Controller processing the
personal data. Furthermore, the user can request a list of recipients
of his personal data [110, Art. 19]. In LPL, the DataRecipient-element
expresses the entities receiving the personal data for processing, such
that the information is accessible. Thus, this right can be fulfilled with
the support of LPL.
The Right to Data Portability is a novelty within the GDPR, which is
intended for transferring personal data between Controllers. Hereby,
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two possibilities have to be considered. On the one hand, the user can
request to receive personal data in a structured, commonly used and
machine-readable format; in order to transmit it to another Controller
himself. On the other hand, the user can request that one Controller
directly transmits personal data to another Controller [110, Art. 20]. In
both cases, LPL can serve in the identification of personal data and
its values using the Data-elements as well as the first HierarchyEntry-
element, which contains the original value. The processing of such data
in a common machine-readable format and the transfer to the user is
hereby trivial. But the direct transfer from one Controller to another is
a hard challenge. Such enforcement of the law would require generic
interfaces for personal data transfer between all possible Controllers.
Thus, interpreting this law ad absurdum, a student could request his
university to transfer his personal data, e.g., information on university
degree, to a social media platform to inform his friends about his
success. A limitation of the scope of this law, e.g., by the domain and
size of the companies exchanging personal data, is therefore worth
aspiring for [118]. The Data Transfer Project (DTP) [80] is an open-
source, service-to-service data portability platform with the intention
to tackle the transfer of personal data between several companies and
services. Hereby, the company internal data format is translated into a
common data model and transferred, afterwards the personal data is
translated into the internal data format of the target company.
The Right to Object enables the user to object the processing of
personal data. The user has to be informed about this right. The
Right to Object states explicitly the right to object purposes which fall
under the category of marketing, automated decision-making, and
research [110, Art. 21]. Furthermore, the Right to Object Automated
Decision-making redundantly defines the objection of processing of
personal data for automated decision-making and its limitation [110,
Art. 22]. Thus, a strong emphasis on automated decision-making is
put by the GDPR. This objection can be expressed by LPL privacy
policies in the same way as the restriction of processing through
the deletion of the corresponding Purpose-element or DataRecipient-
element. Furthermore, the user can be informed about the Right to
Object via the DataSubjectRight-element.
Lastly, it is stated that Union or Member State law may restrict the
Data Subject Rights [110, Art. 23]. Thus, national legal frameworks may
limit and modify the Data Subject Rights.
In summary, this requirement analysis and its comparison to the
capabilities of LPL shows that LPL is able to express all information
necessary to fulfil Data Subject Right requests. However, the realization
of such rights requires additional implementation of additional pro-
cesses, e.g., for the notification of the user and other Controllers or for
updating or deleting stored data. Furthermore, human-interaction is
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required to decide if the conditions and reasons given by the user are
valid.
It may be argued that the information about Data Subject Rights
may not be expressed by only one DataSubjectRight-element, but a
set of DataSubjectRight-elements for each individual right, for a clear
distinction. This possibility is omitted because the information on Data
Subject Rights consists in practice of standardized phrases for which
a single element is sufficient. In conclusion, the R2 Legal Compliance
requirement is fulfilled by LPL. Next, the realization of the R4 Access
Control requirement is detailed utilizing LPL.
5.5 access control
The R4 Access Control requirement (see Section 2.4) states that a privacy
language has to enable access control mechanisms. Access control
requires to verify if an entity is authenticated and authorized to access
data. Classical approaches include RBAC systems. For example a
user has a role assigned, e.g., student, and the role is assigned the
permission to read and write specified files. Therefore, the user has
to be first authenticated before the authorization to access the files is
verified as detailed by Gerl et al. [121] and Wilhelm and Gerl [276].
In the context of privacy policies, not only the user or his role
have to be considered but also what data is allowed to be processed
and for which purpose. The approach for LPL is inspired by the
Privacy-aware Role-based Access Control (P-RBAC) of Ni et al. [200]
and Purpose-based Access Control (PBAC) of Byun et al. [62], which
extend classical RBAC approaches to support concepts of privacy
policies. Furthermore, Privacy-Aware Organization-Based Access Control
(OrBAC) ?? [73] is proposed, which enables the user to define its
own purposes for which data is processed for a specific context. The
context can consider temporal or spatial properties, the user defined
purposes, as well as prerequisite and provisional contexts. LPL defines
the access rules via its Purpose-, Entity- (DataRecipient-element), and
Data-elements. Each Purpose-element can indeed be seen as a whitelist
access rule. Thus, a LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element lpp contains a set of
access rules that is specific for a users’ data.
Within the Usage phase of the LPL life cycle, users’ data is requested
to be processed for a specific purpose. It is essential that access con-
trol is conducted to mitigate unauthorized access to personal data.
Therefore, a Policy-based Access Control (PAC) mechanism based on LPL
is proposed. PAC is intended to be not restricted to a single access
control solution but to be integrated within various existing solutions.
A PAC request to access data is defined as the following tuple:
request = (userIdentifier, credential, P̂req, D̂req, D̂Sreq) (5.58)
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Where userIdentifier is the unique identifier of the requesting user,
which corresponds to the attribute name of the Entity-element and
credential defines the credential of the user for authentication. Fur-
thermore, P̂req is the set of all requested purposes, which corresponds
to the name of Purpose-elements. The requested attributes are defined
by D̂req, which corresponds to the name of the Data-elements. Lastly,
the set of records, i.e. users, from which data is requested is defined
by D̂Sreq.
Based upon this request, Entity-Authentication, Purpose-Authorization,
Entity-Authorization, and Data-Authorization are conducted in the given
order to verify that the requesting entity is authorized to access the
personal data for the specified purposes from the set of users (see
Figure 5.5).
Figure 5.5: Process chain for the Policy-based Access Control (PAC).
Before each of the PAC processes is detailed, several required sup-
port structures are detailed in the following.
5.5.1 Support Structures
LPL privacy policies should be considered as the rule sets for individ-
uals’ personal data access. In the Transfer phase of the LPL life-cycle,
it is defined that the privacy policy may be refined to be stricter for
third parties. Within companies a more fine-grained access control is
required. Privacy policies and data recipients are indeed defined in
a generic and high-level way. To meet the users’ and companies’ re-
quirements, more fine-grained definitions are required. Therefore, the
Purpose-Hierarchy and Entity-Hierarchy are introduced. Furthermore,
the Entity-Lookup Table is introduced as a central register for enti-
ties. The Entity-Lookup Table and Entity-Hierarchy are used for Entity-
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Authentication and Entity-Authorization, while the Purpose-Hierarchy is
used for the Purpose-Authorization process.
5.5.1.1 Entity-Hierarchy
The Entity-Hierarchy allows to define Child-Entities that inherit the
rights of the Parent-Entities. An entity can hereby define an individual
or groups of individuals (roles).
Assuming a privacy policy, the data recipients are often defined in a
generic way, e.g., a company may specify ′trusted third parties ′ or
′advertisement agencies ′ as recipients of personal data. This makes
sense from a privacy policy point of view, because these entities might
be replaced or extended. Thus, a generic definition allows to alter
business partners while the privacy policy stays valid. These generic
definitions of entities have then to be refined to match the intended
access rules of the company, e.g., it has to be defined which companies
fall under ′trusted third parties ′. The same is applicable for internal
company access control to personal data, e.g., definition of individual
departments or individuals. This is enabled by Entity-Hierarchy, which
is defined as a lattice.
Hereby, only the unique name is needed within the Entity-Hierarchy
(see Figure 5.6). Assuming a user agrees to the processing of his
personal data by drC1 ′DR_C1 ′, then this can be assumed as a Parent-
Entity for which more fine-grained Child-Entities can be added to the
Entity-Hierarchy, e.g., employees ′DR_EMP1 ′ and ′DR_EMP2 ′. It is
also possible that a Child-Entity inherits from two Parent-Entities, e.g.,
the employee ′DR_EMP2 ′. This represents the use case when several
users allow a company to use their data. If the processing of a Parent-
Entity is agreed to, then the processing of each of its Child-Entities is
allowed, otherwise not.
5.5.1.2 Entity-Lookup Table
The Entity-Lookup Table is introduced to provide a centralised structure
to look up entities. It is intended as a hash-map to allow a fast lookup
of entities without traversing the Entity-Hierarchy, e.g., during the
Entity-Authentication process.
The Entity-Lookup Table is the set of all entities (ds and dr) that exist
within all stored lpp and additionally all entities that are defined
in Entity-Hierarchy. Each entry of the Entity-Lookup Table defines the
name and authInfo attribute. The authInfo defines the value that is
authenticated against, e.g., the public key if a public/private key au-
thentication is used or the hashed password if a username/password
authentication is used.
Considering the entities defined in Section 5.3, each distinct entity,
defined by the name, is added to the Entity-Lookup Table (see Table
5.3).
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Figure 5.6: Possible structure of Entity-Hierarchy based on the scenario in
Section 5.3). The {}-node is a default node with no access rights
assigned.
Table 5.3: General structure of Entity-Lookup Table shown for the scenario
introduced in Section 5.3 as an example.
Entity-Lookup Table
name authInfo
DS_U1 publicKeyU1
C_C1 publicKeyC1
DR_C1 publicKeyC1
DS_C1 publicKeyC1
C_C2 publicKeyC2
DR_C2 publicKeyC2
5.5.1.3 Purpose-Hierarchy
The Purpose-Hierarchy is introduced for the Purpose-Authorization pro-
cess. Its intention is similar to the Entity-Hierarchy. In privacy policies,
usually only generic high level purpose are defined, e.g., ′Research ′ or
′Marketing ′. To allow the company to define fine-grained purposes
that can be assigned to third party companies or internal departments,
the Purpose-Hierarchy is introduced.
The Purpose-Hierarchy is a forest that consists of several hierarchical
trees of purposes. For each purpose, it is possible to define Child-
Purposes that inherit from the Parent-Purpose (see Fig. 5.7). The unique
name of the Purpose-element p defines each element of the Purpose-
Hierarchy. Assuming a user agrees to the processing of his personal
data for the purpose ′Marketing ′, then this can be assumed as a
Parent-Entity for which fine-grained Child-Entities can be added to
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the Purpose-Hierarchy, e.g., the purpose ′Direct Marketing ′. It is not
possible that a Child-Purpose inherits from two Parent-Purposes. If the
processing of a Parent-Purpose is agreed to, then the processing of each
of its Child-Purposes is allowed, otherwise not.
Figure 5.7: Purpose-Hierarchy showing a possible inheritance hierarchy for
purposes based upon the online shop scenario of Section 5.3.
Next, the PAC processes are detailed, which utilize the Entity-
Hierarchy, Entity-Lookup Table and Purpose-Hierarchy.
5.5.2 Entity-Authentication
Entity-Authentication is necessary to identify the entity ereq that re-
quests the usage of data. Assuming the Entity-Lookup Table from Table
5.3, every entity and its authInfo is accessible. In the following, the
usage of publicKey and privateKey for the authentication is assumed.
During the Usage step, an entity ereq requests data protected by the
privacy policy lppdsU1-{drC1}. To confirm the identity of ereq, it has
to be authenticated. Therefore, it is assumed that an employee of
company eC1 requests data protected by lppdsU1-{drC1} (see Equation
5.59).
requestC1 = (DR_C1,privateKeyC1, {Data Mining},
{postal-code, salary}, {dsU1})
(5.59)
Hereby, requestC1 defines ′DR_C1 ′ as the userIdentifier and
privateKeyC1 as the credential. Hereby, privateKeyC1 matches to
publicKeyC1.
In general, the following authentication process is assumed for
the scenario. The Êlook−up is traversed to identify matching entities
to the requesting entity by its userIdentifier to the corresponding
name of the Entity-Lookup Table, i.e. ′DR_C1 ′. If a match is found, the
credential is used to authenticate the entity via the authInfo of the
Entity-Lookup Table.
Assuming public/private keys for the authentication in this scenario,
the following process can be used for authentication. If a matching
entity ematch is found, then the publicKeymatch is used to encrypt
a nonce and send it to the requesting entity.
encryptedMessagematch = encrypt(nonce,
publicKeymatch)
(5.60)
5.5 access control 121
To successfully authenticate the requesting entity, the computed en-
crypted message has to be decrypted with the privateKeyrequesting
and sent back.
decryptedMessage = decrypt(encryptedMessagematch,
privateKeyrequesting)
(5.61)
The requesting entity is authenticated if the decryptedMessage
equals the nonce.
nonce == decryptedMessage (5.62)
Considering the scenario, the requesting entity provides the identify-
ing userIdentifier ′DR_C1 ′, that is matched against the Entity-Lookup
Table of Table 5.3. Therefore, the authInfo publicKeyC1 can be identi-
fied and matched with the credential of requestC1 privateKeyC1 (see
Equation 5.63).
nonce = decrypt(encrypt(nonce,publicKeyC1),
privateKeyC1)
(5.63)
The authentication fails if either the userIdentifier cannot be found
in the Entity-Lookup Table or the authInfo and credential do not
match. For this scenario, it is assumed that the Entity-Authentication
process results in a successful authentication for requestC1.
Furthermore, it is verified if the requesting entity matches a DataRe-
cipient-element of the corresponding policy lppdsU1-{drC1} in the Entity-
Authorization. But the Purpose-Authorization is conducted beforehand,
following the overall purpose-based structure of LPL.
In practice, asymetric authentication protocols or challenge-response
authentication methods should be used [86] [231] [265]. Examples
for well-known asymetric authentication protocols are the Needham-
Schroeder protocol [192] with Lowe’s [173] correction or Kerberos
[197].
5.5.3 Purpose-Authorization
The Purpose-Authorization process verifies if the request has an au-
thorized purpose, once the requesting entity has been authenticated.
Therefore, the requested purposes P̂req have to be matched with the
purposes of the LPL privacy policies. Hereby, not only a direct match
is considered, but also matches to Child-Purposes, which are stored
in the Purpose-Hierarchy. The request is rejected if no purpose can be
authorized.
The policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2} from Equation 5.52 is assumed to be
subject of the request. Moreover, the purpose ′Research ′ is available
in the Purpose-Hierarchy, as well as its Child-Purposes ′Data Mining ′
and ′Fraud Detection ′ (see Figure 5.7).
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method: authorizePurpose
in: requestedPurpose; lpp //requested purpose for the request; LPL policy
out: P //set of authorized purposes
6 //initialize authorizedPurposes
authorizedPurposes = {};
//receive set of possible purposes
for p : lpp.P
11 possiblePurposes = purposeHierarchy.getChildPurposes(p);
//verify if purpose matches at least one p of lpp
for possibleP : possiblePurposes
16 if match(possibleP, requestedPurpose)
authorizedPurposes.add(p);
return authorizedPurposes;
Listing 5.1: Pseudocode describing the authorization of purposes of a lpp
utilizing Purpose-Hierarchy. The Entity-Hierarchy is assumed to be
accessible within the method.
Assuming requestC1, the purpose ′Data Mining ′ is given. This
purpose, by itself, does not match any of the purposes given in
lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2}, i.e.
′Research ′. Because a Purpose-Hierarchy is as-
sumed in which every Child-Purpose of the authorized purpose is also
authorized, a set of Authorized Purposes P̂auth can be derived. There-
fore, the purpose ′Research ′ is identified in the Purpose-Hierarchy
and all its Child-Purposes as well. P̂possible-research is returned as
Equation 5.64:
P̂possible-research = {’Research’, ’Data Mining’,
’Fraud Detection’}
(5.64)
The requested purpose ′Data Mining ′ is therefore authorized,
because the requested purpose ′Data Mining ′ is present within the
possible authorized purposes P̂possible-research.
In general, the authorization process for a purpose requires the
name of the purpose and the corresponding lpp instance. The autho-
rization is successful if the name of the requested purpose matches
any of the p of the lpp or any of the corresponding Authorized Entities.
The Purpose-Authorization process has the task of gathering all autho-
rized Purposes for a specific request, whereas each requested purpose
of P̂req is processed individually (see Listing 5.1).
5.5.4 Entity-Authorization
After all authorized purpose have been identified, it is verified if the
requesting entity is eligible to process the data for the authorized
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method: authorizeEntity
in: userIdentifier; p //userIdentifier of requesting entity; authorized
purpose
out: boolean //true, iff requesting entity is authorized for a purpose,
otherwise false
6 boolean authorizeEntity(userIdentifier, p):
//for each data recipient of the authorized purpose
for dr : p.DR
//receive set of authorized entities
11 possibleDR = entityHierarchy.getChildEntities(dr).
if possibleDR != null
//verify if userIdentifer matches at least one dr of p
for dr : possibleDR
16 if match(userIdentifer, dr.name)
return true;
return false;
Listing 5.2: Pseudocode describing the authorization of a requesting entity
for an authorized purpose utilizing Entity-Hierarchy. The Entity-
Hierarchy is assumed to be accessible within the method.
purposes. Hereby, the userIdentifier is matched with the DataRecipi-
ent-elements dr of the authorized purposes. This Entity-Authorization
process follows the same basic principles as the Purpose-Authorization
process. The Entity-Hierarchy is utilized hereby in a similar manner.
A requesting entity, identified by the userIdentifier, is authorized
iff the name of a dr for an authorized purposes is matched. The
requestC1 is assumed for the policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2} for which
presearch is identified as an authorized purpose. If the userIdentifier
′DR_C1 ′ of requestC1 matches the name of drC1, it is authorized.
However, employees of the company may be defined that have more
restricted roles. Assuming the userIdentifier ′DR_EMP2 ′ from the
Entity-Hierarchy of Figure 5.6 does not match drC1 nor drC2. Consider-
ing the Entity-Hierarchy, ′DR_EMP2 ′ can be identified as a Child-Entity
of drC1 and drC2. Therefore, also an entity with the userIdentifier
′DR_EMP2 ′ is eligible for presearch.
In general, the authorization process for an entity requires the
userIdentifier of the requesting entity as well as the purpose for
which it should be verified against (see Listing 5.2). The authorization
is successful iff the userIdentifier matches any of the name of dr
of the purpose or any of its Child-Entities. This process has to be
conducted after the Purpose-Authorization. If the authorization fails for
a purpose, then this purpose is removed from the authorized purposes
for the requesting entity.
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method: authorizeData
in: requestedD; P //set of requested data; set of authorized purposes
out: D //set of authorized data
6 //initialize authorizedData
authorizedData = {};
//check for each requested data if it is authorized
for d : requestedD
11 //several authorized purposes are possible
for p : P
for dAuthorized : p.D
if match(d.name, dAuthorized.name)
authorizedData.add(d);
16
return authorizedData;
Listing 5.3: Pseudocode describing the authorization of data from authorized
purposes.
5.5.5 Data-Authorization
Lastly, the Data-Authorization process is conducted. It is intended to
verify that the requested data D̂req matches the defined data defined
in the authorized purpose. It must indeed be prevented that more
data than allowed in lpp can be requested.
Unlike in the Purpose- and Entity-Authorization, no additional sup-
port structures are needed. This process basically implements a direct
match between the requested data and the data for which the au-
thorized purpose is defined. Hereby, the requested data D̂req has
to match or be a subset of the defined set of Data-elements d of
the purpose p. If the verification is not successful, then the query is
rejected.
Assuming the requestC1 requests the data ′postal − code ′ and
′salary ′. For each of the requested data, it has to be verified if it is con-
tained within presearch. In this scenario, presearch contains dsalary
and dpostal−code which matches the requested data ′postal− code ′
and ′salary ′ when comparing it to the name of the corresponding d.
If the data that is requested is not within the authorized purpose,
e.g., ′age ′, then the Data-Authorization fails for the specific authorized
purpose. The Data-Authorization requires the name of the data d of
the corresponding purpose p (see Listing 5.3). The authorization is
successful if the name of the requested data matches any of d from
any AuthorizedPurpose.
When the request is run through the Entity-Authentication, Purpose-
Authorization, Entity-Authorization, and Data-Authorization, it is stated
that the requesting entity is eligible to process the data for the specified
purpose according to the LPL privacy policy lpp. Therefore, the R4
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Access Control requirement is fulfilled. This process is the basis for the
Policy-based De-identification process, which is detailed in Chapter 6.
In the following section, user interfaces for the creation, presentation
and negotiation of LPL privacy policies are proposed.
5.6 privacy policy user interface
As previously detailed, the R3 Human-readability requirement is con-
sidered during the creation of LPL. Within the life cycle of LPL (see
Section 5.3), human interaction with the privacy policy is indeed es-
sential during the Creation and Negotiation phase. During the Creation
phase, the privacy policy is created, for which it is essential to provide
suitable user interface to support the process. The user shall hereby
be informed about the contents of the privacy policy to comply with
the GDPR, thus also the R2 Legal Compliance requirement has to be
considered during the creation of the user interface. Additionally,
the user can personalize the privacy policy according to his privacy
requirements.
In the following, a proof-of-concept implementations for both use
cases is proposed to demonstrate the capability of LPL for fulfilling the
R3 Human-readability requirement [120]. The general layout of the user
interface is detailed, which is utilized for both the Negotiation View
and the Creation View. Furthermore, different negotiation scenarii are
detailed for the Negotiation View. Lastly, the Creation View is detailed,
which enables the creation of LPL privacy policies.
A web-based environment, e.g., an online shop, is assumed for
the proof-of-concept implementations of the user interfaces. Thus,
web-technologies are used for the realization of the following user
interfaces [116] [115] [114].
5.6.1 User Interface Layout
In Section 2.3, several transparency key dimensions for privacy policies
as proposed by Bertino et al. [36] are introduced. The detailed key
dimensions – Record Transparency, Use Transparency, Disclosure and Data
Provisioning Transparency, Algorithm Transparency, and Law and Policy
Transparency – can be covered by the presentation of the corresponding
elements of LPL, e.g., Use Transparency is covered by the Purpose-
element p.
Furthermore, the Layered approach is detailed for the presentation
of privacy policies, which suggests a separation and prioritisation of
the content of the privacy policy, such that the user gets informed
about the most important content first and then additional information
through interaction[18].
This concept corresponds to the Visual Information Seeking Mantra
(VISM), which essentially states: Overview first, Zoom and Filter, then
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Details-on-demand [247]. VISM defines seven tasks in total, for which
an overview is given in the following.
• Overview: The user gains an overview of the content.
• Zoom: The user zooms on elements of interest.
• Filter: The user removes uninteresting elements.
• Details-on-demand: The user selects element(s) to get details.
• Relate: The user can view relationships between elements.
• History: A history of actions is kept to enable undo- and replay-
functions, or progressive refinement of the selection.
• Extract: Selected elements can be extracted.
VISM is intended for information exploration, for which tasks like
Filter, History, or Extract are useful [247]. Considering privacy policies,
which contain a lot of information, not all VISM tasks are applicable.
Thus, the focus lies only on a subset of VISM tasks. Overview is suitable
to give the user an overview over the most important information
of the privacy policy ’at a glance’. Zoom enables the user to display
only information that is of interest for him. Lastly, Details-on-demand
enables the user to inform himself about specific details of the privacy
policy. These tasks are considered in the layout, which is visualized
on the example of the Negotiation View in Figure 5.8.
5.6.1.1 Policy Header
The Policy Header incorporates the title of the policy, localization set-
tings, i.e. drop-down menu for available languages, and a link to
common legal privacy policy. The title of the policy is taken from the
Header-element head referenced by the LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element
lpp.
The localisation of the user interface, as well as the content of
the privacy policy, is derived from the web-browser settings of the
user. If the localisation of the web-browser is not available within
the LPL privacy policy, the default localization defined within the
lang attribute of lpp is used. Furthermore, the user can change the
localisation manually using the corresponding drop-down menu.
Lastly, a link to the common privacy policy is given to comply with
the current standard for representing privacy policies. This might be
omitted, if privacy language based privacy policies are commonly
accepted.
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Figure 5.8: Negotiation View for a LPL privacy policy stating the processing
of personal data for marketing, research, and billing. The layout
elements based on the Negotiation View are highlighted as follows:
1: Policy Header, 2: Privacy Icon Overview, 3: Purpose Overview, 4:
Purpose Detail, and 5: Policy Information.
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Figure 5.9: Place-holder Privacy Icons indicating the processing of personal
data for marketing, research, and billing purposes.
5.6.1.2 Privacy Icon Overview
The Privacy Icon Overview is intended to follow the VISM Overview
task giving an overview over the processing of the personal data, i.e.
purposes. The intention is that users can identify the core purposes of
the processing ’at a glance’ via meaningful pictograms [112].
Currently, no Privacy Icon set has been standardised (see Section
2.3), therefore place-holder Privacy Icons are introduced (see Figure
5.9). Such Privacy Icons have to be evaluated, which is out of the scope
of this thesis.
The Privacy Icons are globally defined for a LPL privacy policy by
a set of Icon-elements. Unlike other concepts for Privacy Icons [213]
[234] [189] [183], the intention is to only express the purpose of the
processing of personal data. Therefore, the user shall be able to identify
if the processing of his personal data is done for purposes that he
is not willing to allow. If this is the case, the user can furthermore
inspect the privacy policy beginning with the Purpose Overview.
5.6.1.3 Purpose Overview
The Purpose Overview lists all purposes of the privacy policy following
the Overview concept of VISM. Hereby, the set of Purpose-elements p
is utilized, from which the Header-element head is used to display the
human-readable name of the purpose.
Furthermore, it is indicated if a purpose is required or optional for
which the required attribute is utilized. An optional purpose is indi-
cated by the addition of a check-box, which is pre-ticked depending
on the optOut attribute.
Given the example in Figure 5.8, the purposes ′Research ′ and
′Billing ′ are required, and the purpose ′Marketing ′ is optional and
has to be consented to.
Thus, the Purpose Overview allows the user to Zoom on the contents
of the purpose via a click on the corresponding purpose. Hereby, the
contents of the purpose are detailed in Purpose Details.
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5.6.1.4 Purpose Details
Within the Purpose Details section of the layout an overview over all de-
tails of the purpose is given. The user is hereby presented information
on the processed data (Data-element d), the corresponding recipients
for the data (DataRecipient-element dr), the retention period of personal
data (Retention-element r), the privacy models (PrivacyModel-element
pm) and pseudonymization method (PseudonymizationMethod-element
psm), the legal basis of the processing (LegalBasis-element lb), and if
automated decision-making is conducted (AutomatedDecisionMaking-
element adm).
Similar to purposes, data and recipients may be required or optional,
which is defined by the required attribute of the Data- or DataRecipient-
element. The presentation follows the same principle as for the the
purposes, where the term ′required ′ indicates a required element and
a check-box indicates an optional element that may be (de-)selected
by the user.
By default, the contents of each of the information domains, e.g.,
data or recipients, is not visible to avoid to overwhelm the user with
information. The user can reveal the information by interacting with
the corresponding header. This corresponds to the Details-on-demand
task of VISM.
5.6.1.5 Policy Information
Within the Policy Information section of the layout, general information
on the policy is given. This includes the display of the responsible
DPO (DataProtectionOfficer-element dpo) and Controller (Controller-
element c). In both cases, contact details are detailed to allow the
user to contact them. Furthermore, information on the data source
(DataSource-element ds), how to lodge a complaint (LodgeComplaint-
element lc), and Data Subject Rights (DataSubjectRight-element dsr)
is given. This content is not visible by default, but can be accessed
interacting with the corresponding header, thus the Details-on-demand
task of VISM is represented again. Therefore, a user can access the
information on how to lodge a complaint when it is necessary for him.
5.6.2 Negotiation View
The Negotiation View (see Figure 5.8) is intended to inform the user
about the contents of the privacy policy in an easy and comprehensive
way for a better transparency utilizing the previously introduced
layout.
During the Negotiation phase of the life cycle, the user gets the
privacy policy presented via the Negotiation View (see Figure 5.8). On
the one hand, the user is informed about the contents of the privacy
policy. On the other hand, the user can customize the privacy settings
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defined by LPL. Note that the privacy policy can be negotiated during
the first presentation of the privacy policy, or at any given time after
the policy has been agreed on. Hereby, the intention is to empower
the user to personalize his policy in detail instead of making only
binary consent decisions on purposes. With LPL, the user can act on
the Purpose-, Data-, and DataRecipient-element changing the required
attribute which are the basis for personalization as detailed by Gerl
et al. [117]. Furthermore, the Minimum Anonymization Level may be
defined by the user for single attributes. The enabled personalization
possibilities are discussed in the following sub-sections.
5.6.2.1 Purpose Consent
Consent management based on the purpose is commonly used in
practice. For example, a user has to agree on the processing of his
e-mail for receiving newsletters as part of marketing campaigns. This
purpose requires explicit consent because it is not covered by any legal
basis nor is part of a legitimate interest of a company, i.e. the business
model.
In the Negotiation View example (see Figure 5.8), the purpose
′Marketing ′ is optional and can be consented to by ticking the
corresponding check-box. Hereby, it has to be considered that only
opt-in consent is legal [110, Art. 7]. Opt-in means that the purpose
has to be actively selected and therefore is not pre-selected. If a
purpose is consented to, then the attribute pointOfAcceptance of
the corresponding Purpose-element p is set with the current data and
time such that the Controller can demonstrate when the consent has
been given. This is required for accountability reasons, e.g., towards
supervisory authorities.
Furthermore, the withdrawal of consent has to be as easy as to give
the consent to a purpose [110, Art. 7]. Within the Negotiation View this
is as simple as to remove the tick of a check-box. A purpose, which is
not consented to, is omitted from the LPL privacy policy. However, it
can be added again based upon the raw privacy policy. Thus, the Nego-
tiation View uses the raw privacy policy, defining possible negotiations,
and the personalized privacy policy.
5.6.2.2 Data Negotiation
Data Negotiation is denoted as a negotiation action that can be per-
formed by the user. For optional Data-elements d, it is assumed that
these are de-selected by default; in other words opt-in actions are
assumed for data. The same assumption is made for optional DataRe-
cipient-elements dr. A user is assumed to consent to the optional
purpose ′Marketing ′. If data and data recipients require opt-in de-
cision, then for each element an additional action is required. This
is intended to raise awareness for the processed personal data of the
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user. Thus, a user can restrict his consent on a fine-grained level for
optional personal data. For example, the Negotiation View in Figure 5.8
enables the user to accept or reject the processing of ′education ′ and
′work− class ′ for the purpose ′Research ′.
5.6.2.3 Data Recipient Negotiation
Similar to Data Negotiation, the user can also negotiate the recipients
for his personal data. This can have various applications in different
domains. For example in social media, the user may define that his
personal data is shared with specific user groups, e.g., data is shared
with ’family’ but not with ’friends’. Considering the given example of
the Negotiation View in Figure 5.8, the user cannot prevent the process-
ing of his personal data by the service provider ′internal ′ which is
required, but can decide if ′external ′ entities can access his personal
data. Thus, the user has fine-grained control over the processing of
his personal data by different recipients, while the Controller can state
what purposes, data and data recipients are required.
5.6.2.4 Minimum Anonymization Negotiation
Next to binary decisions on purposes, data and recipients, LPL en-
ables the user to directly influence the quality of the data, i.e. the
anonymization level, that is processed for a specific purpose. For
each Data-element d, an AnonymizationMethod-element am is specified
which holds the Minimum Anonymization Level and the Maximum Ano-
nymization Level via two AnonymizationMethodAttribute-elements ama.
The Maximum Anonymization Level is set during the Creation phase
of the LPL life cycle. It represents the required data quality for the
processing of the data for the specific purpose. Thus, the requirements
for the Controller, i.e. company, are defined. However, the Minimum
Anonymization Level can be negotiated during the Negotiation phase
of the LPL life cycle. The Minimum Anonymization Level, a numeri-
cal value, has to be lesser or equal to the Maximum Anonymization
Level. Thus, the negotiation of the Minimum Anonymization Level can
be omitted if the Maximum Anonymization Level is set to ′0 ′. Otherwise,
the user can adjust the anonymization level accordingly to match his
personal privacy requirements.
For example, a user could agree to the processing of his personal
data, i.e. postal-code ′94032 ′, for a research purpose. Moreover, as-
sume the user does not want to state his exact postal-code in order to
preserve his privacy. Thus, the user can adjust the Minimum Anony-
mization Level such that only the anonymized postal-code ′9403∗ ′ is
used for research. As detailed before, this requires that the Maximum
Anonymization Level is set to at least ′1 ′ in this case.
This scenario is enabled by defining the anonymization method
′Suppression ′ for the attribute postal-code with the Maximum Ano-
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Figure 5.10: Anonymization method settings for the attribute postal-code
using theCreation View.
nymization Level set to ′3 ′ and the Minimum Anonymization Level set
to ′1 ′ by default (see Figure 5.10). The Minimum Anonymization Level
could be set higher, but the Privacy by Default principle is interpreted
such that data is protected, e.g. de-identified, by default [110, Art. 25
(2)]. Therefore, a company should define that data is used anonymized
by default. Thus, the user may even reduce the Minimum Anonymiza-
tion Level.
This allows the user to potentially specify the anonymization level of
each attribute (EI, QI, SD, and NSD). Thus, fine-grained negotiation
is enabled, including consent management based on purpose, data
and recipients as well as the quality of the data via the Minimum
Anonymization Level.
5.6.3 Creation View
The LPL privacy policy has to be created before the user is able to give
consent to the processing of personal data or to negotiate his personal
privacy requirements. Due to the vast amount of requirements given
by the GDPR (see Section 2.2), the creation of a common privacy policy
requires expert knowledge on both the legal requirements and the
details of the corresponding service the policy is created for [116]
[115].
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The overall layout of the Creation View (see Figure 5.11) corresponds
with the layout of the Negotiation View, but the intended usage dra-
matically varies. While the Negotiation View enables users to inform
themselves about the privacy policy and negotiate it, the Creation View
is intended for use by the Controller to realize raw LPL privacy policies
lppraw.
The creation of raw LPL privacy policies lppraw can be conducted
based on an existing legal privacy policy. This requires a matching
of the legal text to LPL elements. Apparently, it can be realized from
scratch. In this context, the Creation View offers functionality to create,
update, or delete LPL elements.
In the Policy Header section, controls for uploading an existing LPL
policy, resetting the whole policy or to add additional layers (Underly-
ingPrivacyPolicy upp) are given. Thus, an existing LPL policy can be
edited or a new policy can be created.
Within the Privacy Icon Overview, the user can add new Privacy Icons
from a set of pre-defined icons. The Purpose Overview and Purpose
Details sections enable the creation of various purposes for the policy.
Furthermore, all required information for the privacy policy as well as
the de-identification settings are detailed. Lastly, general information
on the policy can be defined within the Policy Information section (see
Figure 5.11).
5.6.4 Discussion
To demonstrate the fulfilment of the R3 Human-readability requirement,
proof-of-concept user interfaces for the creation and negotiation of
LPL privacy policies have been realized and detailed. Furthermore,
the R2 Legal Compliance requirement has been considered, such that
all required information is accessible via the user interfaces. In the
following paragraphs, possible improvements and extensions for the
presented user interfaces are discussed considering both requirements
R2 and R3. For the creation of the user interfaces VISM is used,
whereas only Overview, Zoom, and Details-on-demand is considered.
The remaining design principles have been excluded for the scope
of the proof-of-concept prototypes, but possible implementation is
discussed in the following. The Filter design principle could find
application in the Negotiation View allowing the user to search and
filter for specific groups of personal data, e.g., health data, that is
of relevance for the user. View Relationships could visualise how data
fields are used within automatic decision-making [110, Art. 13 No.
2]. A History of accepted privacy policies could be made available for
the user to recall his decisions, which would also require the user to
have the possibility to Extract the privacy policy contents. In the same
way, a History of negotiations and consent given via the privacy policy
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Figure 5.11: Creation View for a raw LPL privacy policy lppraw stating the
processing of personal data for marketing, research, and billing.
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could be visualized or even a History of the processing of personal
data such that the user is completely and transparently informed.
The Negotiation View prioritises the presentation of the Data-element
d over the DataGroup-elements dg, which can be considered prob-
lematic in the context of the GDPR requirements. In the GDPR, it is
indeed stated that the user has to be informed about the collected data
categories [110, Art. 14 (1)(d)]. Thus, this requirement is not directly
fulfilled by the current version of the Negotiation View, but this could
be changed in future versions.
During the creation of raw LPL privacy policies, it is a hard chal-
lenge to determine which privacy model, anonymization and pseudo-
nymization is sufficient for a purpose, since it requires extensive expert
knowledge. To facilitate the selection of appropriate de-identification
methods a wizard or questionnaire may be introduced. Within the
wizard, a questionnaire could be used to determine the general risk
and attacks that the data-set has to be protected from and therefore
suitable de-identification methods could be proposed [225].
Not only the definition of de-identification methods but also their
presentation is an open challenge. Assuming 5-Anonymity is defined
for an optional purpose publishing the personal data, then the decision
to consent to this purpose is strongly influenced on how the personal
data is protected. From the point of view of the user, 5-Anonymity is
probably unknown or even if known, the user should understand what
the guarantees of this privacy model are, which is not plausible. Thus,
de-identification methods have to be presented in an understandable
way for common users. One approach could be the presentation of
the risk of identification via a percentage, e.g., 20% for 5-Anonymity.
Another approach would be to use coloured indicators (red for high
risk, yellow for medium risk, and green for low to no risk).
Similarly, a suitable selection of the Minimum Anonymization Level
is subject to future work and has to be evaluated. Considering the
Privacy by Default principle [110, Art. 25 (2)] several pre-defined risk
profiles may be proposed to the user.
Concerning the overall design of the user interface, different user
groups have to be considered. The usage of a privacy language enables
the alteration of the user interface for different contexts. Therefore, dif-
ferent user interfaces may be implemented for LPL targeting different
user groups, e.g., children, elderly people, or people with disabilities.
5.7 provenance
In Section 2.6, the R6 Provenance requirement is detailed. The use
cases Data Processing and Data Production are considered, which are
discussed in the following for LPL.
Provenance can be covered by applying the sticky policy concept,
which states that the policy should always be linked to the personal
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data (see Section 4.1). Therefore, the origin of the personal data can be
identified assuming the source of the personal data is specified within
the considered privacy language.
Provenance of data access control is extensively covered in the liter-
ature by various works due to its importance for critical systems. For
example, in the medical domain it is necessary that data records are
properly archived to be audited [129]. Research efforts have been made
for the management of provenance [76] [249] [131] [60] [123] and secur-
ing provenance [129] [130] [174] [199]. Provenance of data is denoted
as the documentation of messages, operations, actors, preferences and
the context that constitute the data [199].
However, Provenance can not only be considered for the origin of
the data (source) but also for the privacy policy, such that it can be
back-traced what the conditions for the processing of the personal data
have been and how they have been refined. Therefore, accountability
for companies can be monitored, i.e. it can be validated according
which privacy policy data is transferred to a third party.
Within LPL, the UnderlyingPrivacyPolicy-element upp is introduced
for Privacy Policy Provenance. Hereby, refined privacy policies incor-
porate the privacy policies that they are based upon as denoted by
Gerl et al. [121]. This enables to distinguish between different privacy
policies, their origin, and the validation of refined privacy policies
against their previous policies. This is illustrated for Data Processing
and Data Production use cases in the following paragraphs.
5.7.1 Data Processing
In the Data Processing use case, it is assumed that data and policies
are transferred to third parties, e.g., for processing or trading. This
scenario corresponds to the Transfer phase of the LPL life cycle (see
Section 5.3.5).
Hereby, it is assumed that the user dsU1 agrees upon a policy with
company eC1 to process his postal-code and salary for research pur-
poses ( ′P_Research ′). The policy between the user and the company
eC1 is hereby denoted as lppdsU1-{drC2,drC2} (see Equation 5.52).
Although, the policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2} allows a secondary com-
pany eC2 to process the data as well, company eC1 restricts the pro-
cessing of the personal data. According to the agreement between eC1
and eC2, company eC2 is only allowed to process postal-code for the
purpose ′P_Research ′. As this restriction is not expressed within the
existing policy, a new LPL policy lppdsC1-{drC2} is defined. The new
policy has to be validated to ensure that the personal data is processed
accordingly to the previous agreed upon policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2}.
Without going into the details of the validation process, it has to be
ensured that the new policy is at least as ’strict’ as the previously
agreed policy. For the given case, this is fulfilled because the purposes
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match, the set of data recipients is a subset of the previous set, and
the processed data attributes are also a subset of the data defined
in lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2}. The validation would fail if, e.g., the data is
processed for a different purpose (taking into account the Purpose-
Hierarchy), as data is processed which has not been specified for the
purpose before, or de-identification methods are removed or weak-
ened. Thus, the semantics of the policy have to be taken into account
during the validation.
Iff the validation is successfully performed, the previously agreed
upon LPL privacy policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2} is set as the Underlying-
PrivacyPolicy-element upp of lppdsC1-{drC2} (see Figure 5.12). Thus,
a chain of policies is created which can be re-evaluated by the user,
company or supervisory authorities to show compliance to the privacy
regulations.
Figure 5.12: Data Processing use case based upon the Transfer phase scenario.
Data is transferred from user dsU1 to company cC1 under the
LPL privacy policy lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2}. The data is furthermore
transferred to cC2 under the policy lppdsC1-{drC2}, which has to
be validated against the previous policy.
The sticky policy concept in combination with UnderlyingPrivacyPol-
icy-elements upp allows furthermore to identify the source of personal
data or a specific attribute (see Listing 5.4).
5.7.2 Data Production
The Data Production use case considers that personal data is processed
to derive new data or information from it, e.g., in machine learning or
data mining. The derived data is hereby based upon the personal data.
It can be either classified again as personal data with a direct relation
to a distinct user, or no longer classified as personal data, e.g. if the
data is anonymized. Moreover, this derivative may be used for critical
decisions, e.g., in health care, disaster prediction, or fraud detection.
For critical use cases, it is crucial to be able to verify and backtrack the
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method: determineSource
3 in: lpp; data //LPL privacy policy; data element to identify origin source of
out: e //source of data
dataSource = null; //entity e
8 //if data can be found in any purpose
for p : lpp.P
for d : p.D
//match data according to name
if match(data, d)
13 dataSource = lpp.ds;
//recursively iterate over all upp
for upp : lpp.UPP
if upp != null
18 temp = determineSource(lpp.upp, data);
//if dataSource is found
if temp != null
dataSource = temp;
23
return dataSource;
Listing 5.4: Pseudocode to determine the origin source of a specific data
attribute.
decision-making, e.g., to make transparent decisions, to verify results,
or for fault checking.
The following Data Production scenario is based upon the scenario
in Section 5.3. A company eC1 has collected personal data of sev-
eral users dsU1, dsU2, and dsU3 with the corresponding privacy
policies lppdsU1-{drC1,drC2}, lppdsU2-{drC1,drC2}, and lppdsU3-{drC1,drC2}
(see Figure 5.13). The LPL privacy policies only differ with respect to
the different users, but not due to their description of the processing of
the personal data. It is defined that the personal data can be processed
for research, which is done by the company eC1 under consideration
of each of the policies.
Thanks to the research process, the company can derive their most
profitable sales regions based upon the postal− codes of the users.
The company eC1 defines for this newly generated data a new policy
stating that it can be only processed within the company for further
research purposes. The new policy is denoted as lppdsC1-{drC1}. The
LPL privacy policies of the users are hereby set as UnderlyingPriva-
cyPolicy-elements upp to document the origin for the sale regions
process. The new LPL privacy policy is linked to the derived data to
ensure a compliant handling of the personal data.
Thus, Data Production use cases can be covered by LPL using the
LayeredPrivacyPolicy-element.
It is demonstrated how LPL can be used for the Data Processing
and Data Production use cases to cover the R6 Provenance requirement.
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Figure 5.13: Data Production use case, demonstrating the production of new
data based upon the personal data of several users. The derived
data is associated with a new LPL privacy policy incorporating
the distinct privacy policies of the users as underlying privacy
policies for enforcing Provenance and credibility.
Thanks to the layering of LPL privacy policies, it is possible not only
to backtrack the source of personal data, i.e. the user, but also the
original agreement (or consent) to the processing of personal data.
This enables to validate the authorization to process personal data and
to review the personal data used to produce new data.
Thus, a chain or graph of policies is generated which can be lever-
aged to transparently show the flow of personal data and its corre-
sponding policies.
Only the creation of new LPL privacy policies is discussed using
layering for Provenance indeed, but more dynamic scenarios have to
be considered. Users may indeed alter their personal privacy require-
ments within the policy, object the processing of their personal data,
or delete their account and corresponding privacy policy. Companies
may update privacy policies concerning their users, e.g., add new
purposes or data to be processed, or alter the transfer conditions of
personal data to third parties. Therefore, not only the creation but
especially the update and the deletion of LPL privacy policies within
the policy graph have to be considered.
Assume a scenario in which a user withdraws his consent to process
personal data for research by a third party, not only the local LPL
privacy policy has to be updated, but the changes have to be cascaded
to the third party. Similarly, if a company adds another mandatory
purpose to its privacy policy, this change has to be transparently
presented to the user, e.g., via notifications. Furthermore, such a dis-
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tributed scenario requires also a protocol to authenticate and authorize
entities, purposes, and other LPL elements across companies to allow
processing and validation of privacy policies. With LPL it is possible,
because LPL contains all necessary information that is required to add
additional functionality, e.g. notifications. These challenges are not
covered within this thesis, but are subject to future work (see Section
8.2).
5.8 discussion
This chapter detailed the rationale behind the Layered Privacy Language
(LPL) and gave a formalization of its elements. Based on the formalized
LPL, the intended life-cycle has been detailed in Section 5.3. Further-
more, the fulfilment of requirements for a privacy language introduced
in Chapter 2 is shown to answer the first research question RQ1: ’How
to represent legal privacy policies in a machine-readable format which
complies to the legal requirements of the General Data Protection
Regulation in the EU while privacy guarantees are defined?’.
Therefore, the fulfilment of the R1 Privacy Policy Structure require-
ment is given by the core structure of LPL denoted by the Layered-
PrivacyPolicy-element lpp, DataSource-element ds, Purpose-element p,
Data-element d and DataRecipient-element dr. The fulfilment of the
R2 Legal Compliance requirement is shown by an in detail comparison
of the legal requirements and their fulfilment by LPL in Section 5.4.
The fulfilment of the R3 Human-readability requirement is discussed
according to proof-of-concept user interfaces for privacy policy cre-
ation, presentation and negotiation, whereas also R2 Legal Compliance
has been considered in Section 5.6. For the fulfilment of the R4 Access
Control requirement, the algorithms for PAC are detailed in Section
5.5). Lastly, it is shown how LPL privacy policies can be utilized for
Data Processing and Data Production use cases due to the layering of
LPL privacy policies to fulfil the R6 Provenance requirement.
Therefore, it has been shown that LPL can express all information
required by the discussed legal regulations of the GDPR, while a
structured and transparent visualization of LPL privacy policies is
possible, i.e. due the usage of human-readable texts and Privacy Icons.
Provenance is given in LPL due to the layering of privacy policies,
while the well-known sticky policy concept is assumed. LPL privacy
policies express access rules to personal data, which take into account
the purpose, data recipient and data. Therefore, the fulfilment of
requirements for a privacy language introduced in Chapter 2 is shown,
except the fulfilment of the R5 De-identification Capabilities requirement,
to answer the first research question RQ1.
The fulfilment of the R5 De-identification Capabilities requirement is
shown in the next chapter detailing the Policy-based De-identification
(PD) process to demonstrate how LPL can express privacy guarantees
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to completely answer RQ1. Furthermore, the PD process is introduced
to answer the second research question RQ2: ’How can machine-
readable privacy policies, expressing privacy-preserving methods, be
utilized to efficiently preserve the privacy of individuals when a set
of users’ personal data is requested for processing?’. The PD process
is evaluated in Chapter 7 with respect to its efficiency to answer the
second research question RQ2.

6
P O L I C Y- B A S E D D E - I D E N T I F I C AT I O N
This chapter details the Policy-based De-identification (PD) process,
which demonstrates the realization of the R5 De-identification Capabili-
ties requirement of Section 2.5. This process concerns the Anonymiza-
tionMethod-element am, PrivacyModel-element pm, and Pseudonymiza-
tionMethod-element psm of LPL.
A data-warehouse scenario is assumed as basis for the PD process,
because in a data-warehouse (personal) data is regularly collected,
updated, and processed for various purposes by the company to
gain added value. The data can be sourced from various origins
and is integrated into a common scheme. Depending on the purpose,
personal data has to be de-identified. If such a data-warehouse scenario
with multidimensional data is considered, manifold challenges arise.
Personalized LPL privacy policies, i.e. LPL policies with varying
privacy and utility configurations, have to be assumed for each record,
which makes this process particularly complex. Thus, for the PD
process, not only a large number of data, but also an equally high
volume of possibly personalized LPL privacy policies has to be taken
into account. Indeed, each LPL privacy policy instance defines the
privacy requirements for a user. Hereby, it is required to efficiently
determine and apply a uniform level of privacy, i.e. a consensus on the
de-identification approach has to be reached, for the whole data-set.
Furthermore, the privacy requirements of the users is contradicted by
the utility needs of the company. The different methods for privacy
preservation – Pseudonymization, Personal Privacy Anonymization, and
Privacy Models – have to be carefully considered and combined to
mitigate any unnecessary negative interference on either privacy or
utility [121] [113].
In the following, the concept of Policy-based De-identification (PD)
is based and illustrated on a data-warehouse scenario. Privacy and
utility requirements are highlighted. Next, each essential process step
is detailed for Pseudonymization, Personal Privacy Anonymization, and
Privacy Model. Lastly, the PD process is discussed before it is evaluated
in Chapter 7.
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6.1 overview
The Layered Privacy Language (LPL) is capable to express de-
identification methods. These latter can be seen as privacy guarantees
given by the company to the user regarding the processing of
personal data for a specific purpose. Attribute-based personalization
of the users’ privacy requirements is considered in LPL through the
adjustment of the Minimum Anonymization Level during the Negotiation
phase, which has a direct impact on the processed data quality. The
negotiation of consent for Purpose-, Data-, and DataRecipient-elements
has only an indirect impact on the de-identification process, because
it is considered during the Policy-based Access Control process, whereas
whole records or single values of a record can be removed from the
data-set.
The utility requirements of the company is considered through the
Maximum Anonymization Level, which is set during the Creation phase
of the LPL life cycle. Finally, next to personal privacy anonymization,
also pseudonymization methods and privacy models can be used
on the data-set to mitigate the risks of re-identification. Therefore, a
high variety of privacy policies is possible, which in the following is
illustrated by a data-warehouse scenario.
6.1.1 Data-warehouse Scenario
Consider a data-warehouse scenario in which the data-warehouse
DW1 is regularly, e.g., daily, updated with the records of two different
services S1 and S2 (see Figure 6.1). Although the services differ in their
functionality, related privacy policies both define a common purpose
′Research ′. For this purpose, data may be processed by the respective
services, e.g., S1 or S2, and the data-warehouse DW1. The assumption
is that both services collect and provide the same types of personal
data: name, age, and postal-code.
Service S1 defines that the personal data is de-identified using
pseudonymization on the name as well as 3-Anonymity on the data-
set. Service S2 may define different de-identification conditions to
protect personal data, e.g., 2-Diversity instead of 3-Anonymity, or none.
Therefore, the de-identification requirements for the same purpose, i.e.
′Research ′, may differ due to the various origins of the policy. Also
the utility requirements can differ, which are defined by the Maximum
Anonymization Level for each Data-element d.
The possibility of personal privacy policies introduces an additional
variability of the privacy requirements by altering Minimum Anony-
mization Levels for each Data-element d. Thus, the PD process has to
consider various privacy and utility requirements, which may change
over time as a user or a company updates the policy. Considering
the data-warehouse, a pre-processing of de-identified data-sets can
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be done after each regular refresh, if known requests exist. Moreover,
the PD process is considered, in general, to be executed on-the-fly
and requests are also applicable for production databases that are
continuously altered.
Fabian and Göthling [100] compared different strategies for the ano-
nymization of personal data in a data-warehouse scenario. In general,
the possibilities for the point of de-identification in a data-warehouse
scenario can vary from de-identification the personal data at their
source, i.e. service S1 and S2, and transfer it to the data-warehouse to
a query-based anonymization, which de-identifies the personal data af-
ter it is requested. Fabian and Göthling [100] quantitatively evaluated
several scenarios measuring the utility of the anonymized data-set. The
evaluation did not include the query-based anonymization scenario,
because no suitable implementation was available at the time. Never-
theless, the results indicate that an as-late-as-possible de-identification,
i.e. anonymization, is overall advantageous for the utility, because
the data-set can be anonymized according to the privacy and utility
requirements of the specific purpose.
The PD process can be classified close to the query-based anonymi-
zation approach, because it determines and applies de-identification
methods on-the-fly. The PD process differs from the query-based de-
identification due to missing query capabilities, e.g., selection or filter.
Although, basic query capabilities can be assumed in the Policy-based
Access Control (PAC) processes, which are intended to select attributes
of records from a selected set of data sources. Next, the interplay of
PAC and PD is detailed as well as privacy and utility challenges that
are considered for the PD process.
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6.1.2 Process Sequence
Because the PD process only focuses on the de-identification of a
data-set, it has to be verified beforehand if the requesting entity is
authorized to access the personal data. This is done by the PAC process
(see Figure 6.3).
The PD process includes Pseudonymization, Personal Privacy Anony-
mization, and Privacy Models (see Chapter 3). Personal Privacy Anonymi-
zation considers the anonymization of individual attributes of a record
according to the Minimum Anonymization Level.
In the PD process, privacy for a data-set is guaranteed due to a com-
bination of all the individual de-identification methods, while utility is
considered as an anonymization limit defined by the Maximum Anony-
mization Level for each attribute. The sequence of the de-identification
methods is crucial to avoid any negative effect on both privacy and
utility.
In Chapter 3, the classification of data into the privacy groups
Explicit Identifier EI, Quasi-Identifier QI, Sensitive Data SD, and Non-
Sensitive Data NSD is detailed. EI attributes identify a user uniquely.
QI attributes identify a user in combination with other QI attributes.
SD attributes do not identify a user, but are valuable information
on the user. NSD attributes do not identify a user and do not have
valuable information on the user. Furthermore, it is explored how
the different de-identification methods affect the privacy groups in a
data-set. To match the properties of Privacy Models, QI attributes are
anonymized and EI are deleted (see Section 3.3). Personal Privacy Ano-
nymization can be conducted on all attributes, but commonly only QI
and SD attributes are anonymized (see Section 3.4). Pseudonymization
commonly only affects EI attributes (see Section 3.5).
pseudonymization and privacy models Pseudonymization
and Privacy Models both affect EI attributes. Privacy Models commonly
require the deletion of EI attributes from the data-set and Pseudonymi-
zation is usually applied on EI attributes to replace the original values
with a pseudonym. Therefore, to preserve the best possible utility of
the data-set, the Pseudonymization has to be conducted before Privacy
Models are used. Otherwise, if Privacy Models would be used before
Pseudonymization, the EI value would by deleted to comply with the
privacy model, before it can be used to generate a pseudonym. Thus,
Pseudonymization has to be used before Privacy Models.
Furthermore, the privacy group of the attribute, i.e., the EI attribute,
has to be altered to NSD after Pseudonymization. The privacy group
of the EI attribute has to be altered to NSD, because otherwise the
values of the pseudonymized EI attribute would be deleted to comply
with the Privacy Model. This alteration of the privacy group is valid,
because pseudonyms are no longer sensitive or able to identify a user,
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directly or indirectly, without authorized access to a bijective mapping
table (see Section 3.4).
pseudonymization and personal privacy anonymization
Pseudonymization affects EI attributes and Personal Privacy Anonymi-
zation affects commonly QI and SD attributes, but it is possible that
also EI attributes can be affected. Assuming, Personal Privacy Anony-
mization is used before Pseudonymization, EI attributes would be first
anonymized before they are pseudonymized. Thus, an anonymized
value would be used for the pseudonym generation, which can nega-
tively affect the utility.
Therefore, similar to the process sequence rationale of Pseudonymi-
zation and Privacy Models, Pseudonymization has to be applied before
Personal Privacy Anonymization. In fact, the EI attribute values will be
pseudonymized, such that any Personal Privacy Anonymization of the
EI values is obsolete. Therefore, Pseudonymization has to be conducted
before Personal Privacy Anonymization.
personal privacy anonymization and privacy models
As previously detailed, Privacy Models require the anonymization
of QI attributes and the deletion of EI attributes. Personal Privacy
Anonymization is commonly applied on QI and SD attributes, but can
also be applied on EI attributes. Thus, those processes have in com-
mon that EI and QI attributes are altered. In general, Personal Privacy
Anonymization defines the minimal privacy requirements of a user for
each attribute of the users’ record and Privacy Models define properties
of a data-set to mitigate privacy attacks, whereas anonymization is
used to achieve such properties.
Considering EI attributes, if Privacy Models are used before Personal
Privacy Anonymization the EI attributes would be deleted to achieve the
privacy model and any personal privacy anonymization is obsolete,
thus privacy is guaranteed. Otherwise, the EI attributes would be first
anonymized during Personal Privacy Anonymization and then deleted
to achieve the privacy model. Thus, the alteration of the EI attribute is
not decisive for the process sequence of Privacy Models and Personal
Privacy Anonymization.
Considering QI attributes, if Privacy Models are used before Per-
sonal Privacy Anonymization, the data-set would first be anonymized
to match the requirements of the Privacy Model before single records
are additionally anonymized to match the individuals’ privacy re-
quirements. Therefore, the properties of the data-set that match the
privacy model can be invalidated. For example, assume 3-Anonymity
is applied on a data-set, QI-group with at least 3 records are created
due to anonymization. Thus, the data-set is 3-anonymous (see Table
6.1). Table 6.1 is 3-anonymous, because each QI group has at least
3 records, e.g., the QI-group ( ′Artist ′, ′ (38− 50) ′, ′ F ′) has exactly 3
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records. Assuming that the attribute age of only one of the three
records requires the Minimum Anonymization Level ′2 ′ instead of the
current anonymization level ′1 ′ (see Figure 6.2), then one record has
to be additionally anonymized. This creates the additional QI-group
( ′Artist ′, ′ (25− 50) ′, ′ F ′) with 1 record (see Table 6.2). Furthermore,
the QI-group ( ′Artist ′, ′ (38− 50) ′, ′ F ′) has only 2 records, thus inval-
idating the properties of the 3-anonymous data-set. Therefore, privacy
is at risk because is no longer mitigated.
Table 6.1: 3-anonymous patient table based on Table 3.10. Anonymization is
conducted with the anonymization hierarchies shown in Figures
3.3, 6.2, and 3.5.
QI SD
Job Age Sex Disease
Professional (25 - 37) M HIV
Professional (25 - 37) M HIV
Professional (25 - 37) M Flu
Professional (25 - 37) M Flu
Artist (38 - 50) F Cancer
Artist (38 - 50) F Cancer
Artist (38 - 50) F Cancer
Table 6.2: Result patient table for the usage of Personal Privacy Anonymization
on a 3-anonymous patient table (see Table 6.1. Anonymization is
conducted with the anonymization hierarchies shown in Figures
3.3, 6.2, and 3.5.
QI SD
Job Age Sex Disease
Professional (25 - 37) M HIV
Professional (25 - 37) M HIV
Professional (25 - 37) M Flu
Professional (25 - 37) M Flu
Artist (38 - 50) F Cancer
Artist (38 - 50) F Cancer
Artist (25 - 50) F Cancer
If the Personal Privacy Anonymization is conducted before Privacy
Models are used, the QI attributes are first anonymized to meet
the individuals’ privacy requirements before the data-set is further
anonymized to meet the criteria of thePrivacy Model. For example, the
same personal privacy requirement for the last record is assumed,
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Figure 6.2: Anonymization hierarchy for the domain ′age ′. The scope of
original values at the anonymization level ′0 ′ has a broad range.
Each subsequently higher anonymization level covers a sub-range
of the original values. The generic value ′ANY ′ is used for the
highest anonymization level.
i.e. the Minimum Anonymization Level for the attribute age is set
to ′2 ′. Therefore, the result of the Personal Privacy Anonymization is
Table 6.3. This table is furthermore anonymized to meet the crite-
ria of 3-Anonymity, thus the QI attributes are anonymized such that
each QI-group has at least 3 records. This results in the QI-group
( ′Artist ′, ′ (38− 50) ′, ′ F ′) with 3 records and ( ′Professional ′, ′ (25−
37) ′, ′M ′) with 4 records (see Table 6.4). This de-identified data-set
fulfils the privacy requirements of the individuals and the privacy
model, but it has to be noted that the utility is reduced compared to
the previous example, i.e. the anonymization level ′2 ′ is used for 4
records, instead of only 1 record (see Tables 6.2 and 6.4).
Therefore, the usage of the Personal Privacy Anonymization before
Privacy Models is necessary to preserve the privacy, although the utility
may be negatively affected by the personal privacy settings. Therefore,
the individuals’ privacy requirements are applied for each attribute
of the record according to the Minimum Anonymization Level. Then,
the data-set is further anonymized to meet the requirements of the
Privacy Model step. Thus, privacy can be preserved considering both
individuals’ privacy requirements during the Personal Privacy Anony-
mization for each attribute and privacy requirements for the data-set
using Privacy Models.
In summary (see Figure 6.3), Pseudonymization is applied first on EI
attributes replacing them with pseudonyms and therefore changing
their privacy group to NSD. Next, Personal Privacy Anonymization is
applied onQI and SD attributes (doing it on EI andNSD is technically
possible but uncommon). Lastly, Privacy Models are applied, altering
QI attributes and deleting EI attributes resulting in a de-identified
data-set TPD based on the privacy requirements defined in LPL.
TPD = (QI
′,SD ′,NSD ′) (6.1)
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Table 6.3: Result patient table for the usage of Personal Privacy Anonymization.
The value of the attribute age is anonymized to meet the individu-
als privacy requirements. Anonymization is conducted with the
anonymization hierarchy shown in Figure 6.2.
QI SD
Job Age Sex Disease
Engineer 35 M HIV
Engineer 33 M HIV
Lawyer 29 M Flu
Lawyer 33 M Flu
Writer 42 F Cancer
Singer 45 F Cancer
Writer (25 - 50) F Cancer
Table 6.4: Result 3-anonymous patient table for the usage of Personal Privacy
Anonymization before Privacy Models. Anonymization is conducted
with the anonymization hierarchies shown in Figures 3.3, 6.2, and
3.5.
QI SD
Job Age Sex Disease
Professional (25 - 37) M HIV
Professional (25 - 37) M HIV
Professional (25 - 37) M Flu
Professional (25 - 37) M Flu
Artist (25 - 50) F Cancer
Artist (25 - 50) F Cancer
Artist (25 - 50) F Cancer
6.1.3 Data Structure – DataWrapper
The DataWrapper-object dw acts as a container for the data of each
record as well as the corresponding authorized purpose which is
derived after the individuals’ LPL privacy policy successfully runs
through the PAC process. A set of DataWrapper-elements DW repre-
sents therefore a data-set, that is processed during PD. A DataWrap-
per-object consists of the following attributes:
dw = (dataList,p) (6.2)
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Figure 6.3: Policy-based De-identification (PD) process step sequence after the
Policy-based Access Control (PAC) has been completed for a request.
• dataList: A hashmap with the attribute name as key and the
attribute value as the value representing the data values for a
record (see Equation 6.3).
• p: After PAC has been conducted successfully, an authorized
Purpose-element p is derived for the data record and added to
the DataWrapper. It contains all sub-elements required for PD
including the set of Data-elements D̂ with the corresponding
AnonymizationMethod-element am, the set of Pseudonymization-
Method-elements P̂SM, and the set of PrivacyModel-elements P̂M,
e.g. the purpose pResearch for Alice in Figure 6.1).
dwAlice.dataList = {(’name’, ’Alice’), (’age’, ’27’),
(’postal-code’, ’94032’), (’salary’, ’30.000’)}
(6.3)
In the following, the individual algorithms necessary for the PD pro-
cess are detailed. Hereby, the focus lies on the efficient determination
of a uniform level of privacy and utility requirements that are applied
on the data-set based on various different LPL privacy policies. The
uniform level incorporates, e.g., the anonymization level for single
values, privacy model configuration, or Maximum Anonymization Level
for attributes.
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6.2 pseudonymization
After the PAC process a multidimensional data-set is assumed. For
each record of the data-set, an authorized Purpose p is assumed de-
tailing the privacy requirements. The first step of the PD process is
the pseudonymization of EI attributes. The PseudonymizationMethod-
element psm defines the pseudonymization method that is to be
applied on the data-set. Furthermore, additional options are defined
via PseudonymizationMethodAttribute-elements psma [113].
As introduced in Section 3.5, various options for the generation
of the pseudonym exist including hashing- and encryption-based
pseudonym generators, dependant and independent pseudonym gen-
eration, or the usage of bijective mapping. LPL is not intended to store
or provide any secret used for the generation of the pseudonym. Fur-
thermore, a secure and separate storage for bijective mapping tables
is required to avoid unauthorized re-identification [110, Recital 29].
Within the data-warehouse scenario, as many individuals and data
sources are involved, not only one but several policies have to be
considered with possible varying specifications for pseudonymization
Therefore, different pseudonymization methods may be defined on
the same attribute. This challenge is addressed by determining and
applying all distinct pseudonymization methods on the data-set. This
has the advantage that a data-set can be generated for a specific
purpose with all pseudonym attributes, but the pseudonyms can
only be re-identified by the authorized entities. The disadvantage of
this approach is that some pseudonyms may be generated that are
unnecessary. This does not affect the resulting privacy or utility of
the resulting de-identified data-set, but only the run-time of the PD
process. This is an edge case, because it can be usually assumed that
purposes that define PseudonymizationMethod-elements are use-case
specific. Thus, the probability of different pseudonymization method
definitions for the same attribute and purpose is low, but still this
challenge is addressed within the PD process.
Thus, the Pseudonymization is done by inspecting each autho-
rized purpose p of the DataWrapper to determine a set of distinct
PseudonymizationMethod psm (see Listing 6.1). The set of distinct
pseudonymization methods is then used on the data-set generating
pseudonyms. The pseudonyms are added to the dataList of each
DataWrapper dw.
Considering the efficiency of this algorithm, the determination of
the set of distinct pseudonymization methods that has to be applied
on the data-set requires the iteration of all DataWrapper dw, i.e. each
Purpose p (see Listing 6.1). Furthermore, each PseudonymizationMethod
psm has to be iterated. Therefore, this algorithm is linearly dependent
on the data-set size, i.e. the number of DataWrappers dw each having
one Purpose p, and the number of PseudonymizationMethod-elements
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defined. Furthermore, the generation of the pseudonyms is highly
dependent on the defined pseudonymization methods (see Section
3.5).
1
method: determineDistinctPseudonymizationMethods
in: DW //DataWrapper list containing all records with corresponding purpose
out: PSM //set of distinct pseudonymization methods to be applied
6 distinctPSM; //initialize empty PSM list
//iterate all DataWrapper
for (dw : DW)
for (psm : dw.p.P̂SM) //access P̂SM of authorized purpose
11
if(!distinctPSM.contains(psm)) //if psm not in distinct PSM list
distinctPSM.add(psm); //add psm
return distinctPSM;
Listing 6.1: Pseudocode of the determination of pseudonymization methods
that have to be applied on the data-set.
Considering the previously introduced data-warehouse scenario (see
Figure 6.1), assume an employee of the data-warehouse ′DR_DW1 ′
to requesting all available data (name, age, postal-code, and salary)
from all data sources ( ′Alice ′, ′Bob ′, ′Charlie ′) for the purpose
′Research ′. Furthermore, assume that the PAC process successfully
authorizes the employee to access the requested data-set (see Table
6.5), which has to be de-identified according to the corresponding LPL
privacy policies.
Table 6.5: Requested data-set for the data-warehouse scenario depicted in
Figure 6.1 which is represented by DWreq.
EI QI SD LPL
Name Age Postal-Code Salary Policy
Alice 27 94032 30.000 lpp1
Bob 33 94036 35.000 lpp2
Charlie 29 94005 28.000 lpp3
According to Figure 6.1, Alice’s record has a sticky LPL privacy pol-
icy that defines for the purpose ′Research ′ that the attribute name is
replaced by a pseudonym generated via HMAC-SHA-1. The attrName
for the pseudonym is hereby defined as ′ID ′. Furthermore, it is as-
sumed that the usage of a bijective mapping table is defined via
psmabijective. The LPL privacy policies of Bob and Charlie define the
same pseudonymization method.
psmAlice = (’HMAC-SHA-1’, ’ID’, {’name’},
ĤEAD, D̂ESC, {psmabijective})
(6.4)
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psmabijective = (’bijective_mapping’, ’true’) (6.5)
Therefore, the data-set encapsulated in DWreq is pseudony-
mized to DWpsm replacing the attribute name with ID holding
the pseudonyms (see Table 6.6). Furthermore, the pseudonyms and
original values are stored in a separate bijective mapping table (see
Table 6.7). Thus, the Pseudonymization process is completed and the
Personal Privacy Anonymization is applied on the data-set next.
Table 6.6: Pseudonymous data-set for the data-warehouse scenario depicted
in Figure 6.1 which is represented by DWpsm.
NSD QI SD LPL
ID Age Postal-Code Salary Policy
80085 27 94032 30.000 lpp1
81183 33 94036 35.000 lpp2
40440 29 94005 28.000 lpp3
Table 6.7: Bijective mapping table for the pseudonymized data-set of the
data-warehouse scenario.
Mapping Store Name
Original Value Pseudonym
Alice 80085
Bob 81183
Charlie 40440
6.3 personal privacy anonymization
To achieve each individuals’ privacy requirement, i.e. the Minimum
Anonymization Level for each value, the Personal Privacy Anonymization
process is run. This process essentially considers for each attribute of
the record the corresponding Data-element d and its privacy definition
contained by the AnonymizationMethod-element am. The Minimum
Anonymization Level is defined as an AnonymizationMethodAttribute-
element ama. It defines which HierarchyEntry-element he replaces the
original value.
The Minimum Anonymization Level can be altered by the user during
the Negotiation phase up to the Maximum Anonymization Level (see Sec-
tion 5.3.2). In the Personal Privacy Anonymization process, the selection
of the anonymization, i.e. the HierarchyEntry-element he representing
the anonymized value, is key. Therefore, two alternative algorithms are
proposed – Minimum Anonymization (AM) and Global Minimum Anony-
mization (GMA) – that both enforce individuals’ privacy constraints,
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but have a potentially different impact on the run-time performance
of PD and the utility of the de-identified data-set.
Considering the previously introduced data-warehouse scenario,
let’s assume that only for the attribute postal-code the Minimum Ano-
nymization Level has been altered from the default value ′0 ′. Therefore,
the Minimum Anonymization Level for the postal-code is set to ′1 ′ by
Alice (see Figure 6.1), to ′2 ′ by Bob, and to ′1 ′ by Charlie. Based on
this scenario, the Minimum Anonymization (MA) and Global Minimum
Anonymization (MA) algorithms are detailed in the following.
6.3.1 Minimum Anonymization
The Minimum Anonymization (MA)-algorithm directly realizes the indi-
viduals’ privacy requirements by replacing each original value with
the anonymized value specified by the Minimum Anonymization Level.
Therefore, the MA-algorithm iterates over all DataWrapper-objects. For
each DataWrapper-object dw, the Minimum Anonymization Level is iden-
tified for each attribute. The corresponding HierarchyEntry-element
is selected accordingly and used to replace the original value in the
dataList of dw (see Listing 6.2).
Considering the efficiency of this algorithm, the Personal Privacy Ano-
nymization of the data-set requires the iteration of all DataWrapper dw,
i.e. each Purpose p, for each attribute (see Listing 6.2). Therefore, this
algorithm is linearly dependent on the data-set size, i.e. the number
of DataWrappers dw, and the number of attributes.
method: minimumAnonymization
in: DW //DataWrapper list containing all records with corresponding purpose
out: DW //updated DW with anonymized d according to Minimum Anonymization
Level
5
//determine miminum-anonymization level from ama for each d
for (dw : DW)
for (data : dw.dataList)
//determine Minimum Anonymization Level
10 minLevel = getMinimumLevel(dw.p.D̂(data.key).am.ÂMA);
//overwrite value with value of hierarchy at Minimum Anonymization Level
data.value = dw.p.D̂(data.key).am.ĤE(minLevel);
//update anonymization hierarchy
15 //first element of ĤE) has to match data.value
updateHE(data.value, dw.p.D̂(data.key).am.ĤE);
return DW;
Listing 6.2: Pseudocode of the Minimum Anonymization-algorithm.
Considering the previously introduced scenario, the original value
of each record is replaced by exactly the value of HierarchyEntry-
element he specified by the Minimum Anonymization Level.
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For the attribute postal-code of Alice the Minimum Anonymization
Level of ′1 ′ is specified. Furthermore, the set of HierarchyEntry-elements
is defined as ĤEAlice.
ĤEAlice = {(’94032’), (’9403*’), (’940**’),
(’94***’), (’9****’), (’*****’)}
(6.6)
The MA-algorithm determines that the value ′9403∗ ′ corresponds to
the Minimum Anonymization Level and replaces the original value with
it. The anonymization hierarchy ĤEAlice is updated, because privacy
models technically require that 1) an anonymization hierarchy with
the first value equalling the processed value such that the original
value can be assigned to an anonymization hierarchy and 2) all ano-
nymization hierarchies have to have the same size. The same size is
required to avoid that an anonymization level is determined for the
attribute which can not be provided for some values, because the
anonymization hierarchy size is too small. Therefore, all he elements
with a lower Anonymization Level than the Minimum Anonymization
Level are replaced with the determined value. Thus, ĤEAlice is replaced
with ĤE ′Alice (see Equation 6.7). Note, that the hierarchy size remains
such that the Maximum Anonymization Level references the same he as
before.
ĤE ′Alice = {(’9403*’), (’9403*’), (’940**’),
(’94***’), (’9****’), (’*****’)}
(6.7)
Similarly, the value ′940 ∗ ∗ ′ is determined for Bob and the value
′9440∗ ′ is determined for Charlie (see Figure 6.4).
The MA-algorithm follows exactly the specification of the individu-
als’ privacy requirement. The downside of the MA-algorithm is that it
can introduce various additional distinct values to the de-identified
data-set, i.e. anonymized values. If no privacy model is specified, the
data recipients receive possibly a data-set that consists of a subset
of values that are anonymized and a subset of original values. If a
privacy model is used, the increased number of distinct values and
anonymization hierarchies to be considered can negatively affect the
run-time (see Chapter 7).
Therefore, an alternative algorithm is proposed – Global Minimum
Anonymization – below, which is evaluated against this algorithm in
Section 7.2.3.
6.3.2 Global Minimum Anonymization
The Global Minimum Anonymization-algorithm does not consider the
individuals’ privacy requirement for each attribute directly, but de-
rives a global unified privacy requirement for each attribute. This
global privacy requirement is derived as the maximum of all Minimum
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Figure 6.4: Minimum Anonymization example for the attribute postal-code.
Anonymization Levels. The maximum of all Minimum Anonymization
Levels guarantees that all individuals’ Minimum Anonymization Levels
are met or exceeded.
Therefore, the GMA-algorithm requires two iterations over all
DataWrapper-objects DW. In the first iteration, the maximum of the
Minimum Anonymization Levels is determined and temporarily stored.
In the second iteration, each DataWrapper-object dw is iterated again,
and the maximum of the Minimum Anonymization Levels, determined
in the first iteration, is used to replace the original value in the
dataList of dw (see Listing 6.3).
Considering the efficiency of this algorithm, the Personal Privacy Ano-
nymization of the data-set requires two iterations of all DataWrappers
dw (see Listing 6.3). Although this algorithm requires two iterations,
it remains linearly dependent on the data-set size and the number
of attributes. But, an increased run-time compared to the Minimum
Anonymization-algorithm (see Section 6.3.1) is expected.
Consider the previously introduced scenario again now with the
GMA-algorithm. The maximum of the Minimum Anonymization Levels
is determined for the attribute postal-code. The Maximum Anonymiza-
tion Level for Alice is ′1 ′, ′2 ′ for Bob, and ′2 ′ for Charlie. In the second
iteration, the original values are replaced with the respective Hierar-
chyEntry-elements at the Anonymization Level ′2 ′, which corresponds
to ′940 ∗ ∗ ′ for Alice, ′940 ∗ ∗ ′ for Bob, and ′944 ∗ ∗ ′ for Charlie (see
Figure 6.5).
Furthermore, each ĤE has to be adapted. In the case of Alice,
ĤEAlice is shortened to ĤE ′′Alice (see Equation 6.8).
ĤE ′′Alice = {(’940**’),
(’94***’), (’9****’), (’*****’)}
(6.8)
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2 method: globalMinimumAnonymization
in: DW //DataWrapper list containing all records with corresponding purpose
out: DW //updated DW with anonymized d according to global Minimum
Anonymization Level
maxLevel; //map storing the global maximum of the Minimum Anonymization Level
for each attribute
7
//determine miminum-anonymization level from ama for each d
for (dw : DW)
for (data : dw.dataList)
//determine Minimum Anonymization Level
12 minLevel = getMinimumLevel(dw.p.D̂(data.key).am.ÂMA);
//determine global maximum Minimum Anonymization Level for each attribute
if (maxLevel(data.key) < minLevel)
maxLevel.put(data.key, minLevel);
17
for (dw : DW)
for (data : dw.dataList)
//overwrite value with value of hierarchy at the global maximum of the
Minimum Anonymization Level
data.value = dw.p.D̂(data.key).am.ĤE(maxLevel(data.key)));
22 //update anonymization hierarchy
updateHE(data.value, dw.p.D̂(data.key).am.ĤE);
return DW;
Listing 6.3: Pseudocode of the Global Minimum Anonymization-algorithm.
Figure 6.5: Global Minimum Anonymization example for the attribute postal-
code.
Because all records are anonymized equally, the ĤE can be short-
ened for all affected records equally. Thus, all anonymization hier-
archies have the same size for each attribute. Note, the Maximum
Anonymization Level may be adapted in this case to match the same
value in the updated ĤE than the original ĤE.
The GMA-algorithm fulfils the personal privacy requirements of
each user, but may also exceed them for records in order to have a
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uniform Anonymization Level. Such excessive anonymization, generally
speaking, has a negative impact on the utility of the de-identified data-
set, because valuable information is redacted that would be otherwise
available. Because the personal privacy approach should always be
used in combination with a privacy model, it can be argued that the
various anonymized values from the Personal Privacy Anonymization
would probably be anonymized anyway to meet the privacy models
requirements, e.g., to create QI-groups with k records in case of k-
Anonymity. Therefore, the possible negative impact of the GMA on the
utility may be neglect-able in the end.
Considering the data-warehouse scenario, the usage of the MA-
algorithm on the already pseudonymized data-set results in Table 6.8,
while the usage of the GMA-algorithm results in Table 6.9. It can be
clearly observed that in Table 6.9 the values for the postal-code are
more anonymized for the records of Alice and Charlie compared to
Table 6.8, thus more utility is lost.
Table 6.8: Data-warehouse scenario data-set pseudonymized and
anonymized using the Minimum Anonymization-algorithm.
NSD QI SD LPL
ID Age Postal-Code Salary Policy
80085 27 9403* 30.000 lpp1
81183 33 940** 35.000 lpp2
40440 29 9440* 28.000 lpp3
Table 6.9: Data-warehouse scenario data-set pseudonymized and
anonymized using the Global Minimum Anonymization-algorithm.
NSD QI SD LPL
ID Age Postal-Code Salary Policy
80085 27 940** 30.000 lpp1
81183 33 940** 35.000 lpp2
40440 29 944** 28.000 lpp3
Consider furthermore that the data-set has to comply to the proper-
ties of 3-Anonymity in the next step of PD, then both data-sets have to
be additionally anonymized which results in the same de-identified
data-set (see Table 6.10). Thus, use cases exist in which utility is not
negatively affected by the Global Minimum Anonymization-algorithm
compared to the Minimum Anonymization-algorithm.
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Table 6.10: Data-warehouse scenario data-set which fulfils the properties of
3-Anonymity. The data-set is pseudonymized and anonymized
using either the MA- or GMA-algorithm for Personal Privacy Ano-
nymization.
NSD QI SD LPL
ID Age Postal-Code Salary Policy
80085 25 - 37 94*** 30.000 lpp1
81183 25 - 37 94*** 35.000 lpp2
40440 25 - 37 94*** 28.000 lpp3
Considering edge cases in which the overall distribution of records
with personal privacy or outliers in the Minimum Anonymization Level
definitions are present, the negative impact on the utility of the de-
identified data-set can be significant. For example, if only one record
out of a million records in the data-set sets the Minimum Anonymization
Level higher than every other record, then all other records will be set
to the same Anonymization Level and an excessive anonymization of
the attribute will be performed on all records.
The advantage of the GMA-algorithm is that the number of distinct
values as well as the size of the corresponding anonymization hierar-
chies is potentially decreased. This can have a positive impact on the
run-time performance of the privacy models, which is essential for the
usage of the PD process on-the-fly (see Chapter 7).
In summary, the Global Minimum Anonymization-algorithm preserves
the individuals’ privacy, may have a negative impact on the utility
depending on the use case, but it may reduce the overall number
of distinct values and the size of anonymization hierarchies. If the
GMA-algorithm is evaluated against the MA-algorithm according
to the run-time performance and discussed in Chapter 7. Next, the
application of the privacy model on the data-set is discussed for the
PD process.
6.4 privacy model
After Pseudonymization and Personal Privacy Anonymization have been
carried out, the data-set is further anonymized to meet the conditions
of privacy models in order to mitigate privacy attacks.
Consider the data-warehouse scenario, various definitions of privacy
models have to be considered. To overcome the trivial solution to use
every distinct privacy model sequentially on the data-set, which would
induce a significant run-time overhead, the Privacy Model Substitution
process is proposed. This process is intended to determine a minimal
set of privacy models that has to be applied on the data-set in order
to meet the privacy requirements of all LPL privacy policies.
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Furthermore, the Maximum Anonymization Level is used to limit the
anonymization of attributes. Therefore, the Maximum Anonymization
Level can be seen as the utility requirement, which is set by the corre-
sponding policy creator, e.g., company, to limit the anonymization of
attributes.
All process steps, which are based on LPL privacy policies, required
to preserve the privacy with privacy models and to preserve the utility
requirements, are detailed in the following.
6.4.1 Set Maximum Anonymization
During the Creation phase of the LPL life-cycle, the creator of the
policy, e.g., the company, sets the Maximum Anonymization Level for
each attribute for each purpose. The Maximum Anonymization Level
defines the limit for the anonymization within the PD process and
limits the Minimum Anonymization Level during the Negotiation phase.
The Maximum Anonymization Level is specified by an Anonymization-
MethodAttribute-element ama for each AnonymizationMethod- am and
respective Data-element d.
Consider the QI attributes age and postal-code. The preservation
of the postal-code is assumed to be more valuable for a research
purpose. Therefore, the policy creator can define a Maximum Anonymi-
zation Level that takes into account this utility preference.
In the data-warehouse scenario, different LPL privacy policies are
considered. Therefore, the Maximum Anonymization Level can differ for
the same attribute due to different LPL privacy policies. To determine
the potentially best utility requirement for the attribute, the minimum
of the Maximum Anonymization Levels is determined for each attribute
in the Set Maximum Anonymization process and set as the limit for
anonymization (see Listing 6.4).
Considering the efficiency of this algorithm, the determination of the
maximum of the Minimum Anonymization Levels requires the iteration
of all DataWrappers dw (see Listing 6.4). Furthermore, each attribute
has to be iterated. Therefore, this algorithm is linearly dependent on
the data-set size and the number of attributes.
For example, in the data-warehouse scenario, the Maximum Anony-
mization Level for the attribute postal-code is set to ′3 ′. Because the
policy of Bob originates also from service S2, it is assumed that Bobs’
policy is based upon the same raw LPL privacy policy and therefore
also has the Maximum Anonymization Level ′3 ′, but for Charlie the
Maximum Anonymization Level ′4 ′ is assumed (see Figure 6.6). Thus,
the minimum Maximum Anonymization Level is ′3 ′ and therefore is set
for all records.
In this way, the utility requirements are integrated within the PD
process. Next, the privacy groups are defined for each attribute.
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Figure 6.6: Example for Set Maximum Anonymization process for the attribute
postal-code.
method: setMaximumAnonymization
in: DW //DataWrapper list containing all records with corresponding purpose
out: void //nothing is returned
5
minLevel; //map storing the global minimum of the Maximum Anonymization Level
for each attribute
//determine Maximum Anonymization Level from ama for each d
for (dw : DW)
10 for (data : dw.dataList)
//determine Maximum Anonymization Level
maxLevel = getMaximumLevel(dw.p.D̂(data.key));
//storage of global minimum Maximum Anonymization Level for each
attribute
15 if (minLevel(data.key) > maxLevel)
minLevel.put(data.key, maxLevel);
// set the minimum of Maximum Anonymization Level as the anonymization limit
setAnonymizationLimit(minLevel);
Listing 6.4: Pseudocode for the Set Maximum Anonymization.
6.4.2 Set Privacy Group
To use privacy models on the data-set, it is required that each attribute
is assigned a privacy group, which is subject to the Set Privacy Group
process. For each Data-element d, the attribute pGroup defines that
the corresponding attribute is either an EI, QI, SD or NSD attribute.
The classification of an attribute in privacy group is not trivial and
may be done based on the context of the purpose of the processing.
For example, the attribute room temperature could be classified as
NSD because it is not related to any individual. But, if the increase or
decrease of the room temperature is used to detect the presence of
persons in a room it might be classified as a QI attribute, because it
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could be used to identify the location of individuals if it is combined
with other attributes, e.g., individuals’ working period. Thus, the
classification of attributes is strongly use case dependent.
In the data-warehouse scenario, different privacy policies are as-
sumed, therefore it is possible that the attributes are assigned different
privacy groups by different policies. To use the privacy model, a
unique privacy group for each attribute has to be found in case of
heterogeneous settings in different privacy policies. For attributes,
privacy groups can be seen as privacy risk and utility indicators, e.g.,
EI attributes have the highest risk for identifying an individual and
SD have no risk to identify an individual but are valuable information.
Thus, they can be assigned an order (see Equation 6.9).
EI > QI > SD > NSD (6.9)
The strictest privacy group is Explicit Identifier followed by Quasi-
Identifier, Sensitive Attribute, and Non-Sensitive Attribute. Because only
one privacy group can be assigned to one attribute, the algorithm
determines the strictest privacy group for each attribute utilizing the
order (see Listing 6.5).
To determine the strictest privacy group for the whole data-set, a list
of all attributes and privacy groups (pGroupList), defining the currently
strictest privacy group for each attribute, is stored. For each Data-
element d of the DataWrapper, the privacy group is compared against
the corresponding privacy group of the attribute from pGroupList. If the
value of the privacy group is stricter than the entry in the pGroupList,
the privacy group of the attribute is updated in pGroupList. Thus,
after all DataWrapper-objects are iterated, the strictest privacy group is
determined for each attribute and can be added to the configuration
of the privacy model.
Considering the efficiency of this algorithm, the determination of the
privacy group for each attribute requires the iteration of all DataWrap-
pers dw (see Listing 6.5). Furthermore, each attribute has to be iterated.
Therefore, this algorithm is linearly dependent on the data-set size
and the number of attributes.
For example, assume the policy of Alice defines the attribute
postal-code as a QI and the policy of Charlie defines it as a SD.
According to the order of Equation 6.9 QI is stricter then SD, therefore
QI is set for the attribute postal-code.
6.4.3 Privacy Model Substitution
In the previous process steps, all information required to use privacy
models on the data-set is prepared. What is missing is the privacy
model (or set of privacy models). Following the previous argumenta-
tion regarding the data-warehouse scenario, it is possible that varying
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1
method: setPrivacyGroup
input: DW //DataWrapper list containing all records with corresponding
purpose
output: pGroupList //array with the privacy group for each attribute
6 pGroupList; //pGroupList array
//for each record
for (dw : DW)
int i = 0; //attribute counter
11 //determine the strictest privacy group for each d
for (d : dw.p.D̂)
if (d.pGroup < pGroupList[i])
pGroupList[i] = d.pGroup;
i++;
16
return pGroupList;
Listing 6.5: Pseudocode for the Set Privacy Group.
privacy models are defined. Thus, the strictest set of privacy models
has to be derived from all corresponding LPL privacy policies.
The selection of a privacy model for a use case is challenging by
itself, because it requires expert knowledge. Psaraftis et al. [225] pro-
posed a question-based recommendation system to tackle this chal-
lenge. The Customized Recommendation System for Optimum Privacy
Model Adoption (CRPM) determines a suitable privacy model based
upon a decision-tree using 15 distinct questions. These questions con-
sider the properties of privacy models and the processed data-set to
recommend one suitable privacy model. But the questions themselves
require expert knowledge in the privacy domain, e.g., the user of
CRPM has to know about QI-groups and privacy groups. Further-
more, the CRPM approach only considers the recommendation of a
privacy model, but it does not recommend the configuration of the
privacy model, e.g. the value of k for k-Anonymity. For these reasons,
the CRPM approach cannot be directly used for this problem state-
ment. However, the properties of privacy models can be considered to
determine the strictest set of privacy models from various LPL privacy
policies.
Prasser and Kohlmayer [223] [159] introduce in the ARX framework
another approach. In the ARX framework, the configuration of the
de-identification process is optimized considering the properties and
configuration of privacy models. For example, if k-Anonymity and
l-Diversity are configured, both defining the size of QI-groups, the
maximum value of k and l is derived and used for the configuration.
Thus, privacy models are not individually used on the data-set, but
the properties required for the data-set are derived from all privacy
models and applied. Therefore, performance is optimized. Further-
more, ARX verifies that no conflicting or duplicate privacy models are
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defined [221]. Therefore, ARX prevents misconfiguration of privacy
models, optimizes the de-identification process due to consideration of
overlapping privacy model properties, and considers the configuration,
i.e. parameters, of privacy models.
Based on both approaches, the Privacy Model Substitution is proposed
to identify the strictest set of privacy models. The term ’strictest’
concerns the privacy properties, i.e. the risk of re-identification and
which privacy attacks are mitigated by the privacy model. For this
purpose, the classification of privacy models according to the mitigated
attack models in Table 6.11 is used.
Table 6.11: Reduced list (see Table 3.15) of privacy models and their classifi-
cation according to the attack models they mitigate.
Privacy Model
Record
Linkage
Attribute
Linkage
Table
Linkage
Probabilistic
Attack
k-Anonymity x
Recursive (c, l)-Diversity x x
t-Closeness x x
Considering the comparison of two privacy models, following sub-
stitution scenarios are possible (see Figure 6.7).
Figure 6.7: Examples for Privacy Model Substitution showing Complete Substi-
tution, Attribute Substitution, Model Substitution, and Model Combi-
nation.
• Complete Substitution: If two privacy models are equal including
the same configuration, then one privacy model is completely
substituted by the other. For example, if the first privacy model
is 3-Anonymity and the second privacy model is 3-Anonymity,
then they are substituted, i.e. reduced, to 3-Anonymity.
• Attribute Substitution: If two privacy models are equal but have
different configurations, then the result is the privacy model with
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the strictest configuration, i.e. lower the risk for re-identification.
For example, if the first privacy model is 3-Anonymity and the
second privacy model is 2-Anonymity, then the same privacy
model is used with the strictest configuration, i.e. k = 3, such
that the set of privacy models is substituted to 3-Anonymity.
• Model Substitution: If the two privacy models are different, then
the result consists of one of the given privacy models, while
the configuration depends on both given privacy models. For
example, if the first privacy model is 3-Anonymity and the sec-
ond privacy model is (1,2)-Diversity, then the mitigated privacy
attacks are considered for the selection of the substitute privacy
model. Thus, the attack model Record Linkage is mitigated by
both k-Anonymity, and (c,l)-Diversity. But, (c,l)-Diversity also miti-
gates Attribute Linkage (see Table 3.15) [108]. Thus, (c,l)-Diversity
is used as substitute privacy model. Next, the configuration for
the substitute privacy model is derived. For this purpose the
configurations of the initial privacy models are considered. The
parameters l and k denote how many records are required for
each QI-group, the greater the value for k or l the lower the re-
identification risk [177]. Therefore, the maximum of both l and k
is used to determine the substitute configuration. Furthermore,
the c of the given privacy model has no comparable variable in
k-Anonymity, thus it is used as is for the substitute configuration.
Thus, (1,3)-Diversity is the substitute privacy model.
• Model Combination: If the privacy models cannot be substituted
by another single privacy model, e.g., because there is no privacy
model covering their properties, the process result is the original
set of privacy models. For example, if the first privacy model
is 3-Anonymity and the second privacy model is (0.2)-Closeness,
then a privacy model is required which mitigates Record Link-
age, Attribute Linkage, and Probabilistic Attacks. Considering the
overview of mitigated attacks by privacy models in the Privacy
Model Substitution Table (see Table 6.11), no privacy model can
be found fulfilling all these requirements. Thus, both privacy
models have to be defined.
It can be observed that not only the attack models are used for
creating the substitution rules, e.g., for Model Substitution, but also
expert knowledge on the impact of each privacy model configuration
and their interplay.
Instead of crafting a decision-tree like Psaraftis et al. [225], I propose
to formalize comprehensive rules that can be extended. A Privacy
Model Substitution Table is introduced holding such rules. Each rule
takes a pair of privacy models as an input and defines a substitute
privacy model and rules for deriving the substitute privacy model
configuration using basic operations (see Table 6.12). Rules are created
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for each possible privacy model pair. Considering only k-Anonymity,
(c,l)-Diversity, and t-Closeness, this results in six rules. For each pri-
vacy model, one rule for matching the same privacy model, e.g.,
{ki1-Anonymity,ki2-Anonymity}, results in the same substitute pri-
vacy model, e.g., {kr1-Anonymity}, for which the handling of the
configuration is detailed, e.g., using the maximum of the k parameters
{(kr1,max(ki1,ki2))}.
Pairing distinct privacy models requires expert knowledge of
each privacy model. Because the combination of k-Anonymity with
l-Diversity and k-Anonymity with t-Closeness was already detailed,
let’s focus on the remaining pair – l-Diversity and t-Closeness
({(ci1, li1)-Diversity, ti2-Closeness}). Inspecting the mitigated pri-
vacy attacks for each privacy model, i.e. Record Linkage and Attribute
Linkage for l-Diversity, and Attribute Linkage and Probabilistic Attacks
for t-Closeness, no substitute privacy model can be found that covers
the given attack models. Therefore, the Model Combination case applies
with the set ({(cr1, lr1)-Diversity}, {tr2-Closeness}) with the same
configurations ({(cr1, ci1), (lr1, li1), (tr2, ti2)}). Adding a new privacy
model to the Privacy Model Substitution Table requires to pair it with
each other privacy model in the table. Therefore, the size of the
Privacy Model Substitution Table for n privacy models is n(n+1)2 , which
requires more effort and expert knowledge for each additional privacy
model.
With the Privacy Model Substitution Table accessible, each record,
represented by its corresponding DataWrapper dw, is iterated sequen-
tially, thus substituting the privacy models of the record (see Listing
6.6). For each iteration, the strictestPrivacyModelList is derived through
substitution, which is used as the basis for the next iteration. When
DW is completely iterated, the strictestPrivacyModelList contains the
strictest privacy models that cover each privacy requirement given by
every records’ LPL privacy policy. Therefore, the privacy guarantees
of several privacy models can be applied on the data-set with the
Policy-based De-identification process. Assuming the previous example
with l-Diversity and t-Closeness, the mitigation of Record Linkage, At-
tribute Linkage Probabilistic Attacks will be given. Note that although
Attribute Linkage is mitigated by both privacy models, strategies of
both l-Diversity and t-Closeness will be used to protect the data-set
from the privacy attack.
Considering the efficiency of this algorithm, the determination of
the set of privacy models used on the data-set requires the iteration
of all DataWrappers dw (see Listing 6.6). Furthermore, each Privacy-
Model-element pm has to be iterated and substituted. The substitution
process itself requires the iteration of the Privacy Model Substitution Ta-
ble to first determine and then apply the appropriate substitution rule.
Therefore, this algorithm is linearly dependent on the data-set size and
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the number of PrivacyModel-elements. Additionally, the substitution
process has to be taken into account.
This allows the reduction of privacy models, which have a relatively
high computational cost, used on the data-set, while the minimal
required privacy settings (considering the whole data-set) are ap-
plied. Therefore, privacy is preserved and the overall performance is
potentially increased.
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method: privacyModelSubstitution //run for each dw of DW
3 input: privacyModelList //P̂M from a p of dw merged with previous
strictestPrivacyModelList
output: strictestPrivacyModelList //substituted PM
strictestPrivacyModelList;
iterator = privacyModelList.iterator();
8
// add initial privacy model
strictestPrivacyModelList.add(iterator.next());
//for each privacy model currentPM
13 while (iterator.hasNext()) {
currentPM = iterator.next();
tempPMList = strictestPrivacyModelList;
//substitute currentPm with each pm of strictestPrivacyModelList
18 for (pm : strictestPrivacyModelList)
//substitution according to Privacy Model Substitution Table
substitutedPM = substitutePM(pm, currentPM);
// replace pm with substituted pm
temporaryPrivacyModelList.replace(pm, substitutedPrivacyModels);
23 //updated strictestPrivacyModelList
strictestPrivacyModelList = temporaryPrivacyModelList;
return strictestPrivacyModelList;
Listing 6.6: Pseudocode for the Privacy Model Substitution.
Consider the data-warehouse scenario. The policy of Alice de-
notes that 3-Anonymity has to be applied, which is also assumed
for Bob as his record originates from the same service. Because Char-
lies’ record originates from services S2, a different privacy model
– 2-Anonymity – is assumed. Sequentially processing the records of
Alice, Bob, and Charlie, the first pair of privacy models that is com-
pared is {3-Anonymity, 3-Anonymity} (see Figure 6.8). According
to the Privacy Model Substitution Table (see Table 6.12), this results in
{3-Anonymity} matching the Complete Substitution case. This substi-
tuted privacy model is then paired with the privacy model defined
by Charlie: {3-Anonymity, 2-Anonymity}. This matches the Attribute
Substitution case for which the same rule of the Privacy Model Sub-
stitution Table is applicable. The rule denotes that k-Anonymity is the
substitute privacy model with the maximum k({(kr1,max(ki1,ki2))})
resulting in {3-Anonymity}. The algorithm terminates with all records
iterated, resulting in the definition of 3-Anonymity for the data-set as
the strictest privacy model.
6.4.4 Apply Privacy Models
After the completion of the Set Maximum Anonymization, Set Privacy
Group, and Privacy Model Substitution processes, all necessary informa-
tion is available to apply the privacy models, such that the data-set
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Figure 6.8: Example for Privacy Model Substitution process.
is anonymized to fulfil the requirements of the privacy models. The
minimum necessary set of privacy models is configured resulting in
a De-identified Data-set, which is pseudonymized and anonymized
according to individuals’ personal privacy requirements. Furthermore,
the utility requirements given by the policy creators in form of ano-
nymization limitation is considered and fulfilled. Assuming the data-
warehouse scenario, this results in Table 6.10. The efficiency of this
process step highly depends on the set of privacy models, i.e. the
efficiency of each privacy model itself.
6.5 discussion
Within this chapter, the Policy-based De-identification (PD) process is
detailed which combines Pseudonymization, Personal Privacy Anonymi-
zation, and Privacy Models. This process aims at de-identification of
multidimensional data-sets. Furthermore, utility requirements,i.e. the
Maximum Anonymization Level set by the policy creator, are taken into
account. Thus, a trade-off between privacy and utility based upon
LPL privacy policies is achieved. The possibility of multiple privacy
policies is introduced. This can be introduced by personalized policies
or different origin of LPL privacy policies. Therefore, the challenge of
unifying the privacy and utility requirements for each distinct request
of personal data is raised. With the combined usage of more than one
privacy model, the privacy guarantees of all privacy models apply, i.e.
privacy models are complementary such that the combined strictest
privacy guarantees are given. This challenge is tackled by several
approaches, most noteworthy are the Privacy Model Substitution Table
or different algorithms for the Personal Privacy Anonymization. Each ap-
proach is carefully designed to preserve the individuals’ privacy and
the data-sets utility. Furthermore, the complexity of each algorithm
is discussed. In the following, several aspects of the PD process are
detailed that are subject to discussion or improvement in future work.
During the Pseudonymization process, it is assumed that all distinct
pseudonymization methods are applied on the data-set, which could
introduce unnecessary overhead. This issue can be tackled by, for ex-
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ample, extending the request by specifying the requested pseudonym
attribute, i.e. attrName of the PseudonymizationMethod-element psm.
Therefore, the corresponding pseudonymization is only done if the
attribute representing the pseudonym is requested, but this requires
also the requesting entity to be aware of such virtual pseudonym
attributes that are only calculated on-the-fly and are not persisted by
default.
In the data-warehouse scenario, it is assumed that the anonymiza-
tion hierarchies, represented by ĤE, are pre-processed and stored in
the LPL privacy policy. Considering the data-warehouse scenario, it
is possible that the anonymization hierarchies for the same original
value differs, e.g., due to different origins. Therefore, the anonymi-
zation process for Personal Privacy Anonymization and Privacy Models
may require additional correction mechanisms to unify heterogeneous
anonymization hierarchies. Another approach would be to process the
anonymization hierarchies on-the-fly instead of pre-processing them
(see Section 5.3.3). Therefore, generalization hierarchies or suppres-
sion strategies would have to be provided (see Section 3.2). But this
approach could be exploited to tamper with the Minimum Anonymiza-
tion Levels of individuals by introducing unnecessary hierarchy levels
without any actual anonymization. Thus, use cases and appropriate
solution approaches have to be researched to tackle this challenge.
The GMA-algorithm for the Personal Privacy Anonymization may
introduce high utility loss in the case of an outlier Minimum Ano-
nymization Levels. Therefore, appropriate mechanisms to detect such
outliers have to be put in place to preserve the utility. One possible
approach can be envisioned which analyses first DW to determine the
minimum, maximum and mean Minimum Anonymization Level for each
attribute. If the distance of the minimum to the mean or mean to max-
imum exceeds some pre-defined thresholds then countermeasures can
be put into place to mitigate information loss. Such countermeasures
can include to switch to the MA-algorithm or to alter DW removing
all outlier dw while preserving the overall properties of the data-set.
The feasibility and effects of personal privacy outlier detection and
mitigation strategies is therefore subject to future research.
To define a set of privacy models that fulfils the requirements of
a set of privacy models, the Privacy Model Substitution Table has been
introduced alongside a complementary algorithm. Hereby, the rules
for the substitution are defined based on the privacy guarantees, i.e.
mitigated privacy attacks, as well as expert knowledge to unify the
configuration. The generation of the rules could be further extended by
considering additional properties of privacy models, e.g., performance,
utility-preservation or compatible data-set formats. Furthermore, the
extension of the Privacy Model Substitution Table becomes infeasible if
a high number of privacy models has to be included, because each
additional privacy model has to be matched against all existing privacy
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models. This could be tackled by an algorithmic solution automatically
deriving the optimal rules based upon the properties of each privacy
model, such as only n entries are required instead of n(n+1)2 .
Lastly, the PD process is only designed for multidimensional data-
sets, but other types of data-sets have to be privacy-preserving pro-
cessed, e.g., transactional data-sets or longitudinal data-sets (see Sec-
tion 3.1). Although the overall design of the PD process is applicable
to other data-sets, the de-identification methods as well as LPL would
need to be extended, e.g., to incorporate location-based privacy. On
the one hand, the current location of the user may be factored in as
a restriction during the definition of the purpose, i.e. an extension
for LPL. For example, if the user is located within his work area his
movements can be processed, otherwise the movements of the user are
not allowed to be tracked. On the other hand, the PD process may be
extended to incorporate methods to preserve the privacy of location
data. A sequence of locations of a user can be used to infer movement
patterns, i.e. to identify the homes of users [22], or infer sensitive
information, e.g. the age, work frequency, or if the user is a smoker or
coffee drinker [180]. Various methods are proposed to counter such
inferences, i.e. by degrading the spatial and temporal data [161] [279].
The integration of such location-based privacy approaches in LPL and
PD will require extensive literature research, use case definitions, as
well as quantitative and qualitative evaluations.
In summary, the PD process demonstrate how a privacy language
can be utilized to preserve the privacy when a set of users’ personal
data is requested for processing. This fulfils the last requirement for
a privacy language – R5 De-identification Capabilities – introduced in
Chapter 2. Therefore, the first research question RQ1 ’How to represent
legal privacy policies in a machine-readable format which complies to
the legal requirements of the General Data Protection Regulation in
the EU while privacy guarantees are defined?’ is answered.
Furthermore, the second research question RQ2 ’How can machine-
readable privacy policies, expressing privacy-preserving methods, be
utilized to efficiently preserve the privacy of individuals when a set of
users’ personal data is requested for processing?’ is partially answered,
since it was shown how a machine-readable privacy policy, i.e. LPL,
can be utilized to preserve the individuals’ privacy while a data-set is
requested. Therefore, not only the Policy-based De-identification (PD) is
essential, but also the Policy-based Access Control (PAC) (see Section 5.5).
What remains unanswered of RQ2 is the efficiency of the PD process,
which is evaluated in the next chapter via multiple experiments.
7
E VA L UAT I O N
After detailing the Layered Privacy Language (LPL) and the Policy-based
De-identification (PD) process, the open question regarding RQ2 is if the
processing of LPL policies in addition to the de-identification process
can be done efficiently. In this chapter, we introduce the Policy-based
De-identification Benchmark Framework (PDBF) which is used for the
following experiments. The used data-sets, privacy model framework,
and hardware specification are furthermore detailed. After presenting
the set-up, several aspects of the PD process are evaluated. First, the
PD process run-time is compared to the run-time of privacy models
to validate the overall feasibility of the PD process. Next, the impact
of personal privacy settings on the run-time of the PD process is
evaluated for which the Minimum Anonymization- and Global Mini-
mum Anonymization-algorithm are compared for the Personal Privacy
Anonymization. Lastly, the results are summarized and discussed.
7.1 policy-based de-identification benchmark frame-
work
To evaluate the PD process, not only data-sets have to be provided,
but also LPL privacy policies have to be provided for each record of
the data-set. The LPL privacy policies offer various possibilities to
define de-identification including pseudonymization, personal privacy
settings, i.e. setting the Minimum Anonymization Level, and privacy
models, which can vary in each policy. Thus, various configurations
are possible. Furthermore, run-time measurements have to be taken
throughout the PD process and conditioned for evaluation. The Policy-
based De-identification Benchmark Framework (PDBF) is proposed by
Gerl and Becher [111] to fulfil those requirements (see Figure 7.1).
PDBF uses a specification language to define the properties of the
benchmark, e.g., the data-sets, level of anonymity and points for run-
time measurements. Based upon the configuration, the Data Provider
and Policy Provider generate the necessary inputs, which are then pro-
cessed using the PD process. The generated run-time measurements
and de-identified data-sets are used for evaluation.
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Figure 7.1: Framework architecture for Policy-based De-identification bench-
mark evaluation.
7.1.1 Data Provider
The Data Provider defines the data, which is de-identified by the PD
process. Therefore, the data is served as an input to the Policy Provider
as well as the PD process.
To conduct the experiments, common data-sets for evaluating pri-
vacy models were used, i.e. 1994 US census database (ADULT) [88], 1998
KDD data mining competition (CUP) [137], US NHTSA crash statistics
(FARS) [191], American Time Use Survey (ATUS) [263], and Integrated
Health Interview Series (IHIS) [47] (see Table 7.1). These data-sets have
been provided by Prasser and Kohlmayer [223] [159] with correspond-
ing anonymization hierarchies for each attribute.
All data-sets have a different number of records, ranging from
around thirty thousand to over one million records. Each data-set has
8 to 9 attributes. The anonymization hierarchies for the attributes have
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a size from 2 up to 6. It is noteworthy, that the number of distinct
values for all attributes in the data-set for CUP, i.e. with over 14,000
distinct values, highly exceeds other data-sets, which have up to 305
distinct values.
Table 7.1: Overview of used data-sets for the evaluation. #Attr denotes num-
ber of attributes. Hierarchy Size defines for each attribute the depth
of the hierarchy. #Records denotes the number of records. #DV
denotes the number of distinct attribute values.
Data-set #Attr Hierarchy Size #Records #DV
ADULT 9 (2,5,2,3,4,3,3,2,3) 30,162 166
CUP 8 (6,5,2,3,2,5,5,5) 63,441 14,407
FARS 8 (6,3,4,4,2,3,3,4) 100,937 238
ATUS 9 (3,6,2,3,3,3,3,3,4) 539,253 305
IHIS 9 (6,3,3,4,5,3,2,2,2) 1,193,504 186
The Data Provider can condition the data-sets such that it is random-
ized, i.e. shuffling records, or shortened, i.e. a subset of records is used.
Thus, comparable subsets of a data-set can be configured.
7.1.2 Policy Provider
The Policy Provider creates a corresponding LPL privacy policy lpp
with exactly one Purpose-element p for each record of the data-set. It
is assumed, that p resulting from the PAC process for each record
(see Section 5.5). The LPL privacy policy lpp, i.e. the Purpose p, is
generated only with the necessary elements and attributes required
for the PD process. Thus, elements like the Controller c or DataProtec-
tionOfficer dpo are omitted while for the PD process relevant elements
are included, e.g., Data d or Privacy Model pm.
For each attribute of the record, a corresponding Data-element d is
generated with an AnonymizationMethod-element am and set of Hier-
archyEntry-elements for the anonymization hierarchies. Furthermore,
the pGroup is defined for each d, such that the attributes are classified
as either EI, QI, SD, or NSD. Independent from the data-set, the
remaining de-identification methods are defined for the purpose p.
• PseudonymizationMethod-element psm: A set of psm defines
the pseudonymization applied on the data-set. Required
PseudonymizationMethodAttribute-elements psma are generated
for each psm to complete the configuration.
• PrivacyModel-element pm: A set of pm defines the privacy mod-
els for the data-set. Required PrivacyModelAttribute-elements
pma are generated for each pm to complete the configuration.
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• AnonymizationMethodAttribute-element ama: For each attribute,
the Minimum Anonymization Level is specified representing the
personal privacy requirements of the individual. Furthermore,
for each attribute the Maximum Anonymization Level is specified
representing the utility requirements of the policy creator, i.e.
the company.
Therefore, the Data Provider defines the properties of the policy,
pseudonymization methods, personal privacy anonymization, and
privacy models, which can all be configured and customized. The
created LPL privacy policy lpp is correlated to the data-set records.
Thus, the Policy Provider specifies a personalized sticky policy for each
record of the provided data-set.
7.1.3 Policy-based De-identification
The Policy-based De-identification receives the data-set from the Data
Provider and the LPL privacy policies from the Policy Provider. Based on
this, for each record and LPL privacy policy pair, a DataWrapper-object
dw is created. The attributeList of dw is based upon the attribute
name for the key and the value of the record is set as the value. Fur-
thermore, the Purpose-element p of the generated LPL privacy policy
lpp is set. Based on the set of DataWrapper-objects DW, the PD process
is performed including Pseudonymization, Personal Privacy Anonymiza-
tion, and Privacy Models as detailed in Chapter 6. All algorithms are
implemented with Java, except privacy models for which the ARX
framework is utilized. An overview of implemented algorithms and
selection of the ARX framework is detailed in the following.
For Pseudonymization, several algorithms are implemented for both
Hashing and Cryptographic approaches. For non-keyed Hashing, the
MDX and SHA-X algorithms are used, such that their variations MD2
[147], MD5 [232], SHA-1, SHA-256, SHA-384, and SHA-512 are sup-
ported [254] [79] [57] [201]. For keyed Hashing, HMAC is implemented
using MDX and SHA-X algorithms, e.g., HMAC-MD5 or HMAC-
SHA-512 [35] [1]. The usage of salts is supported by the PBKDF2
algorithm in combination with HMAC functions, e.g., PBKDF2 with
HMAC-SHA-256 [148] [1]. Lastly, for the Cryptographic approach the
algorithms AES [75] [250], DES [85], and Blowfish [241] are supported.
Both the MA- and GMA-algorithms are implemented for the Personal
Privacy Anonymization. The anonymization is based upon Generalization
and Suppression, but only the pre-processed values in the HierarchyEn-
try-elements are used to replace the original values.
Several privacy-preserving frameworks, providing privacy models
implementations, were surveyed to select the most suitable for PDBF.
Therefore, several criteria were defined that the desired framework
has to meet.
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• Currentness: The privacy-preserving framework should be ac-
tively maintained and developed with a recent last update.
• Number of Privacy Models: Various privacy models, and their vari-
ations, should be provided. At least one variation of k-Anonymity,
l-Diversity, t-Closeness and δ-Presence should be provided.
• Benchmark: The framework should provide a benchmark or possi-
bilities to quantify the de-identified data-set such that the results
can be used as a baseline for the implementation, e.g., run-time,
utility, or privacy.
Considering these criteria, several frameworks were compared, in-
cluding UTD Anonymization Toolkit (UTD) [149], Cornell Anonymization
Toolkit (CAT) [125], Tool for Interactive Analysis of Microdata Anonymi-
zation Techniques (TIAMAT) [77], System for Evaluating and Comparing
Anonymization Algorithms for Relational, Transaction, and R-T Data-sets
(SECRETA) [218], Open Anonymizer [252], Anon-Tool [87], µ-ARGUS
[208], sdcMicro [259] and ARX [223]. Table 7.2 summarizes the results
of the comparison, showing that sdcMicro, µ-ARGUS, and ARX are the
most current frameworks. Furthermore, it can be observed that most
frameworks only support 1 to 3 privacy models, except ARX which
supports 21 variations of privacy models including the desired privacy
models k-Anonymity, l-Diversity, t-Closeness and δ-Presence. Lastly, a
Benchmark is only supported by CAT, SECRETA, and ARX, whereas
ARX offers exceptional functionality to measure the run-time, utility
and privacy. Based on this comparison, the ARX framework fulfils all
criteria. Additionally, it is free to use under the Apache License 2.0
and well documented. Thus, it was selected as the basis for the PD
process in PDBF. Because, ARX is chosen, additional algorithms had
to be integrated in the PD process (see Annex A).
In summary, the PDBF supports various methods for Pseudonymi-
zation, Personal Privacy Anonymization, and Privacy Models that can
be freely combined for the PD process. Furthermore, the usage of
various data-sets and varying LPL privacy policies for each record is
supported, such that personal privacy settings can be simulated.
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Table 7.2: Overview of privacy-preserving frameworks providing privacy
model implementations.
Framework Currentness
Privacy
Benchmark
Models
UTD 2012 3 -
CAT 2014 2 X
TIAMAT 2009 1 -
SECRETA 2014 1 X
Open Anonymizer 2015 2 -
Anon-Tool 2014 1 -
µ-ARGUS 2018 - -
sdcMicro 2018 2 -
ARX 2018 21 X
7.1.4 Benchmark Configuration
The run-time for all following experiments is measured with nanosec-
ond precision. The measurements use the arithmetic mean of 10 con-
secutive runs. Initial experiments showed that no warm-up runs are
required for the measurements, therefore they are omitted.
Within ARX, several parameters can influence the overall perfor-
mance (run-time, memory consumption) while the privacy model is
applied on the data-set [222]. For ARX the following default configura-
tion is used, which affects the performance, i.e. run-time and memory
consumption, of the anonymization for the privacy model:
• historySize = 200: The maximum number of snapshots stored in
the buffer.
• maximumSnapshotSizeSnapshot = 0.8: The maximum relative size
of a snapshot compared to the dataset.
• maximumSnapshotSizeDataset = 0.2: The maximum relative size
of a snapshot compared to its predecessor.
The anonymization process, in terms of privacy and utility, is not
affected by these parameters. To have comparable configurations, com-
mon privacy models in the literature are selected. Their configuration
is furthermore chosen according to the configuration used in the
respective works:
• k-Anonymity (k = 5) [257]
• (c,l)-Diversity (c = 4) and (l = 3) [177]
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• t-Closeness (t = 0.2) [167]
• δ-Presence (δ = (0.05, 0.15)) [194]
The experiments are run on a 64-bit Windows 7 desktop computer,
which is stocked with an Intel Core i7-6700HQ processor and 32 GB
of RAM. The 64-bit JVM (1.8.0_91) is given a heap size of 12.5 GB
-Xmx12500m. To achieve more stable run-times the concurrent mark
sweep (CMS) garbage collector is used (-XX:+UseConcMarkSweepGC).
Based on the introduced Policy-based De-identification Benchmark
Framework, several experiments are detailed in the following to evalu-
ate the run-time efficiency of the PD process.
7.2 experiments
The PD process has been introduced to answer how machine-readable
privacy policies can be utilized to preserve the privacy of individuals,
thus partially answering the second research question RQ2. Indeed,
what has not been covered yet of RQ2 is how efficient the PD process
is. Therefore, the focus of this chapter lies on the Personal Privacy
Anonymization and Privacy Model sub-processes of PD. Experiments
on the efficiency of the Pseudonymization sub-process are omitted,
because their efficiency highly relies on the method for the pseudonym
generation. For example, the usage of cryptographic methods, e.g.,
AES, requires more run-time than the usage of hashing methods,
e.g., MD5. However, the run-time of the remaining PD processes is
subject to the evaluation as well as the influence of personal privacy
settings. In both cases, it is required to not only process the data-
set but also the corresponding LPL privacy policy. Therefore, the
viability of the PD process compared to the sole application of state-
of-the-art privacy models is evaluated. Furthermore, the addition of
personal privacy settings, i.e., LPL privacy policies with varying de-
identification requirements, is subject to the evaluation. Lastly, the
MA- and GMA-algorithms are compared according to their influence
on the run-time of the PD process while personal privacy settings are
given.
7.2.1 Policy-based De-identification Overhead
To evaluate the viability of the overall Policy-based De-identification
approach, the run-time of the processes introduced by the PD process
are compared to the sole application of privacy models. For a fair
comparison, no pseudonymization methods nor records with personal
privacy settings are used, such that only Personal Privacy Anonymization
and Privacy Model processes of PD are taken into account. A detailed
analysis of the run-time performance of the sub-processes highlights
the impact of each algorithm on the overall run-time. It is expected
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that the overall PD process run-time exceeds the run-time of the sole
application of privacy models.
7.2.1.1 Experiment Set-up
Each privacy model (k-Anonymity, (c,l)-Diversity, t-Closeness, δ-Presence)
is used on each data-sets (ADULT, CUP, FARS, ATUS, IHIS). All the
attributes of the data-sets are used. No personal privacy settings or
pseudonymization is applied. The Minimum Anonymization is used
for the Personal Privacy Anonymization. The run-time of the overall
PD process, as well as each sub-process is measured. This results in
20 different configurations for which the results are shown in Table
7.3. This experiment simulates a scenario in which all records have
the same privacy policy configuration considering only one privacy
model. Therefore, it extends the sole application of an privacy model
on a data-set by the PD process.
The determination of the run-time difference is conducted based on
the measures, which have been conducted with nanosecond precision,
of each sub-process and the overall run-time. Therefore, the run-time
measures rMA: Minimum Anonymization, rmax: Set Maximum Anonymi-
zation, rgroup: Set Privacy Group, rsub: Privacy Model Substitution, rpm:
Apply Privacy Models, and roverall: Overall Run-time (see Equation 7.1)
are introduced.
roverall = rMA + rmax + rgroup + rsub + rpm (7.1)
The ∆time is calculated as the sum of the introduced sub-process of
the PD algorithms to apply Personal Privacy Anonymization and Privacy
Models.
∆time = rMA + rmax + rgroup + rsub (7.2)
For the calculation of ∆percent, the overall adjusted run-time
roverall is put into relation to the sole run-time of the application of
privacy models rpm (see Equation 7.3).
∆percent = ((
roverall
rpm
) ∗ 100) − 100 (7.3)
7.2.1.2 Individual Process Run-time Impact
In the following, each process is analysed and discussed in terms of
its impact on the overall run-time performance.
minimum anonymization The results are similar within each
data-set group, i.e. for the same data-set size. This is to be expected
considering the theoretical complexity analysis (see Section 6.3.1).
The results within a data-set group vary, this can be tracked back to
measurement errors which is also shown by a relative high deviation
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of run-times even for the same configuration. The percentage of the
run-time of the Minimum Anonymization-algorithm to the overall run-
time of the PD process is calculated (see Equations 7.4.
%MA = (
rMA
roverall
) ∗ 100 (7.4)
Considering %MA, it can be observed that the impact of the MA-
algorithm on the overall run-time roverall is small for configurations
with big data-sets, i.e. IHIS, or run-time heavy privacy models, i.e.
(0.05, 0.15)-Presence (see Table 7.3). The range of %MA lies between
0.11% and 10.27%.
Although no personal privacy settings are given, the algorithm
iterates over each Data-element, or more specifically its Anonymization-
Method- and AnonymizationMethodAttribute-elements, to determine the
Minimum Anonymization Level. Then, the Minimum Anonymization Level
is used to replace the original value with the corresponding value
of the HierarchyEntry-element. Within, this experiment the Minimum
Anonymization Level is always set to ′0 ′, therefore the original value is
used for each value. Therefore, each attribute for each record in the
data-set is iterated. Thus, the number of attributes and the number of
records both linearly influences the run-time of MA.
set maximum anonymization The Set Maximum Anonymiza-
tion-algorithm determines the Maximum Anonymization Level of each
attribute of each record, then calculates the minimum of the Maximum
Anonymization Level for each attribute and sets it as a limit for the ano-
nymization. For this experiment, the default Maximum Anonymization
Level is used, which is the size of the hierarchy for each anonymi-
zation hierarchy (see Hierarchy Size in Table 7.1). Therefore, the Set
Maximum Anonymization-algorithm depends on the number of records
and number of attributes (see Section 6.4.1). This low complexity of
the algorithm, is represented by the results. The results show constant
measurements below 0.00 seconds for each configuration, indicating
that the impact on the overall run-time is neglect-able even for big
data-sets, i.e. IHIS.
set privacy group The Set Privacy Group-algorithm determines
the privacy group for each attribute and sets it for the application of the
privacy model. Similar to the Set Maximum Anonymization-algorithm,
it depends on the number of records and number of attributes (see
Section 6.4.2). This low complexity of the algorithm, is represented
by the results. The results show constant measurements below 0.00
seconds for each configuration, indicating that the impact on the
overall run-time is also neglect-able.
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privacy model substitution The Privacy Model Substitution-
algorithm determines a set of privacy models that the de-identified
data-set has to comply to. The measurement results are similar within
each data-set group. For the experiment, each LPL privacy policy has
exactly one PrivacyModel-element pm specified. Although the privacy
model does not differ within each configuration, each pm has to run
through the substitution process (see Section 6.4.3). Furthermore, it
can be observed that the substitution of the privacy models has an
impact on the overall run-time due to the noticeable run-time increase
compared to Set Maximum Anonymization and Set Privacy Group. The
percentage of the run-time of each the Privacy Model Substitution-
algorithm to the overall run-time of the PD process is calculated (see
Equations 7.5.
%sub = (
rsub
roverall
) ∗ 100 (7.5)
Considering %sub, it can be observed that the impact of the Privacy
Model Substitution-algorithm on the overall run-time roverall is very
small, especially for configurations with big data-sets, i.e. IHIS, or
run-time heavy privacy models, i.e. (0.05, 0.15)-Presence (see Table 7.3).
The range of %sub lies between 0.06% and 4.79%.
Considering the configurations for the IHIS data-set, it can be ob-
served that for (0.05, 0.15)-Presence the run-time of 1.21 seconds exceeds
the run-time of privacy models with less configuration parameters,
e.g., 5-Anonymity with a run-time of 0.74 seconds. Therefore, it can
be concluded that also the number of PrivacyModelAttribute-elements
pma impacts the run-time. Thus, the run-time of this algorithm is in-
fluenced by the number of records, number of defined privacy models
pm, and number of privacy model parameters pma.
apply privacy models It can be observed that the run-time
to apply the privacy model, i.e. anonymize the data-set to match
the defined properties of the privacy model, highly varies for each
configuration (see Section 6.4.4). Additionally, it can be observed that
the size of the data-set has considerable impact on the run-time. Also
the number of attributes, i.e. EI, QI and SD attributes, which are
concerned by privacy models, influences the run-time. Thus, the data-
set size, number of EI, QI and SD attributes, and privacy model itself
have an impact on the run-time. The percentage of the run-time of
the Apply Privacy Models-algorithm to the overall run-time of the PD
process is calculated (see Equations 7.6.
%pm = (
rpm
roverall
) ∗ 100 (7.6)
Considering %pm, it can be seen that the run-time of the privacy
model highly exceeds the run-time of all other algorithms, e.g., for
the application of (0.05, 0.15)-Presence on IHIS the MA requires 4.40
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seconds while the run-time of the privacy model (0.05, 0.15)-Presence
rpm requires 563.73 seconds. This is a %pm of 99.02%. In general, the
range of %pm lies between 84.93% and 99.84%. Thus, the run-time of
the privacy model is identified with the highest impact factor on the
run-time (see Figure 7.2).
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Figure 7.2: Run-time comparison of Policy-based De-identification to Apply
Privacy Models for different privacy models.
summary It can be concluded that the algorithms Set Maximum
Anonymization and Set Privacy Group have only a minor impact on the
run-time, because they only depend on the number of records and
number of attributes and require no complex logic. The processes Min-
imum Anonymization and Privacy Model Substitution also depend on the
number of records and number of attributes, but have more complex
functionality. Therefore, they have a small but noticeable impact on
the run-time considering %MA and %sub. Lastly, the experiment has
shown that the run-time of the privacy model has the highest impact
on the overall run-time, which is further detailed in the following
comparison of the run-time difference of the PD process to the sole
application of privacy models.
7.2.1.3 Policy-based De-identification Run-time
To validate the efficiency of the presented PD process, ∆time and
∆percent are calculated and considered. Hereby, the actual run-time
difference (Time) and the percentage difference (Percent) for each con-
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figuration is calculated (see Table 7.3). It can be observed that the
run-time increases overall linearly for each privacy model and data-
set, i.e. number of records (see Figure 7.3). Minor variations can be
observed, which can be tracked back to measurement errors. Due
to the variation in performance of the privacy model and the rather
similar run-time of the remaining algorithms for configurations with
the same data-set (see Table 7.3), it can be observed that the ∆time
run-time mainly depends on the privacy model.
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Figure 7.3: Run-time difference for all configurations from Table 7.3 of the
Policy-based De-identification Overhead experiment. All data-sets are
used and visualized in the graph via their size, i.e. number of
records (see Table 7.1).
Considering the percentage difference of the PD process to the sole
application of privacy models, several observations can be made (see
Figure 7.4). First, the percentage ∆percent run-time varies for each
privacy model asserting the previously derived observation that the
privacy model itself has a significant impact on the run-time. Second,
the overall run-time overhead decreases with an increasing size of the
data-set.
Lastly, abnormalities in the ∆percent run-time can be observed
for the CUP data-set for each privacy model. While, the ∆percent
is increased exponentially for 5-Anonymity, it is decreased for the
remaining privacy models compared to the assumed linear growth
of ∆percent. Inspecting the run-time measurements of the individual
processes, it can be observed that rpm is increased, thus the run-time
for the privacy model is causing this abnormality. A closer inspection
of the data-sets shows that CUP has a significant higher number of
distinct values (see Table 7.1), which can have an impact on the run-
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7.3 of the Policy-based De-identification Overhead experiment. All
data-sets are used and visualized in the graph via their size, i.e.
number of records (see Table 7.1).
time of the privacy models. Additional experiments revealed that also
Differential Privacy or k-Map show the same effect as k-Anonymity if a
data-set with a high number of distinct values (#DV) is de-identified.
Thus, this abnormality can be tracked back to the increased number
of distinct values in CUP, which has a varying impact on the run-time
of some privacy models.
Concluding the results for the data-set groups, the average run-time
difference of the overall process is 6.23% for all configurations of
ADULT, 6.54% for CUP, 5.39% for FARS, 6.06% for ATUS, and 2.84%
for IHIS. Therefore, the overhead has a tendency to decrease for an
increased number of records.
Considering the results of the privacy model groups, the average
run-time difference of the overall process is 9.89% for all configurations
with 5-Anonymity, 7.48% for (4,3)-Diversity, 3,07% for 0.2-Closeness, and
1.22% for (0.05, 0.15)-Presence. This confirms the strong dependency of
the run-time overhead to the used privacy model.
Furthermore, it can be concluded that the PD approach is suitable
for data-warehouse scenarios (millions or billions of data records)
as the percentage ∆percent run-time decreases with the size of the
data-set. In other words, the PD approach is especially suitable for
large data-sets. For example, for the data-set IHIS (1,193,504 records)
and (00.5, 0.15)-Presence the overhead is only 1.00%. Therefore, if the
de-identification of a big data-set in a data-warehouse environment
is required, the usage of the PD process (with LPL privacy policies)
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imposes only a small run-time overhead compared to the usage of
privacy models. But the PD process has various advantages. First, not
only anonymization of the data-set can be done to fulfil the privacy
requirements of privacy models, but also the privacy requirements
of individuals, i.e. personal privacy settings, are taken into account.
Second, the PD process automatically determines the required privacy
settings for the de-identification from various LPL privacy policies,
thus diverse requirements can be unified automatically. Furthermore,
this is done dynamically for each request and the decision-making is
accountable. Without machine-readable privacy policies, this process
would require manual, or semi-automatic, inspection of privacy poli-
cies and purpose-based decision-making, which may be error-prone.
Lastly, the PD process differentiates the utility requirements, i.e. ano-
nymization limit for attributes, for each purpose. Therefore, not only
the privacy of individuals is taken into account, but also the utility
requirements of the processing entity, e.g., company.
All this features are provided by the PD process for a relative small
run-time overhead for big data-sets, which is advantageous for data-
warehouse scenarii in which personal data originates from various
sources with varying processing policies.
7.2.2 Personal Privacy – Minimum Anonymization
In the previous experiment, the run-time efficiency of the PD process
has been analysed without any personal privacy settings. Within this
experiment, the impact of the personal privacy on the run-time is
evaluated using the MA-algorithm for Personal Privacy Anonymization.
The experiment varies both the number of records with personal
privacy settings (PP) as well as the number of attributes with personal
privacy settings (#Attr).
7.2.2.1 Experiment Set-up
In contrast to the previous experiment, the data-set and privacy model
is not altered. An initial set of experiments showed that the impact of
personal privacy settings on the run-time is not influenced by the data-
set or the applied privacy model. Therefore, IHIS is used, because it is
has the highest volume of records, and k-Anonymity is used, because it
has a relatively small run-time compared to the other privacy models
and therefore the experiment is run faster overall. To determine the
impact of the data-set size 10,000, 100,000, and 1,000,000 records are
randomly chosen of IHIS for each run with the Fisher–Yates shuffle
algorithm [106] to prevent any dependencies on the data. All attributes
of the data-set are used.
The number of records with personal privacy (PP) is altered, i.e.
how many users personalize their privacy policy, and the number of
attributes (#Attr) for each record that are used for personal privacy
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settings are altered. PP is altered proportional from none ′0.0 ′ to all
′1.0 ′ in steps of 10% ( ′0.0 ′, ′0.1 ′, ′0.2 ′, ′0.3 ′, ′0.4 ′, ′0.5 ′, ′0.6 ′, ′0.7 ′,
′0.8 ′, ′0.9 ′, ′1.0 ′).
The IHIS data-set has 9 attributes, therefore the number of attributes
with personal privacy (#Attr) is varied from none ′0 ′ to ′9 ′ ( ′0 ′, ′1 ′,
′2 ′, ′3 ′, ′4 ′, ′5 ′, ′6 ′, ′7 ′, ′8 ′, ′9 ′). Personal privacy is applied on an
attribute, i.e. Data-element, by specifying the Minimum Anonymiza-
tion Level randomly between ′0 ′ (default) and an exclusive upper
limit. The exclusive upper limits have been chosen accordingly to the
size of the given hierarchy of the attribute, representing a mediocre
anonymization level (see Table 7.4).
The usage of ′0 ′ attributes or ′0.0 ′ records with personal privacy de-
notes the baselines in which no personal privacy has to be considered.
This results in 331 different configurations for which the run-time is
measured.
Table 7.4: Overview of IHIS attributes, the size of the corresponding anonymi-
zation hierarchies, and the exclusive upper Minimum Anonymization
Levels used in the experiments.
IHIS
Attribute
Minimum Anonymization
Exclusive Upper Limit
Anonymization Hierarchy
Size
year 4 6
quarter 2 3
region 2 3
pernum 3 4
age 3 5
marstat 2 3
sex 1 2
racea 1 2
educ 1 2
7.2.2.2 Variation of Personal Privacy Percentage
For the evaluation of the influence of the number of records in the data-
set with personal privacy settings (varying from the default privacy
policy) the results of the experiment using all attributes for personal
privacy ( ′9 ′) are used. The proportion of records with and without
personal privacy settings (PP) is hereby varied for comparison (see
Table 7.5).
These results show a linear growth of the run-time with regards
to the data-set size, which was expected based on previous exper-
iment (see Figure 7.5). Comparing the baseline measurements (PP
′0.0 ′) for 10,000, 100,000, 1,000,000 records with the respective results
of the remaining measurements, it can be observed that for some
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configurations with 100,000 and 1,000,000 records in the data-set the
overall run-time is increased. For example, the baseline measurement
(PP ′0.0 ′) for 1,000,0000 records has a run-time of 98.46 seconds. If
records with personal privacy settings are introduced then the overall
run-time is altered, e.g., if 40% percent of the the records use personal
privacy settings (PP ′0.4 ′) then 116.39 seconds are required for the
overall run-time. It can be observed, that the effect on the run-time
can vary for 10,000 and 100,000 records (see Table 7.5). For example,
the processing of 10,000 records with PP ′0.1 ′ requires 0.49 seconds
compared to the baseline of 0.6, which is a decrease of 0.11 seconds.
The processing of 100,000 records with PP ′0.2 ′ requires 6.66 seconds
which is a decrease of 0.28 seconds to the baseline of 6.94 seconds, but
the measurement of ′0.8 ′ has an increased run-time with 0.41 seconds.
Considering 1,000,000 records, the run-time is increased for each
configuration using records with personal privacy settings (PP ′0.1 ′ to
′1.0 ′). For example, the configuration with PP ′0.3 ′ requires a run-time
of 112.59 seconds which is an increase of 14,13 seconds compared to
the baseline of 98.46 seconds.
Table 7.5: Overall run-time of the PD process using the Minimum Anony-
mization-algorithm for varying number of records with personal
privacy settings (PP). The number of attributes used for personal
privacy settings (#Attr) is fixed to ′9 ′.
Overall
Run-Time [s]
IHIS Data-set Size
10,000 100,000 1,000,000
PP
0.0 0.6 6.94 98.46
0.1 0.49 6.71 103.52
0.2 0.51 6.66 108.15
0.3 0.54 6.80 112.59
0.4 0.53 7.06 116.39
0.5 0.53 6.94 119.07
0.6 0.52 6.95 122.45
0.7 0.56 7.37 123.71
0.8 0.57 7.35 124.51
0.9 0.57 7.42 124.68
1.0 0.55 7.39 124.70
A closer inspection of the individual run-time measurements of the
sub-processes reveals that the run-time is relatively constant (consid-
ering measurement errors) for all sub-processes, e.g., Personal Privacy
Anonymization, but varies for Apply Privacy Models. Considering the
measurements for 100,000 records, it can be observed that the run-
times of Minimum Anonymization and Privacy Model Substitution vary
within the margin of measurement error (see Table 7.6). Therefore, the
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Figure 7.5: Line graph showing the overall run-time in seconds for different
number of records with personal privacy (PP) on all attributes
′9 ′ using the Minimum Anonymization-algorithm. 5-Anonymity is
applied on different data-set sizes of IHIS.
variation of the proportion of records with personal privacy settings
(PP) within the data-set does not have a significant impact on those
processes.
Apparently, run-time of the privacy model, i.e. 5-Anonymity, is
affected by the variation of PP, which is ambiguous for data-sets with
10,000 and 100,000 records. But for data-sets with 1,000,000 records, i.e.
large data-sets, it can be stated that the variation of the proportion of
records with personal privacy settings (PP) within the data-set has a
negative effect on the run-time, but this effect has no direct correlation
to the number of records with personal privacy. In both cases, the
main influencing factor on the overall run-time is the Apply Privacy
Models sub-process of PD, which is affected by varying PP.
With the variation of PP, some values are anonymized during MA,
which can alter the properties of the data-set, i.e. number of distinct
values (#DV) and the correlated number of hierarchy elements (#HE).
Depending on an increase or decrease of #DV and #HE, the run-time
of the privacy model, i.e. k-Anonymity, is increased or decreased (see
Section 7.2.3.4).
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7.2.2.3 Variation of the Number of Personal Privacy Attributes
For the evaluation of the influence of the number of attributes with
personal privacy in the data-set, the number of attributes (#Attr) as
well as the number of records with personal privacy (PP) is varied
for IHIS. The PP is varied, because of the previous rationale showing
an unpredictable influence on the run-time. Previous results show
a possible significant influence of the number of records with per-
sonal privacy. Therefore, the influence of #Attr is discussed based
on a sub-set with PP of ′0.4 ′ (see Table 7.7). The discussion of other
configuration sets, e.g., PP of ′0.6 ′, is omitted because it leads to the
same conclusions.
The baseline measurements with ′0 ′ attributes used for personal
privacy settings indicate a linear growth of the overall run-time reas-
suring previous results. Comparing the baseline measurements (#Attr
′0 ′) for 10,000, 100,000, 1,000,000 records with the respective results
of the remaining measurements, it can be observed that for some con-
figurations with 10,000, 100,000 and 1,000,000 records in the data-set
the overall run-time is increased (see Table 7.7). Considering 1,000,000
records, the run-time is increased for each configuration (#Attr ′1 ′ to
′9 ′). For example, the configuration with #Attr ′5 ′ requires a run-time
of 114.22 seconds which is an increase of 16.55 seconds compared to
the baseline of 97.67 seconds (see Figure 7.6).
In a detailed inspection of the individual PD process run-times,
it can also be stated that the run-time of the privacy model, i.e. 5-
Anonymity, is affected by the variation of #Attr, which is ambiguous
for data-sets with 10,000 and 100,000 records. But for large data-sets, i.e.
1,000,000 records, the number of attributes used for personal privacy
settings has a negative effect on the run-time.
With the variation of #Attr, a sub-set of attributes (compared to the
previous experiment) is anonymized during MA. Thus, the effect of
altered properties of the data-set, i.e. number of distinct values (#DV)
and the correlated number of hierarchy elements (#HE), is weaker.
Therefore, depending on the increase or decrease of #DV and #HE,
the run-time of the privacy model, i.e. k-Anonymity, is increased or
decreased (see Section 7.2.3.4).
In fact, with the usage of the MA-algorithm, the percentage of
records with personal privacy settings (PP) in the data-set and the
number of attributes used for personal privacy settings (#Attr) affects
the run-time of privacy models. The run-time of the privacy model
can be either increased or decreased, with a tendency for an increase
of the run-time for bigger data-sets. The remaining processes of PD
are not significantly affected by either PP or #Attr.
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Table 7.7: Overall run-time of the PD process using the Minimum Anonymiza-
tion-algorithm for varying number of number of attributes used
for personal privacy settings (#Attr). The proportional number of
records with personal privacy settings (PP) is fixed to ′0.4 ′.
Overall
Run-Time [s]
IHIS Data-set Size
10,000 100,000 1,000,000
#Attr
0 0.61 6.96 97.67
1 0.63 7.37 107.76
2 0.55 7.26 110.35
3 0.53 7.09 110.73
4 0.56 7.04 113.00
5 0.52 7.06 114.22
6 0.52 6.92 115.89
7 0.54 6.98 115.78
8 0.53 6.91 117.47
9 0.53 7.06 116.39
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Figure 7.6: Line graph showing the overall run-time in seconds for different
numbers of attributes with personal privacy using the Minimum
Anonymization-algorithm. 5-Anonymity is used on different data-
set sizes of IHIS. The number of records with personal privacy
(PP) ′0.4 ′ is constant.
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7.2.3 Personal Privacy – Global Minimum Anonymization
In the previous experiment the impact of personal privacy on the
run-time is evaluated using the MA-algorithm. In contrast, within
this experiment the impact of personal privacy on the run-time is
evaluated using the GMA-algorithm for Personal Privacy Anonymization.
This algorithm is intended to improve the run-time of privacy models,
if personal privacy settings are used within the processed data-set.
Therefore, the experiment varies both the number of records with
personal privacy settings (PP) as well as the number of attributes with
personal privacy settings (#Attr).
7.2.3.1 Experiment Set-up
The experiment is conducted with the same configuration as before
for the MA-algorithm in Section 7.2.2, except that the GMA-algorithm
is used for Personal Privacy Anonymization. The run-time of the PD
process, as well as each sub-process is measured. This results in 331
different configurations. In the following, the results are first detailed
and then compared to the results using the MA-algorithm.
7.2.3.2 Variation of Personal Privacy Percentage
For the evaluation of the influence of the number of records in the data-
set with personal privacy settings (varying from the default privacy
policy) the results of the experiment using all attributes for personal
privacy ( ′9 ′) are used. The proportion of records with and without
personal privacy settings is hereby varied for comparison (see Table
7.8). These results show a linear growth of the run-time regarding
the data-set size, which is expected based on previous experiments.
Comparing the baseline measurements (PP ′0.0 ′) for 10,000, 100,000,
1,000,000 records with the respective results of the remaining mea-
surements, it can be observed that for each configuration the overall
run-time is decreased significantly. For example, the baseline mea-
surement (PP ′0.0 ′) for 1,000,0000 records has a run-time of 99.24
seconds. If records with personal privacy settings are introduced then
the overall run-time is altered, e.g., if 40% percent of the the records
use personal privacy settings (PP ′0.4 ′) then 13.95 seconds are required
for the overall run-time, which is a decrease of 85.29 seconds.
It has to be noted that the baseline measurements slightly vary
from the baseline measurements of the experiment using the MA-
algorithm, which can be traced back to measurement errors. Therefore,
the introduction of records with personal privacy settings in the data-
set using the GMA-algorithm has a significant impact on the run-time
(see Figure 7.7).
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Table 7.8: Overall run-time of the PD process using the Global Minimum Ano-
nymization-algorithm for varying number of records with personal
privacy settings (PP). The number of attributes used for personal
privacy settings is fixed to ′9 ′.
Overall
Run-Time [s]
IHIS Data-set Size
10,000 100,000 1,000,000
PP
0.0 0.61 7.11 99.24
0.1 0.16 1.58 13.82
0.2 0.18 1.68 14.86
0.3 0.18 1.64 13.98
0.4 0.17 1.56 13.95
0.5 0.17 1.58 14.14
0.6 0.15 1.56 14.13
0.7 0.16 1.57 13.93
0.8 0.15 1.73 15.49
0.9 0.17 1.81 15.94
1.0 0.19 1.55 13.91
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Figure 7.7: Line graph showing the overall run-time in seconds for different
number of records with personal privacy (PP) on all attributes ′9 ′
using the Global Minimum Anonymization-algorithm. 5-Anonymity
is is on different data-set sizes of IHIS.
A closer inspection of the individual run-time measurements of
the sub-processes reveals that the run-time of the GMA-algorithm
is greater than the run-time of the MA-algorithm, e.g., 0.52 seconds
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compared to 0.31 seconds for PP of ′0.3 ′ (see Table 7.9). This can
be traced back to the additional iteration required on the data-set to
determine the maximum of the Minimum Anonymization Level (see
Section 6.3.2).
Furthermore, it can be observed that the run-time of Apply Privacy
Models is significantly reduced from 5.81 seconds of the baseline, e.g.,
0.16 seconds for PP of ′0.3 ′. The run-time of the privacy model, i.e.
5-Anonymity, is affected by the introduction of records with personal
privacy settings using the GMA-algorithm for PD. It can be observed
that the variation of PP between ′0.1 ′ and ′1.0 ′ does vary the run-time
of the privacy model (PM). This variation can be caused by different
data-set instances of IHIS and personal privacy settings, which can
affect the #DV and #HE in the data-set, thus varying the run-time of the
privacy model. Moreover, measurement errors and a high deviation in
the run-time for privacy models can cause this variation.
In general, the reduction of the run-time is caused by the GMA-
algorithm, which reduces the number of #DV and #HE in the data-
set before the privacy model is used, thus decreasing the run-time
of the privacy model (see Section 7.2.3.4). Moreover, the run-time
difference within the range of PP ′0.1 ′ to ′1.0 ′ is small, because the
GMA-algorithm determines a global anonymization level for each
attribute according which each value is anonymized. Therefore, it
is expected that attributes are anonymized to similar levels among
different configurations, thus a low difference in the run-time can
be observed. The baseline configuration with PP ′0.0 ′ is unaffected,
because no personal privacy settings are given, thus a big run-time
difference to the remaining configurations can be observed.
Thus, it can be stated that the main influencing factor of the PD
process, i.e. Apply Privacy Models, has a significantly reduced run-time
if records with personal privacy settings are present within the data-
set and the GMA-algorithm is used, because the number of #DV and
#HE is decreased by the GMA-algorithm.
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7.2.3.3 Variation of the Number of Personal Privacy Attributes
For the evaluation of the influence of the number of attributes with
personal privacy in the data-set, #Attr and PP is varied. For compar-
ison, the influence of #Attr is discussed based on the sub-set with a
PP of ′0.4 ′ (see Table 7.10). The discussion of other configuration sets,
e.g., PP of ′0.6 ′, is omitted because it leads to the same conclusions.
Table 7.10: Overall run-time of the PD process using the Minimum Anonymi-
zation-algorithm for varying number of number of attributes used
for personal privacy settings (#Attr). The proportional number of
records with personal privacy settings (PP) is fixed to ′0.4 ′.
Overall
Run-Time [s]
IHIS Data-set Size
10,000 100,000 1,000,000
#Attr
0 0.64 7.34 101.06
1 0.38 4.31 49.16
2 0.29 3.30 33.63
3 0.24 2.52 26.97
4 0.18 2.02 17.89
5 0.19 1.72 15.13
6 0.17 1.64 14.16
7 0.18 1.56 14.02
8 0.15 1.56 13.91
9 0.17 1.56 13.95
The baseline measurements with ′0 ′ attributes used for personal
privacy settings indicate a linear growth of the overall run-time reas-
suring previous results. Comparing the baseline measurements (#Attr
′0 ′) with the remaining measurements, it can be observed that if more
attributes with personal privacy settings are introduced then the over-
all run-time is decreased. For example, if ′5 ′ attributes of the record
are used for personal privacy settings then 15.13 seconds are required
for the overall run-time compared to the baseline of 101.06 seconds for
1,000,000 records. Furthermore, it can be observed that the run-time
is increased for each configuration (#Attr ′1 ′ to ′9 ′) for each data-set
size (see Figure 7.8).
In a detailed inspection of the individual PD process run-times,
it can also be seen that the run-time of the privacy model, i.e. 5-
Anonymity, is significantly affected by the variation of #Attr confirming
the rationale for PP.
With the variation of #Attr, a sub-set of attributes is anonymized
during GMA. Thus, the effect of altered properties of the data-set,
i.e. number of distinct values (#DV) and the correlated number of
hierarchy elements (#HE), increases for each additional attribute with
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personal privacy settings. In other words, the higher the number of
attributes with personal privacy settings #Attr the lower the run-time
for the privacy model (PM). This can be observed in Table 7.10, except
for #Attr ′8 ′ and ′9 ′ for which the run-time of ′9 ′ is slightly higher.
This can be caused by differing sub-sets of the data-set or measuring
errors.
Thus, the usage of the GMA-algorithm, the introduction of records
with personal privacy settings (PP or #Attr) decreases the run-time
of the privacy models. The remaining processes of PD are not signifi-
cantly affected by either PP or #Attr.
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Figure 7.8: Line graph showing the overall run-time in seconds for differ-
ent numbers of attributes with personal privacy using the Global
Minimum Anonymization-algorithm. 5-Anonymity is used on differ-
ent data-set sizes of IHIS. The number of records with personal
privacy (PP) is set to ′0.4 ′.
7.2.3.4 Personal Privacy Anonymization Algorithm Comparison
In the following, the run-time difference of the Minimum Anonymi-
zation-algorithm and Global Minimum Anonymization-algorithm is de-
tailed. It has already been shown that the variation of PP and #Attr has
a minor impact on the run-time of the GMA-algorithm. This discussion
focuses on the differentiation of the run-time difference for small and
big data-set sizes of 10,000 and 1,000,000 records, while PP is fixed to
′0.4 ′ and #Attr varies from ′0 ′ to ′9 ′.
For the run-time difference calculation, the run-time of the PD
process with MA (rPD-MA) and PD process with GMA (rPD-GMA) is
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used. The time difference (see Equation 7.7) and percentage difference
(see Equation 7.8) is used for the following comparison.
∆time-difference = rPD-MA − rPD-GMA (7.7)
∆percent-difference = (
rPD-MA − rPD-GMA
rPD-MA
) ∗ 100 (7.8)
Considering the smaller data-set with 10,000 records (see Table 7.11),
it can be observed that the baseline run-time (#Attr ′0 ′) varies by
0.03 seconds, which is a ∆percent-difference of 4.92%. Similarly, the
baseline run-time varies for the data-set with 1,000,000 records for
3.47% (see Table 7.13). On the one hand, this difference is introduced
by the additionally required run-time of the GMA-algorithm. On the
other hand, this difference is based on measuring errors.
The ∆time-difference for the small data-set with 10,000 records
indicates a better run-time for the GMA-algorithm if records with
personal privacy settings are present within the data-set. The run-time
is reduced on average, excluding the baseline measurements, by 0.33
seconds with 0.25 seconds as the minimal run-time difference and 0.38
seconds as the maximal run-time difference. This corresponds to a
∆percent-difference between 39.68% and 71.70%, which averages to
60.73%.
Similar results can be observed for the data-set with 100,000 records
(see Table 7.13). The ∆time-difference indicates a better run-time for
the GMA-algorithm if records with personal privacy settings are
present within the data-set. The run-time is reduced on average, ex-
cluding the baseline measurements, by 91.42 seconds with 58.60 sec-
onds as the minimal run-time difference and 103.56 seconds as the max-
imal run-time difference. This corresponds to a ∆percent-difference
between 54.38% and 88.16%, which averages to 80,26%.
Considering the data-sets with 10,000 and 1,000,000 records, the
GMA-algorithm improves the run-time of the PD process significantly.
The rationale for this improvement is the reduction of the number
of distinct values and anonymization hierarchies during the Personal
Privacy Anonymization. The reduced volume of inputs for the privacy
models, also reduces their run-time. For example k-Anonymity requires
the calculation of QI-groups, which are based upon the distinct values
and anonymization hierarchies. Therefore, if fewer distinct values are
available also fewer QI-groups have to be considered.
This can be observed by relating the number of distinct values (#DV)
and number of distinct anonymization hierarchy elements (#HE) of the
data-set before it is anonymized by the privacy model (Pre-PM Data-
set) to ∆percent-difference (see Table 7.12 and Table 7.14). The #DV
and #HE are measured for each configuration for the input data-set as
well as the data-set before it is anonymized to comply with the privacy
model (Pre-PM Data-set). The baseline configuration has no personal
privacy settings defined for the LPL privacy policies (#Attr is set to
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′0 ′), thus the MA-algorithm does not affect the data-set. Considering
the remaining configurations, it can be observed that the number of
distinct values (#DV) is reduced. The percentage reduction of #DV
(∆#DV#Attr) is calculated on the baseline #DV in relation to the #DV of
each configuration (see Equation 7.9). Considering ∆#DV#Attr , the #DV
is reduced up to 59.49% for the data-set size of 10,000 (see Table 7.12)
and up to 56.18% for the data-set size of 1,000,000 (see Table 7.14).
∆#DV#Attr = (
#DV0 − #DV#Attr
#DV0
) ∗ 100 (7.9)
Furthermore, it can be observed that the number of hierarchy
elements (#HE) is reduced. The percentage of the #HE reduction
(∆#HE#Attr) is calculated on the baseline #HE in relation to the #HE
of each configuration (see Equation 7.10). Considering ∆#HE#Attr , the
#HE is reduced up to 80.06% for the data-set size of 10,000 (see Table
7.12) and up to 80.03% for the data-set size of 1,000,000 (see Table
7.14).
∆#HE#Attr = (
#HE0 − #HE#Attr
#HE0
) ∗ 100 (7.10)
For both data-set sizes, it can be observed that an increase of
∆#DV#Attr or ∆#HE#Attr correlates to an increased ∆percent-difference
(see Table 7.12 and Table 7.14).
Thus, a significant reduction of the overall run-time can be achieved
using the GMA-algorithm if records with personal privacy settings
are present. In contrast, the MA-algorithm potentially increases the
overall run-time of PD, because the number of distinct values (#DV),
i.e. anonymized values, are added to the data-set as well as additional
anonymization hierarchies (increased number of distinct hierarchy
elements #HE).
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7.3 conclusion
To evaluate the efficiency of the Policy-based De-identification process,
the Policy-based De-identification Benchmark Framework is proposed in
this chapter and used for three different experiments. The PD process
considers for each record a corresponding LPL privacy policy (see
Chapter 6).
First, the run-time overhead introduced by the PD processes com-
pared to the sole application of privacy models is evaluated. For this
experiment no personal privacy settings are introduced. The detailed
investigation of the run-time for each PD sub-process shows that they
have only a minor impact on the overall run-time, except Apply Privacy
Models which has the highest impact. Therefore, it can be stated that
the PD sub-processes are efficient. Furthermore, it is concluded that
the PD approach is suitable for data-warehouse scenarios (millions
or billions of data records) as the percentage ∆percent run-time de-
creases with the size of the data-set and run-time intensive privacy
models. For example, for the data-set IHIS (1,193,504 records) and
(00.5, 0.15)-Presence the run-time overhead is only 1.00%.
Next, the impact of personal privacy settings on the run-time of the
PD process is evaluated using the MA-algorithm for Personal Privacy
Anonymization. The variation of the proportional number of records
with personal privacy settings (PP) and number of attributes with per-
sonal privacy settings (#Attr) is investigated using different numbers
of records of IHIS. The results show that the run-time of Apply Privacy
Models sub-process is mainly influenced by the introduction of per-
sonal privacy settings (PP or #Attr). The results show that the run-time
can be either increased or decreased, while the results of the big data-
set with 1,000,000 records consistently has increased run-times (see
Table 7.5). An in detail inspection revealed, that the introduction of
personal privacy settings alters the properties of the data-set after the
MA, such that #DV and #HE is increased or decreased and as a conse-
quence the run-time of the privacy model is respectively increased or
decreased. The remaining sub-processes are not significantly affected
by the introduction of personal privacy settings (see Table 7.6).
Lastly, the experiment has been repeated with the GMA-algorithm
and compared to the results using the MA-algorithm. The results show
that the Personal Privacy Anonymization has a slightly increased run-
time and a significantly decreased run-time for the privacy models if
personal privacy settings (PP or #Attr) are introduced (see Tables 7.8
and 7.9). The increased run-time for the GMA-algorithm can be traced
back to the additional iteration required for the determination of the
maximum Minimum Anonymization Level for each attribute (see Section
6.3.2). The significantly decreased run-time for Apply Privacy Models
is caused by the reduction of the number of distinct values #DV and
number of hierarchy elements #HE processed.
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The direct comparison of the results for the PD process with MA and
the PD process with GMA showed, that the usage of GMA decreases
the run-time significantly, e.g., up to 88.16% for the presented results
(see Tables 7.11 and 7.13). Moreover, the correlation of a decreased
#DV and #HE to a decreased privacy model run-time, i.e. k-Anonymity,
is demonstrated (see Tables 7.12 and 7.14). But this improvement of
the run-time comes with the cost of possible loss of utility, because the
anonymization of all values to the maximum Minimum Anonymization
Level anonymizes some values more than required (see Section 6.3.2).
Thus, valuable data may be lost depending on the specific use case.
To answer the second research question RQ2, the Policy-based De-
identification process was introduced to preserve the privacy of individ-
uals considering pseudonymization, personal privacy settings, i.e. Per-
sonal Privacy Anonymization, and privacy models which are expressed
via LPL (see Chapter 6). Furthermore, the evaluation demonstrated
that the PD processes are efficient considering the run-times of the
individual processes in comparison to the run-time of privacy models.
Additionally, the impact of personal privacy on the run-time has been
evaluated comparing the Minimum Anonymization- and Global Min-
imum Anonymization-algorithm. Although both algorithms preserve
the privacy according to the individuals requirements, the run-time
and utility properties differ. On the one hand, the MA-algorithm only
anonymizes data according to the Minimum Anonymization Levels de-
fined by the corresponding LPL privacy policy, but the run-time of the
privacy model may be increased or decreased. The increase/decrease
of the run-time is correlated to a increase/decrease of #DV and #HE in
the data-set after MA, because some values are anonymized altering
the number distinct values in the data-set. On the other hand, the
GMA-algorithm anonymizes all values of an attribute to the same
anonymization level, i.e. the maximum of the Minimum Anonymization
Levels for each attribute, hence #DV and #HE is decreased after GMA.
This significantly decreases the run-time of the privacy model. On the
downside, the MA-algorithm may decrease the utility of the resulting
data-set. Thus, a trade-off between run-time efficiency and utility has
to be made depending on the use case.

8
C O N C L U S I O N A N D F U T U R E W O R K
This chapter concludes the work of this thesis and gives and outlook
for future works.
8.1 conclusion
The goal of this thesis is to formalize privacy policies in machine-
readable format integrating legal requirements of the GDPR and
privacy-preserving technologies. Furthermore, an efficient enforce-
ment of policy-based and user-guided processing of personal data has
to be enabled.
To achieve this goal the research questions RQ1 and RQ2 are formal-
ized and answered. To answer the first research question RQ1 – ’How
to represent legal privacy policies in a machine-readable format which
complies to the legal requirements of the General Data Protection
Regulation in the EU while privacy guarantees are defined?’ – a set of
requirements is derived considering the legal and technical point of
view on privacy (see Chapter 2):
• R1 Privacy Policy Structure
• R2 Legal Compliance (to GDPR)
• R3 Human-readability
• R4 Access Control
• R5 De-identification Capabilities
• R6 Provenance
Background information on the variety of de-identification methods
that are considered is given in Chapter 3. An extensive literature re-
search has been conducted comparing and classifying related privacy
languages according to this set of requirements for a privacy language
expressing privacy policies (see Chapter 4). The literature research
revealed, that several privacy languages have been proposed each with
a distinct focus objective. Most of the surveyed privacy languages have
a R1 Privacy Policy Structure and focus on the realization of privacy
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guarantees using R4 Access Control. The remaining requirements are
only partially fulfilled by other privacy languages. R2 Legal Compliance
to GDPR is considered by several privacy languages, but the explicit
integration of the requirements for a privacy policy (Art. 12 - 14 GDPR)
or Data Subject Rights (Art. 12 - 23 GDPR) in a privacy language is
not realized. R3 Human-readability is essential for transparency, but
is often decoupled from the privacy-preserving rules. Only a few
privacy languages in the literature provide or consider mechanisms
for R6 Provenance. Lastly, expressing R5 De-identification Capabilities,
i.e. pseudonymization, anonymization and privacy models, and their
realization have not been the main focus of any privacy language
in the literature. Therefore, a research gap is identified for a pri-
vacy language expressing privacy policies and using de-identification
methodology to realize privacy-preserving processing rules while all
given requirements are fulfilled.
To answer research question RQ1 the Layered Privacy Language (LPL)
is proposed for which each of the requirements R1, R2, R3, R4, R5, and
R6 are fulfilled. The core structure of LPL is modelled in such a way to
integrate the R1 Privacy Policy Structure requirement. Therefore, LPL
consists of a set of purposes that furthermore define which attributes
are processed by which data recipients. Additionally, the data source
is denoted.
The R2 Legal Compliance requirement is realized by a broad legal re-
quirement analysis based on the GDPR from which various elements
are derived which have to be modelled within LPL. For example,
the Controller and Data Protection Officer have to be expressed by the
privacy policy to inform the user about the responsible authorities.
Furthermore, requirements of the Data Subject Rights are considered,
such that the fulfilment of Data Subject Right requests can be eased
based on the information available in LPL privacy policies. The fulfil-
ment of the R2 Legal Compliance requirement is shown via a detailed
qualitative evaluation of each legal requirement.
The R3 Human-readability requirement is essential for a privacy
language such that the contents of the policy can be transparently
communicated to the user, which is also essential for R2 Legal Com-
pliance. This R3 Human-readability requirement is considered within
LPL via the addition of human-readable headers and descriptions
for elements as well as the introduction of a distinct element for ex-
pressing Privacy Icons. The fulfilment of the requirement is shown
via a proof-of-concept implementation of user interfaces allowing the
creation, presentation, and negotiation of LPL privacy policies. Hereby,
also the R2 Legal Compliance requirement has been considered, such
that all required information is presented using a Layered approach.
The R4 Access Control requirement is realized in LPL by enabling
entities, e.g., the processing entities, to be authenticated and autho-
rized. Furthermore, it is assumed that a request for data also denotes
8.1 conclusion 213
the purpose, attributes and individuals for which personal data is
processed. Therefore, the LPL privacy policy acts as a rule-set against
which a request is validated. The fulfilment of the R4 Access Control re-
quirement is discussed according to the introduced Policy-based Access
Control (PAC) process for which the pseudocode is detailed.
The R5 De-identification Capabilities requirement is realized by several
elements in LPL. Therefore, LPL can express for each purpose a set
of privacy models and pseudonymization methods that have to be
applied on the data-set if requested. Furthermore, for each attribute of
the purpose a Minimum Anonymization Level is defined, which can be
altered by the user to define in which quality his personal data will be
used for the purpose. Moreover, the creator of the LPL privacy defines
the Maximum Anonymization Level, which defines the limit for the
anonymization, thus utility requirements are defined. This extensive
definition of de-identification requirements is unique to LPL and
allows a fine-grained definition of privacy and utility requirements.
The fulfilment of the R5 De-identification Capabilities requirement is
shown by the introduction of the Policy-based De-identification (PD)
process, which utilizes LPL privacy policies to de-identify on-the-fly
requested data-sets. The combination of the PAC and PD process
enables a purpose-based restricted access to personal data, which is
furthermore de-identified if required.
The R6 Provenance requirement is realized via the introduction of
an identifiable data source, i.e. the user, to the LPL privacy policy,
which is also subject to the R4 Access Control requirement. Therefore,
the source of the personal data can be identified. Furthermore, a LPL
privacy policy is designed to reference other LPL privacy policies.
This enables the refinement of privacy policies, e.g., more fine-grained
access control or de-identification requirements, for the sharing of
personal data with third parties. On the one hand, this allows the
validation of an LPL privacy policy against an underlying LPL privacy
policy, thus proof for compliance to the GDPR can be given. On the
other hand, this allows to trace back the source of personal data,
e.g., allowing users to make use of their Data Subject Rights for data
that is transferred to third parties. Lastly, the processing of personal
data produces also new data, e.g., survey results, for which it can
be crucial to trace back the original data sources to demonstrate that
the original data has not been tampered with. This scenario can also
be expressed with the underlying privacy policies. The fulfilment
of the R6 Provenance requirement is discussed according to use case
scenarios.
Therefore, it was shown that all requirements for a privacy language
expressing privacy policies are integrated in LPL and their application
discussed. The first research question RQ1 is answered with the Layered
Privacy Language (LPL), for which compliance to legal requirements of
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the GDPR is shown. This enables the expression of privacy guarantees
via access control and de-identification rules.
Considering the big picture, privacy policies are intended to trans-
parently inform users about the processing of their personal data and
their rights. Thus, users can freely agree and consent to the processing
of their personal data. The personal privacy concept denotes that users
can influence, i.e. negotiate, the processing of their personal data,
thus for each user a personal privacy policy is defined. During the
processing of personal data the corresponding individuals’ personal
privacy policies have to be considered distinctively such that each
user’s privacy is preserved. Similarly, when personal data is trans-
ferred, e.g., sold or shared, to third parties, the sticky policy concept is
considered such that the personal data record is always linked to the
corresponding privacy policy. Besides, the entity, i.e. the company, that
issues the privacy policy can express it’s requirements that have to be
considered during the de-identification process for a specific purpose.
These utility requirements, i.e. how much a value can be anonymized
to be still useful, are defined within the policy and have to realized
during the de-identification process.
Considering a data-warehouse, containing personal data from var-
ious sources, the privacy requirements for processing the personal
data for a specific purpose have to be derived from all corresponding
privacy policies. Because users can have personalized privacy policies
and privacy policy can origin from various sources, different privacy
and utility requirements are possible for the de-identification process.
Additionally, the de-identification process has to be conducted effi-
ciently for each request, because the privacy policies of some records
can be altered at any time, i.e. withdrawal of consent by the user.
These additional challenges are subject to the second research ques-
tion RQ2 – ’How can machine-readable privacy policies, expressing
privacy-preserving methods, be utilized to efficiently preserve the pri-
vacy of individuals when a set of users’ personal data is requested for
processing?’ – which can be split into two problem statements. First,
the variety of users’ personal privacy policies, expressed by a privacy
language, has to be considered during the de-identification process,
thus complexity has to be handled. Second, the de-identification pro-
cess has to be efficient in regard to its run-time to be a viable option
in practice compared to common de-identification approaches, i.e. use
privacy models on a data-set.
To tackle the first challenge, handling varying privacy and utility
requirements, is possible thanks to the Policy-based De-identification,
which is proposed to determine a common or unified level of privacy
and utility from varying LPL privacy policies. For example, vary-
ing definitions of privacy models are tackled by the introduction of
the Privacy Model Substitution-algorithm, which determines a set of
privacy models that fulfils all privacy requirements of the given pri-
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vacy models. Therefore, the Privacy Model Substitution Table is used
as a basis for the decision-making, which is created using expert
knowledge on privacy models. Similarly, mechanisms for determin-
ing the set of pseudonymization methods, privacy groups, Maximum
Anonymization Level and Minimum Anonymization Level for attributes
are introduced. Furthermore, two alternative algorithms for Personal
Privacy Anonymization are introduced, for which the Minimum Ano-
nymization (MA)-algorithm is intended to exactly realize the privacy
requirements of each individual. In contrast, the Global Minimum Ano-
nymization (GMA)-algorithm determines a unified anonymization level
for each attribute. This reduces the number of distinct values within
the data-set which is intended to improve the overall efficiency, i.e.
run-time, of the PD process.
This leads to the second challenge, the PD process should be effi-
cient. In other words, the additional processing of possible millions or
billions of personalized LPL privacy policies for a data-warehouse sce-
nario should not significantly increase the overall run-time. Therefore,
a quantitative evaluation is conducted based on three experiments.
First, the overall overhead of the PD processes compared to the sole
application of privacy models on a data-set is evaluated, showing an
overhead of 5.58% on average. Next, the run-time impact of personal
privacy settings on the PD process is evaluated by comparing the usage
of the MA- and the GMA-algorithm. The usage of the MA-algorithm
with personal privacy settings introduces a variation of the run-time,
both an increase and a decrease. The usage of a data-set with the size
of 1,000,000 showed only increased run-times. In contrast, the usage
of the GMA-algorithm with personal privacy settings introduced a sig-
nificant run-time decrease for all tested configurations of up to 88.16%
compared to the baseline. This significant improvement is based on the
reduction of distinct values and anonymization hierarchies due to the
GMA-algorithm, which reduces the run-time of privacy models. But,
this improvement comes with a possible reduction of the final utility
of the data-set, because the all values of an attribute are anonymized
to the same level instead of individual levels. Therefore, outliers in
the personal privacy settings can decrease the utility of the whole
data-set. Thus, a trade-off between run-time efficiency and utility has
to be made considering the use case, i.e. the properties of the data-set
and corresponding personal privacy settings.
Therefore, the second research question RQ2 is answered by the
introduction of the Policy-based De-identification process, which is able
to derive uniform privacy and utility requirements from varying LPL
privacy policies and apply them to preserve the privacy of individuals.
Furthermore, the quantitative evaluation showed that the PD process
only add a run-time overhead of 5.58% compared to the sole applica-
tion of privacy models with a tendency of a lower overhead for bigger
data-sets, thus especially viable for data-warehouse scenarios. It has
216 conclusion and future work
been shown that an decrease of distinct values and anonymization
hierarchies is related to an decreased run-time of privacy models. To
reduce the possible negative impact of personal privacy settings the
GMA-algorithm is introduced, which enabled a significant run-time
reduction if personal privacy settings are used, but potentially reduced
the utility of the resulting de-identified data-set.
The research questions RQ1 and RQ2 are answered in this thesis by
the Layered Privacy Language (LPL) and the Policy-based De-identification
(PD) process using LPL. Thus, the goal of this thesis to formalize
privacy policies in machine-readable format integrating legal require-
ments of the GDPR and privacy-preserving technologies and to enable
the enforcement of efficient policy-based and user-guided processing
of personal data is achieved. In the following, an outlook for future
work in the privacy domain is given in the context of LPL and the PD
process.
8.2 future work
For future work, three main topics are considered. Extended Scenarii
details possible extensions and optimizations for LPL and the PD pro-
cess. Company Compliance details the challenges that have to be faced
for companies to demonstrate their compliance after the processing of
personal data. User Experience details user-friendly presentation and
negotiation of privacy policies using privacy languages as the basis.
8.2.1 Extended Scenarii
The Layered Privacy Language (LPL) and the Policy-based De-identification
(PD) process are discussed according to a data-warehouse scenario
using multidimensional data. The extension of this scenario is subject
to future work.
In fact, other data-set types could be considered for the de-
identification process, e.g., transaction data, longitudinal data, graph
data, and time series data. Each of the data types has properties
that have to be preserved during the de-identification process. For
example, longitudinal data contains several entries for the same user.
Therefore, the affiliation of the records to the same entity has to be
preserved during de-identification. Considering data-sets that contain
the location data of users, specialized privacy models have to be
applied to preserve the privacy [109] [178].
Furthermore, the focus on other domains is subject to future work,
e.g., IoT [103] or e-Health [56] [138]. For example, devices in the IoT
domain have restricted resources for computation, for which LPL may
be further developed to fulfil specific storage capacity requirements.
Because the PD process is resource intensive, the IoT device on which
the PD process is run must be carefully selected. Additionally, it
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has to be considered that IoT devices are heterogenous and highly
interconnected, thus various privacy policies have to be managed to
enable efficient access control and de-identification [155] [103].
Therefore, the extension of LPL and the PD process is subject to
future work. The evaluation showed that the individual algorithms
of the PD process do not add significant run-time overhead com-
pared to the sole application of privacy models, but the integration
of caching mechanisms and parallelization may further decrease the
overhead. For example, a cache may be introduced that temporarily
stores requests and corresponding de-identified data-sets. If a request
is repeated and identified within the cache, the PD process can be
skipped and the cached de-identified data-set can be returned. Because
the caching of de-identified data-sets requires extra storage capacity
for big data-sets, a trade-off between the storage capacity and run-time
savings has to be found.
The parallelization of independent algorithms, e.g., Set Maximum
Anonymization and Set Privacy Group, may decrease the run-time of the
PD process. Considering the possible worse utility of the PD process
with the GMA-algorithm compared to the PD process with the MA-
algorithm, the data-set may be analysed regarding its personal privacy
properties, while simultaneously the default PD process with MA is
run to predict if the GMA is advantageous regarding the run-time and
utility trade-off. If it is advantageous, the PD process with GMA may
be started instead.
Therefore, it is essential to quantify the utility for which a suitable
metric has to be defined, considering the Accuracy, Completeness and
Consistency properties of the data-set [38]. Commonly, only Accuracy is
considered to quantify the utility, e.g., information loss, but consider-
ing the use of personal privacy anonymization and pseudonymization
also Completeness and Consistency of the data-set should be taken into
account. For example, the usage of pseudonyms for EI attributes in-
stead of deleting them during the application of the privacy model
may be an improvement for the utility considering Completeness. Fur-
thermore, in longitudinal data-sets, it is essential that the affiliation of
the records to the same entity has to be preserved, which is possible
using pseudonymization but may be error prone using anonymiza-
tion. Therefore, the Consistency property of utility is affected. With
such an utility metric, the properties of the PD process can be further
optimized.
In summary, LPL and the PD process are subject to future works that
extend them for use in other domains and with other data-set types.
Furthermore, the optimization of the PD process considering perfor-
mance improvements and detailed analysis of its utility properties is
to be considered.
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8.2.2 Company Compliance
Within this work, the life-cycle of the Layered Privacy Language (LPL)
incorporated the creation and negotiation of privacy policies, as well
as their pre-processing, storage, transfer and usage. Therefore, the life-
cycle focused on the ex ante processing of personal data. But, there are
also challenges that can be faced after the personal data is processed,
i.e. ex post processing [89]. The processing entity, i.e. company, has to
show its compliance to the legal framework – the GDPR – if audited
by supervisory authorities. Hereby, the compliant privacy-preserving
processing of personal data has to be accounted for.
These challenges can be tackled by logging the processing requests
and their outcome, i.e. request and outcome of PAC and PD. Therefore,
the logs may contain the requesting entity, purpose of the processing,
attributes, and requested entities from the request in addition to
common attributes, e.g. the time-stamp. These logs can be used as the
basis to show compliance to supervisory authorities and to determine
the origin of privacy incidents. Approaches for compliance checking
and inference detection can be found in the literature [275] [52] [3].
To ensure the validity of the log entries it has to be ensured that
they are not manipulated, i.e. log entries must be immutable. There-
fore, log entries may be stored in a blockchain preventing unnoticed
manipulation [172] [160] [285] [2] [61]. These technologies have to be
combined to a holistic approach that considers all aspects of privacy
from consent management, privacy-preserving processing, and ex post
processing.
Considering that personal data is transferred alongside sticky poli-
cies, additional challenges have to be faced considering the compliant
processing of personal data. First, it has to be considered that the
original policies, i.e. underlying LPL privacy policies, may be altered,
updated, or deleted. Therefore, also the related transferred policies
have to be altered. Additionally, the validation of a refined policy
against its updated original policy has to be repeated considering the
distributed definitions of purposes, entities, and data.
Second, it has to be ensured that the transferred policies can be
processed by third parties, e.g., the rules defined the Purpose-Hierarchy
have to be accessible. Otherwise, authentication and authorization,
i.e. PAC, may fail. Considering the generic definition of identifiers
for elements, it has to be ensured that identifiers are globally unique
instead of only within a company. Therefore, it should be strived for
a standardization for a privacy vocabulary, e.g., for purposes, data
groups and attributes [55].
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8.2.3 User Experience
Transparency of privacy policies is important for enabling free and
voluntary consent of the user. It is legally required to inform the user
about the processing of his personal data. But in practice, privacy
policies are rarely read by users because they require a high effort to
be understood by the users [182]. Therefore, many users accept privacy
policies without reading them (carefully) [253]. Additionally, it has
been shown that privacy policies are too complex, long and demanding
in their formulation [46]. Considering LPL privacy policies, privacy
guarantees are detailed using privacy models, pseudonymization and
anonymization, which are complex methods by themselves. Therefore,
it is safe to assume that users would not understand if it is stated that
their personal data is protected with 5-Anonymity if it is processed for
research purposes.
It is possible with LPL privacy policies to give the user various
options for personalization. Hereby, the user is given the possibility
to decide which data, i.e. attributes, and in what quality the data is
used, i.e. the anonymization level. Furthermore, the data recipients for
a purpose can be selected by the user. Thus, the user may be offered
various personalization options, which enable him to decide about the
processing of his personal data. But this variety of options may also
overwhelm the user, because he is unable or unwilling to assess the
impact of his decisions.
LPL is capable to express the legally required information that has
to be provided by privacy policies, detail de-identification methods
that protect the users personal data, and enable the user to personalize
his privacy settings. But the challenge remains that the information
provided by LPL privacy policies has to be refined and displayed such
that users are informed about the processing of their personal data
and enabled to personalize their privacy settings. This challenge can
be tackled by providing users with suitable user interfaces. Within this
thesis, proof-of-concept user interfaces for creation, presentation and
negotiation of LPL privacy policies are presented, but they are neither
finalized nor extensively evaluated. Therefore, extensive research has
to be conducted to determine suitable user-friendly interfaces that in-
form the users comprehensibly about the contents of privacy policies,
but should also provide detailed information on the processing of per-
sonal data if requested. The usage of standardized Privacy Icons is an
interesting approach, but the creation, evaluation and standardization
of Privacy Icons is a challenge by itself.
To enable user-friendly personalization of privacy policies is another
challenge. First, the default settings should be privacy-friendly by
default (Privacy by Default principle). Furthermore, the user has to be
informed about the future impact of his decision, both considering the
possible restriction of features of the service and possible risks where
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the personal data are processed. For example, the user may decide
about providing his current location to an online map service. If the
user decided against the provision of his current location to the service,
then he is not able to access features that provide him nearby points-of-
interest (POIs). If the user decides that his current location is provided
to the service, then he is able to use the features, but his location will
be used to provide him personalized advertising. Therefore, the user
is provided with all information to give an informed decision about
the processing of his current location.
Although the user may be provided with all required information,
he may be overwhelmed by the number of decisions that have to be
taken, especially if this process has to be repeated for each service.
Therefore, tools for supporting the decision-making for the person-
alization of privacy policy settings, based on the users preferences
are subject to future research. Hereby, the user should be able to ex-
press preferences on the usage of his personal data, e.g., personal
data should never be published, which are then matched against the
services’ privacy policy. The usage of privacy languages for expressing
privacy policies, i.e. LPL, and privacy preferences seems advantageous,
because the machine-readable formats can be automatically matched
to determine if the privacy policy complies with the users’ preferences.
Furthermore, personal privacy settings may be altered on-demand to
comply to the privacy preferences of the user. Therefore, a suitable
privacy language for expressing users’ privacy preferences is subject
to future work.
In summary, the user has to be informed about the processing of
his personal data and enabled to personalize his privacy settings for
which LPL can be used as a basis. But the transparent presentation and
negotiation of the privacy policy requires the research of suitable user
interfaces. Furthermore, the creation of a privacy language modelling
users’ privacy preferences, which are matched against LPL privacy
policies is subject to future work.
Part I
A P P E N D I X

A
P O L I C Y- B A S E D D E - I D E N T I F I C AT I O N – A R X
A L G O R I T H M S
For the implementation of the Policy-based De-identification (PD) the
ARX framework is used. ARX allows the anonymization of sensitive
personal data supporting privacy models and algorithms for risk and
utility measurements [223] [159].
For the implementation of the PD process, additional algorithms
– Data-set Transformation and Anonymization Hierarchy Transformation –
are required, which are highlighted in the following for completeness.
The algorithms Data-set Transformation and Set Maximum Anonymiza-
tion are run before Anonymization Hierarchy Transformation, Set Privacy
Group, Privacy Model Substitution, and Apply Privacy Models (see Figure
A.1).
Figure A.1: Policy-based De-identification (PD) process step sequence with the
ARX specific processes after the Policy-based Access Control (PAC)
has been completed for a request.
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a.1 data-set transformation
Personal data and corresponding authorized purpose are encapsulated
within the DataWrapper-object dw, whereas a data-set is represented
by a set of dw objects. To enable the compatibility with ARX, each
DataWrapper-object has to be transformed into a two-dimensional
array (see Listing A.1). The first dimension represents the record and
the second dimension represents the attributes of the record. This
ARX specific process introduces some processing overhead to the PD
process, but is excluded from the final measurements for the evaluation
in Chapter 7. Next, another ARX specific process is detailed which
aims at preparing the anonymization hierarchies to be processed.
method: dataTransformation
in: DW //DataWrapper list containing all records with corresponding purpose
4 out: dataArray //transformed data-set that can be processed by ARX
dataArray[][] //two-dimensional array
k = 0; //record counter
9 for (dw : DW) //iterate records
for (l = 0; l < dataArray[0].length; l++) //iterate attributes
//store value of attribute in dataArray
dataArray[k + 1][l] = dw.dataList(dataArray[0][l]);
14
k++;
return dataArray;
Listing A.1: Pseudocode for the Data-set Transformation.
a.2 anonymization hierarchy transformation
The Anonymization Hierarchy Transformation is also an ARX specific
process like the Data-set Transformation. Although, the anonymization
hierarchies ĤE already contain complete anonymization hierarchies
for each attribute, specific requirements have to be met to be pro-
cessed by ARX. First, it is verified if the first value (anonymization
level ′0 ′) of the anonymization hierarchy matches the value that has
to be anonymized. Next, the sizes of all anonymization hierarchies for
an attribute have to be equal. These properties are verified again to
guarantee a correct format of the anonymization hierarchies, although
they may have already been fulfilled by the Personal Privacy Anonymi-
zation iff personal privacy requirements have been given by the users.
Lastly, ARX requires the removal of duplicate hierarchies.
These properties are enforced by the Anonymization Hierarchy Trans-
formation (see Listing A.2).
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For each record, the anonymization hierarchy for each attribute is
extracted and stored as an array. If the first entry of the array does not
match the hierarchyBase (the first element of the hierarchy), it is added
and the whole hierarchy is transformed into an array suitable for ARX.
This array is then adjusted in length, if necessary, so that all hierarchies
for the same attribute have the same length. If a hierarchy is too short,
the last entry is copied and appended. The last entry is chosen because
it is the most anonymous value of the hierarchy. This guarantees a
fixed hierarchy length for the same attribute and causes no loss of
privacy or utility. Thus, the anonymization hierarchies are transformed
into a suitable format for ARX and are added to its configuration of
the privacy model.
method: anonymizationHierarchyTransformation
3 in: DW //DataWrapper list containing all records with corresponding purpose
out: HEList //well-formed set of HE
HEList; //arrayList with all anonymization hierarchies
heBases; //arrayList with all first elements of the hierarchies
8
// get all hierarchies out of the wrappers
for (dw : DW)
for (i = 0; i < sizeOf(dw.p.D̂; i++)
//transform ĤE set to array
13 hierarchyArray = dw.p.D̂(i).am.ĤE;
//prevent duplicate hierarchies
if (not heBases(i).contains(hierarchyArray[0]))
//add hierachyArray to HEList
18 HEList(i).add(hierarchyArray);
//add first element of hierarchyArray to heBases
heBases(i).add(hierarchyArray[0]);
// for each HE in HEList unify hierarchy size
23 for (ĤE : HEList)
adjustHierarchySize(ĤE, HEList);
return HEList;
Listing A.2: Pseudocode for the Anonymization Hiearchy Transformation.
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